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Mind and Supermind
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  • Cited by 36
  • Cited by
    This book has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Gao, Jie 2016. Rational action without knowledge (and vice versa). Synthese,


    Noggle, Robert 2016. Belief, quasi-belief, and obsessive-compulsive disorder. Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 29, Issue. 5, p. 654.


    Sridharan, Vishnu 2016. From conscious experience to a conscious self. Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 29, Issue. 3, p. 419.


    Dub, Richard 2015. Delusions, Acceptances, and Cognitive Feelings. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, p. n/a.


    Ramsey, William 2015. Must cognition be representational?. Synthese,


    Sridharan, Vishnu 2015. Conscious belief as constructed memory: an empirical challenge to dispositionalism. Mind & Society, Vol. 14, Issue. 1, p. 21.


    Arcangeli, Margherita 2014. Against Cognitivism About Supposition. Philosophia, Vol. 42, Issue. 3, p. 607.


    Carruthers, Peter 2014. On central cognition. Philosophical Studies, Vol. 170, Issue. 1, p. 143.


    Langland-Hassan, Peter 2014. Inner Speech and Metacognition: In Search of a Connection. Mind & Language, Vol. 29, Issue. 5, p. 511.


    Mandelbaum, Eric 2014. Thinking is Believing. Inquiry, Vol. 57, Issue. 1, p. 55.


    Ross, Jacob and Schroeder, Mark 2014. Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 88, Issue. 2, p. 259.


    Carruthers, Peter 2013. Mindreading in Infancy. Mind & Language, Vol. 28, Issue. 2, p. 141.


    Shepherd, Joshua 2013. The apparent illusion of conscious deciding. Philosophical Explorations, Vol. 16, Issue. 1, p. 18.


    Staffel, Julia 2013. Can there be reasoning with degrees of belief?. Synthese, Vol. 190, Issue. 16, p. 3535.


    Engel, Pascal 2012. Trust and the doxastic family. Philosophical Studies, Vol. 161, Issue. 1, p. 17.


    Frankish, Keith 2012. Dual systems and dual attitudes. Mind & Society, Vol. 11, Issue. 1, p. 41.


    Frankish, Keith 2012. Delusions, Levels of Belief, and Non-doxastic Acceptances. Neuroethics, Vol. 5, Issue. 1, p. 23.


    Gomila, Antoni Travieso, David and Lobo, Lorena 2012. Wherein is Human Cognition Systematic?. Minds and Machines, Vol. 22, Issue. 2, p. 101.


    LEMAIRE, Stéphane 2012. A Gate-Based Account of Intentions. Dialectica, Vol. 66, Issue. 1, p. 45.


    Marraffa, Massimo 2012. Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives. Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 25, Issue. 4, p. 617.


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    Mind and Supermind
    • Online ISBN: 9780511487507
    • Book DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511487507
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Book description

Mind and Supermind offers an alternative perspective on the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. Keith Frankish argues that the folk-psychological term 'belief' refers to two distinct types of mental state, which have different properties and support different kinds of mental explanation. Building on this claim, he develops a picture of the human mind as a two-level structure, consisting of a basic mind and a supermind, and shows how the resulting account sheds light on a number of puzzling phenomena and helps to vindicate folk psychology. Topics discussed include the function of conscious thought, the cognitive role of natural language, the relation between partial and flat-out belief, the possibility of active belief formation, and the nature of akrasia, self-deception and first-person authority. This book will be valuable for philosophers, psychologists and cognitive scientists.

Reviews

‘This is an important contribution to our understanding of mind and of the nature of belief. Frankish explores, with care and imagination, the subtle ways in which science and our ‘folk’ image converge and diverge. Folk psychology, according to Frankish, has two distinct theoretical cores. Failure to make this distinction leads to confusion and cross talk. In this well-paced and readable treatment, Frankish offers a clear, constructive and original angle on some of the most persistent and perplexing problems in the field. Recommended reading for anyone interested in the philosophy and science of mind and belief.’

Andy Clark - Indiana University

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