Book contents
- International Economic Dispute Settlement
- International Economic Dispute Settlement
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Contracting v. Multilateralism in Global Economic Governance
- Part I Current Challenges in International Trade Dispute Settlement
- Part II Current Challenges in International Investment Dispute Settlement
- Part III New Issue Areas and Dispute Settlement
- Part IV Regional Approaches for International Economic Dispute Settlement
- Index
- References
2 - Contracting v. Multilateralism in Global Economic Governance
Before, During and After the WTO
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 August 2021
Book contents
- International Economic Dispute Settlement
- International Economic Dispute Settlement
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Contracting v. Multilateralism in Global Economic Governance
- Part I Current Challenges in International Trade Dispute Settlement
- Part II Current Challenges in International Investment Dispute Settlement
- Part III New Issue Areas and Dispute Settlement
- Part IV Regional Approaches for International Economic Dispute Settlement
- Index
- References
Summary
This chapter considers three legal ideal types for international economic governance, each with its own dispute resolution approach. The private contract mode of transnational economic governance lets businesses create mutual agreements (contracts), so long as these agreements adhere to basic contractual confines. For transnational business, the private contract model is generally coupled with a form of dispute resolution where the parties choose their dispute settlement preference: mediation, good offices, arbitration or adjudication in a designated adjudicatory system. In essence, business chooses its rules and the judge of those rules, albeit within certain confines. The private contract model is the most decentralized mode of transnational economic governance, and it exists only so far as governments choose to let businesses define the contractual terms for trade and the resolution of disputes.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- International Economic Dispute SettlementDemise or Transformation?, pp. 15 - 44Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021
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