Introduction

Once a new IGO is established, it may develop in ways unintended or unanticipated by its state founders. Through the interplay of crisis decision-making, institutional constraints, and the individuals involved, new precedents emerge which build the foundations for the organization’s later operations. As the previous chapter argued, when the UN started operations in 1946 the general expectation among member states was that the UN secretary-general would play some sort of ‘political’ role; however, the precise implications of this were never discussed or spelled out in detail. Article 99 gave the secretary-general the unprecedented right to ‘bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security’. But what exactly did this article entail? What would be the relationship between the secretary-general and the Security Council, and what rights and responsibilities did the secretary-general have in the UN’s efforts to maintain international peace and security? The UN founders had left these questions unanswered, but they quickly gained importance as the UN organization faced its first crises in Iran and elsewhere in 1946.

The lack of clarity and agreement on the practical implications of article 99 and the precise nature of the role of the UN secretary-general, meant that the first holder of the office, Trygve Lie, enjoyed considerable autonomy to explore his new position. From the start, Lie was determined to ensure that the UN, and the office of the secretary-general, should serve as ‘a force for peace’ in the world. To this end he sought to clarify the rights and responsibilities of the secretary-general, and to seek the support of the member states for a range of new activities beyond those the League of Nations secretary-general had pursued.