Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Chapter 1 Prologue
- Chapter 2 Rational choice and revealed preference
- Chapter 3 Arrovian impossibility theorems
- Chapter 4 Simple majority rule and extensions
- Chapter 5 The fairness-as-no-envy approach in social choice theory
- Chapter 6 Impartiality and extended sympathy
- Chapter 7 Individual rights and libertarian claims
- Chapter 8 Epilogue
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Chapter 5 - The fairness-as-no-envy approach in social choice theory
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 October 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Chapter 1 Prologue
- Chapter 2 Rational choice and revealed preference
- Chapter 3 Arrovian impossibility theorems
- Chapter 4 Simple majority rule and extensions
- Chapter 5 The fairness-as-no-envy approach in social choice theory
- Chapter 6 Impartiality and extended sympathy
- Chapter 7 Individual rights and libertarian claims
- Chapter 8 Epilogue
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
There is something extraordinary, and seemingly unaccountable in the operation of our passions, when we consider the fortune and situation of others. Very often another's advancement and prosperity produces envy, which has a strong mixture of hatred, and arises chiefly from the comparison of ourselves with the person. At the very same time, or at least in very short intervals, we may feel the passion of respect, which is a species of affection or good-will, with a mixture of humility. On the other hand, the misfortunes of our fellows often causes pity, which has in it a strong mixture of good-will. This sentiment of pity is nearly allied to contempt, which is a species of dislike, with a mixture of pride. I only point out these phenomena, as a subject of speculation to such as are curious with regard to moral enquiries.
David HumeIntroduction
Consider the problem of dividing a cake among three individuals once again. Reliance on the Pareto efficiency criterion in finding an appropriate division will be of no help, because all divisions that leave nothing to be wasted will be Pareto-efficient. If we take recourse to the simple majority decision rule, our choice will be narrowed down, but the outcome thereby arrived at may well be strongly unappealing, as we have illustrated by Example 4.5. Invoking the no-envy concept of equity, we can also narrow down the range of eligible divisions.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Rational Choice, Collective Decisions, and Social Welfare , pp. 126 - 152Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1983