Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables
- List of Figures
- Acknowledgments
- Part I The Puzzle of Electoral Clientelism
- Part II Empirical Evidence
- Appendices
- A Survey List Experiment Details
- B Variables from the Afrobarometer Survey Data
- C Field Experiment Radio Recording Script
- D Description of Control Variables in the Field Experiment
- E The Sample and Balance in the Field Experiments
- F Supplementary Results for Chapter 5
- G Supplementary Results for Chapter 7
- Bibliography
- Index
E The Sample and Balance in the Field Experiments
from Appendices
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 October 2017
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables
- List of Figures
- Acknowledgments
- Part I The Puzzle of Electoral Clientelism
- Part II Empirical Evidence
- Appendices
- A Survey List Experiment Details
- B Variables from the Afrobarometer Survey Data
- C Field Experiment Radio Recording Script
- D Description of Control Variables in the Field Experiment
- E The Sample and Balance in the Field Experiments
- F Supplementary Results for Chapter 5
- G Supplementary Results for Chapter 7
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
E.0.1 Experiment 1
This section provides evidence about the sample analyzed in Experiment 1 (presented in Chapter 5). To draw the sample, I first identified sampling sites by mapping the sampling locations of the nationally representative Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). I then selected sites within Nairobi and the surrounding area to maximize diversity in the types of locations sampled for the experiment. At each sampling site, participants were sampled using a random walk, a common approach to sampling in areas where the entire sample space cannot be enumerated.
Experiments are useful because, with randomization and a sufficiently large sample, treatment and control groups should “look the same.” It is this similarity that permits us to infer the causal influence of the treatment—in this case, the impact of the information about electoral handouts on electoral support and perceptions of political candidates. Table E.1 presents descriptive information and evidence of this covariate balance in treatment and control groups in Experiment 1. In the section above, I provide details about how each of these variableswas constructed. About 30 percent of those in both the treatment and control group report receiving an electoral handout ahead of the 2007 election. This is comparable to estimates from the nationally representative Afrobarometer survey. The table further shows that treatment and control groups are comparable on a number of covariates. There is slight imbalance is with respect to education, age, partisanship. More participants in the control group have some secondary education, more treatment group participants are aged 31–35, and the treatment group has more ODM supporters. I therefore augment the main analyses with regression analyses that include control variables.
E.0.2 Experiment 2
Table E.2 presents descriptive information about the sample for Experiment 2 (analyzed in Chapter 3). It also provides evidence of covariate balance in treatment and control groups. Participants in treatment and control groups are comparable with respect to their past experience with electoral clientelism, perceptions of ballot secrecy, partisan attachments, gender, age, income, and education. They are also comparable on a number of attitudinal measures, including attitudes about reciprocity, government redistribution, and Kenyans from other regions and ethnic groups. The previous section describes how the variables were constructed.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Money for VotesThe Causes and Consequences of Electoral Clientelism in Africa, pp. 202 - 206Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2017