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  • Cited by 7
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    This (lowercase (translateProductType product.productType)) has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Chappell, Timothy 2013. Glory in Sport (and Elsewhere). Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, Vol. 73, p. 99.


    Ellis, Fiona 2011. Desire, Infinity, and the Meaning of Life. Philosophy, Vol. 86, Issue. 04, p. 483.


    MAY, JOSHUA 2011. EGOISM, EMPATHY, AND SELF-OTHER MERGING. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 49, p. 25.


    Chappell, Timothy 2011. Glory as an Ethical Idea. Philosophical Investigations, Vol. 34, Issue. 2, p. 105.


    TONER, CHRISTOPHER 2008. SORTS OF NATURALISM: REQUIREMENTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL THEORY. Metaphilosophy, Vol. 39, Issue. 2, p. 220.


    Warren, James 2001. Epicurus' dying wishes. Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society, Vol. 47, p. 23.


    Duff, Antony 1980. Desire, Duty and Moral Absolutes. Philosophy, Vol. 55, Issue. 212, p. 223.


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  • Print publication year: 1973
  • Online publication date: December 2009

15 - Egoism and altruism

Summary

I shall be concerned with issues of egoism as against morality, and with the question whether there are any rational considerations by which an egoist who is resistant to moral claims could, under the unlikely assumption that he was prepared to listen, be persuaded to be less resistant to them. The discussion is all about antagonism between egoism and morality, and does not say anything, or imply much, about the proper place of egoistic concerns within morality. That is in many ways a more important subject, but I find it necessary to get clear about this one first.

I have placed the issue in terms of ‘morality’, but the title refers to altruism. I take altruism, in the sense I intend, to be a necessary feature of a morality. It follows that a principle to the effect that everyone ought exclusively to pursue his own interests – the principle of what is rather quaintly called ‘ethical egoism’ – would not constitute a morality or be a moral principle. There perhaps could be such a principle, and I shall refer to it occasionally, but it will, in my use of the terms, stand in contrast to morality. That remark is not meant to be much more than an announcement of terminology, and is not intended to be worth arguing about. However, I think there is a point in using the terminology in this way: it helps to emphasise what I take to be one basic and universal function of morality.

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Problems of the Self
  • Online ISBN: 9780511621253
  • Book DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511621253
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