Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures
- Preface
- 1 Preferences, Comparative Evaluations, and Reasons
- Part I Preferences in Positive Economics
- Part II Preferences, Welfare, and Normative Economics
- 7 Preference Satisfaction and Welfare
- 8 Preferences in Welfare Economics
- Part III Psychology, Rational Evaluation, and Preference Formation
- References
- Index
8 - Preferences in Welfare Economics
from Part II - Preferences, Welfare, and Normative Economics
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures
- Preface
- 1 Preferences, Comparative Evaluations, and Reasons
- Part I Preferences in Positive Economics
- Part II Preferences, Welfare, and Normative Economics
- 7 Preference Satisfaction and Welfare
- 8 Preferences in Welfare Economics
- Part III Psychology, Rational Evaluation, and Preference Formation
- References
- Index
Summary
Chapter 7 showed that satisfying preferences does not by itself contribute to welfare. Preference satisfaction theories of welfare are untenable. This conclusion puts normative economists in an awkward position because it seems that their work rests on an untenable theory of welfare.
This chapter argues that welfare economics does not rely on a mistaken theory of welfare. It argues that welfare economics presupposes no theory of welfare at all. Rather than constituting well-being, preference satisfaction can serve as evidence of well-being, regardless of what theory of welfare one accepts. In defending this apparently paradoxical thesis, this chapter offers guidelines concerning when the tools of standard normative economics can be used justifiably to address specific problems.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare , pp. 88 - 104Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2011