Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- List of Maps
- Acknowledgements
- Glossary of terms
- Tables of military ranks and army structures
- Introduction
- Part I Strategic plans and theoretical conceptions for war against the Soviet Union
- Part II The military campaign and the July/August crisis of 1941
- 5 Awakening the bear
- 6 The perilous advance to the east
- 7 The battle of Smolensk
- 8 The attrition of Army Group Centre
- 9 In search of resurgence
- 10 Showdown
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
8 - The attrition of Army Group Centre
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 April 2013
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- List of Maps
- Acknowledgements
- Glossary of terms
- Tables of military ranks and army structures
- Introduction
- Part I Strategic plans and theoretical conceptions for war against the Soviet Union
- Part II The military campaign and the July/August crisis of 1941
- 5 Awakening the bear
- 6 The perilous advance to the east
- 7 The battle of Smolensk
- 8 The attrition of Army Group Centre
- 9 In search of resurgence
- 10 Showdown
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
Summary
The killing fields at Yel'nya
The arduous exertion of the long thrust into the Soviet Union, followed by the savage ongoing battles around Smolensk, Yel'nya and along the flanks of the army group, necessitated a period of rest and refitting for Guderian's and Hoth's armoured groups. On 23 July this was optimistically assessed to require only ten days in order for the panzer divisions to return to about 60–70 per cent of their former strength. Yet to reach this lofty goal it was acknowledged that ‘panzer replacements from Germany will arrive too late’ for the renewed offensive operations. Halder's information indicated that the goal could not be achieved by merely repairing mechanical faults and battle damage to the existing pool of tanks in the panzer divisions. It was therefore suggested that one panzer division in each panzer group (Halder's notes recommended 17th and 20th Panzer Divisions) be broken up and used to reinforce the other divisions. Thus, in order to avoid ‘very quickly sinking to an unbearably small panzer strength’ in the armoured divisions, the rehabilitation process would have to include disbanding divisions, as well as undertaking a great many repairs to the existing quantity of tanks. Here the time factor also constituted a serious problem, not only in carrying out the repairs, but first receiving all the required spare parts, especially tank engines, via the dismal logistical system.
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- Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East , pp. 306 - 360Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009