Skip to main content Accessibility help
The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure
  • Cited by 181
  • Export citation
  • Recommend to librarian
  • Buy the print book

Book description

Brian Skyrms, author of the successful Evolution of the Social Contract (which won the prestigious Lakatos Award) has written a sequel. The book is a study of ideas of cooperation and collective action. The point of departure is a prototypical story found in Rousseau's A Discourse on Inequality. Rousseau contrasts the pay-off of hunting hare where the risk of non-cooperation is small but the reward is equally small, against the pay-off of hunting the stag where maximum cooperation is required but where the reward is so much greater. Thus, rational agents are pulled in one direction by considerations of risk and in another by considerations of mutual benefit. Written with Skyrms's characteristic clarity and verve, this intriguing book will be eagerly sought out by students and professionals in philosophy, political science, economics, sociology and evolutionary biology.


‘… dense but exciting … comprehensive and ambitious in scope … a treasure trove of interesting and intriguing results.‘

Source: The Times Literary Supplement

'The book is a treasure trove of interesting and intriguing results…'.

Source: The Times Literary Supplement

‘I can unreservedly recommend this delightful book. It is an absolute pleasure to read and a more stimulating introductory text on evolutionary thinking of social institutions is hard to image … Brain Skyrms has done us a great service, and I am looking forward to his next book.’

Source: Studia Logica

Refine List

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.


Alexander, J. M. (2000) “Evolutionary Explanations of Distributive Justice.” Philosophy of Science 67: 490–516
Alexander, J. M., and Skyrms, B. (1999) “Bargaining with Neighbors: Is Justice Contagious?Journal of Philosophy 96: 588–598
Anderlini, L., and Ianni, A. (1996) “Path Dependence and Learning from Neighbors.” Games and Economic Behavior 13: 141–178
Anderlini, L., and Ianni, A. (1997) “Learning on a Torus.” In The Dynamics of Norms. Ed. C. Bicchieri, R. Jeffrey, and B. Skyrms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 87–107
Aristotle. (2000) Politics. Tr. Benjamin Jowett. New York: Dover
Arthur, W. B., Durlauf, S. N., and Lane, D. A. (1997) The Economy as an Evolving Complex System II. Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley
Aumann, R. J. (1990) “Nash Equilibria Are Not Self-Enforcing.” In Economic Decision Making, Games, Econometrics and Optimization. Ed. J. J. Gabzewicz, J.-F. Richard, and L. A. Wolsey. North Holland: Amsterdam, 201–206
Aumann, R. J., and Myerson, R. (1988) “Endogenous Formation of Links Between Players and Coalitions: An Application of the Shapley Value.” In The Shapley Value. Ed. A. Roth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 175–191
Axelrod, R. (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books
Axelrod, R. (1997) The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition and Collaboration. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press
Axelrod, R., and Hamilton, W. D. (1981) “The Evolution of Cooperation.” Science 211: 1390–1396
Axtell, R. L., Epstein, J. M., and Young, H. P. (2001) “The Emergence of Classes in a Multi-Agent Bargaining Model.” In Social Dynamics. Ed. S. Darlauf and H. P. Young. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 191–211
Bala, V., and Goyal, S. (1998) “Learning from Neighbors.” Review of Economic Studies 65: 595–621
Bala, V., and Goyal, S. (2000) “A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation.” Econometrica 68: 1181–1231
Banerjee, A., and Weibull, J. (2000) “Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap-Talk Coordination Games.” Games and Economic Behavior 32: 1–24
Battalio, R., Samuelson, L., and Huyck, J. (2001) “Optimization Incentives and Coordination Failure in Laboratory Stag Hunt Games.” Econometrica 61: 989–1018
Bereby-Meyer, Y., and Erev, I. (1998) “On Learning to Become a Successful Loser: A Comparison of Alternative Abstractions of the Learning Process in the Loss Domain.” Journal of Mathematical Psychology 42: 266–286
Bergstrom, T. (2002) “Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection Models.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 16: 231–238
Bergstrom, T., and Stark, O. (1993) “How Altruism Can Prevail in an Evolutionary Environment.” American Economic Review 85: 149–155
Bhaskar, V. (1998) “Noisy Communication and the Evolution of Cooperation.” Journal of Economic Theory 82: 110–131
Bhaskar, V., and Vega-Redondo, F. (forthcoming) “Migration and the Evolution of Conventions.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Binmore, K. (1993) Playing Fair: Game Theory and the Social Contract I. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
Binmore, K. (1998) Just Playing: Game Theory and the Social Contract II. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
Binmore, K., and Samuelson, L. (1997) “Muddling Through: Noisy Equilibrium Selection.” Journal of Economic Theory 64: 235–265
Binmore, K., Samuelson, L., and Vaughan, R. (1995) “Musical Chairs: Modeling Noisy Evolution.” Games and Economic Behavior 11: 1–35
Bjornerstedt, J., and Weibull, J. (1996) “Nash Equilibrium and Evolution by Imitation.” In The Rational Foundations of Economic Behavior. Ed. K. Arrow et al. New York: Macmillan, 155–171
Blume, L. E. (1993) “The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction.” Games and Economic Behavior 4: 387–424
Blume, L. E. (1995) “The Statistical Mechanics of Best-Response Strategy Revision.” Games and Economic Behavior 11: 111–145
Blume, A., DeJong, D. V., Kim, Y.-G., and Sprinkle, G. B. (1998) “Experimental Evidence on the Evolution of Messages in Sender-Receiver Games.” American Economic Review 88: 1323–1340
Blume, A., DeJong, D. V., Kim, Y.-G., and Sprinkle, G. B. (2001) “Evolution of Communication with Partial Common Interest.” Games and Economic Behavior 37: 79–120
Blume, A., Kim, Y-G., and Sobel, J. (1993) “Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication.” Games and Economic Behavior 5: 547–575
Borgers, T., and Sarin, R. (1997) “Learning Through Reinforcement and the Replicator Dynamics.” Journal of Economic Theory 77: 1–14
Borgers, T., and Sarin, R. (2000) “Naive Reinforcement Learning with Endogenous Aspirations.” International Economic Review 41: 921–950
Bryant, J. (1994) “Coordination Theory, The Stag Hunt, and Macro-economics.” In Problems of Coordination in Economic Activity. Ed. James W. Friedman. Boston: Kluwer, 207–226
Busemeyer, J. R., and Stout, J. C. (2002) “A Contribution of Cognitive Decision Models to Clinical Assessment: Decomposing Performance on the Bechara Gambling Task.” Psychological Assessment 14: 253–262
Bush, R. R., and Mosteller, F. (1951) “A Mathematical Model of Simple Learning.” Psychological Review 58: 313–323
Bush, R. R., and Mosteller, F. (1955) Stochastic Models of Learning. New York: Wiley
Catania, A. C. (1999) “Thorndike's Legacy: Learning, Selection and the Law of Effect.” Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior 72: 425–428
Chao, L., and Levin, B. (1981) “Structured Habitats and the Evolution of Anticompetitor Toxins in Bacteria.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA 78: 6324–6328
Charness, G. (2000) “Self-Serving Cheap Talk: A Test of Aumann's Conjecture.” Games and Economic Behavior 33: 177–194
Cheney, D., and Seyfarth, R. M. (1990) How Monkeys See the World: Inside the Mind of Another Species. Chicago: University of Chicago; Press
Chwe, M. (2000) “Communication and Coordination in Social Networks.” Review of Economic Studies 67: 1–16
Clark, K., Kay, S., and Sefton, M. (2000) “When Are Nash Equilibria Self-Enforcing? An Experimental Analysis.” International Journal of Game Theory 29: 495–515
Cooper, R., DeJong, D., Forsythe, R., and Ross, T. W. (1992) “Communication in Coordination Games.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 107: 739–771
Costerton, J. W., Stewart, P. S., and Greenberg, E. P. (1999) “Bacterial Biofilms: A Common Cause of Persistent Infections.” Science 284: 1318–1322
Crawford, V. (1998) “A Survey on Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk.” Journal of Economic Theory 78: 286– 298
Crawford, V., and Sobel, J. (1982) “Strategic Information Transmission.” Econometrica 50: 1431–1451
Crespi, B. J. (2001) “The Evolution of Social Behavior in Microorganisms.” Trends in Ecology and Evolution 16: 178–183
Crespi, B., and Springer, S. (2003) “Social Slime Molds Meet Their Match.” Science 299: 56–57
Danielson, P. (1992) Artificial Morality. London: Routledge
Danielson, P. (2002) “Competition Among Cooperators: Altruism and Reciprocity.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 99 (supplement 3): 7237–7242
Darwin, C. (1882) The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex. 2d. ed. New York: D. Appleton
Davis, B. (1990) “Reinforced Random Walk.” Probability Theory and Related Fields 84: 203–229
Davis, B. (1999) “Reinforced and Perturbed Random Walks.” In Random Walks (Bolyai Society of Mathematical Studies 9). Ed. Pál Révést and Bálint Tóth. Budapest: János Bolyai Mathematical Society, 113–126
De Finetti. B. (1975) Theory of Probability. Vol. 2. Trans. A. Machi and A. Smith. New York: John Wiley
De Waal, Frans. (1998) Chimpanzee Politics: Sex and Power Among the Apes. 2d. ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press
Diaconis. P. (1988) “Recent Progress in DeFinetti's Notion of Exchangeability.” In Bayesian Statistics. Ed J. Bernardo, M. DeGroot, D. Lindley, and A. Smith. New York: Oxford University Press, 111–125
Dieckmann, T. (1999) “The Evolution of Conventions with Mobile Players.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 38: 93–111
Dunlap, P. V. (2000) “Quorum Regulation of Luminescence in Vibrio Fischeri.” In Molecular Marine Biology. Ed. D. H. Bartlett. Norfolk, U.K.: Horizon Scientific Press, 3–21
Durlauf, S. (1996) “A Theory of Persistant Income Inequality.” Journal of Economic Growth 1: 75–93
Durlauf, S., and Young, H. P., eds. (2001) Social Dynamics. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
Durrett, R., and Levin, S. (1994) “The Importance of Being Discrete (and Spatial).” Theoretical Population Biology 46: 363–394
Durrett, R., and Levin, S. (1997) “Allelopathy in Spatially Distributed Populations.” Journal of Theoretical Biology 185: 165–171
Ellison, G. (1993) “Learning, Local Interaction and Coordination.” Econometrica 61: 1047–1071
Ellison, G. (2000) “Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution.” Review of Economic Studies 67: 17–45
Ely, J. 2002 “Local Conventions.” Advances in Theoretical Economics. Vol. 2n. l, Article l.
England, R. R., Hobbs, G., Bainton, N. J., and Roberts, D. McL. (1999) Microbial Signalling and Communication. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Epstein, J. M. (1998) “Zones of Cooperation in Demographic Prisoner's Dilemma.” Complexity 4: 36–48
Epstein, J., and Axtell, R. (1996) Growing Artificial Societies: Social Science from the Bottom Up. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
Erev, I., Bereby-Meyer, Y., and Roth, A. (1999) “The Effect of Adding a Constant to All Payoffs: Experimental Investigation and Implications for Reinforcement Learning.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 39: 111–128
Erev, I., and Roth, A. E. (1998) “Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique Mixed Strategy Equilibria.” American Economic Review 88: 848–881
Eshel, I., Samuelson, L., and Shaked, A. (1998) “Altruists, Egoists and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model.” American Economic Review 88: 157–179
Eshel, I., Sansone, E., and Shaked, A. (1996) “Evolutionary Dynamics of Populations with a Local Interaction Structure.” ELSE Working Papers n. 25, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution, University College, London
Estes, W. K. (1950) “Toward a Statistical Theory of Learning.” Psychological Review 57: 94–107
Evans, C. S., Evans, C. L., and Marler, P. (1994) “On the Meaning of Alarm Calls: Functional Reference in an Avian Vocal System.” Animal Behavior 73: 23–38
Farrell, J., and Rabin, M. (1996) “Cheap Talk.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 10: 103–118
Foster, D. P., and Young, H. P. (1990) “Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics.” Theoretical Population Biology 28: 219–232
Frank, S. (1994) “Spatial Polymorphism of Bacteriocins and other Allelopathic Traits.” Evolutionary Ecology 8: 369–386
Fudenberg, D., and Levine, D. K. (1998) A Theory of Learning in Games. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
Goyal, S., and Vega-Redondo, F. (2001) “Network Formation and Social Coordination.” Working Paper WP 481, Queen Mary College, University of London, Department of Economics
Grafen, A. (1990) “Biological Signals as Handicaps.” Journal of Theoretical Biology 144: 517–546
Grim, P. (1995) “The Greater Generosity of the Spatialized Prisoner's Dilemma.” Journal of Theoretical Biology 173: 353–359
Grim, P., Mar, G., and St. Denis, P. (1998) The Philosophical Computer: Exploratory Essays in Philosophical Computer Modeling. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
Hamilton, W. (1964) “The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior I and II.” Journal of Theoretical Biology 7: 1–52
Hamilton, W. (1996) Narrow Roads of Geneland. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman
Hampton, J. (1987) “Free-Rider Problems in the Production of Collective Goods.” Economics and Philosophy 3: 245–273
Hampton, J. (1997) Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition. New York: Cambridge University Press
Harley, C. B. (1981) “Learning the Evolutionarily Stable Strategy.” Journal of Theoretical Biology 89: 611–633
Harms, W. (1999) “Biological Altruism in Hostile EnvironmentsComplexity 5: 23–28
Harms, W. (2001) “Cooperative Boundary Populations: The Evolution of Cooperation on Mortality Risk Gradients.” Journal of Theoretical Biology 213: 299–313
Harsanyi, J., and Selten, R. (1988) A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games. Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press
Hauser, M. D. (1997) The Evolution of Communication. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
Hegselmann, R. (1996) “Social Dilemmas in Lineland and Flatland.” In Frontiers in Social Dilemmas Research. Ed. W. Liebrand and D. Messick. Berlin: Springer, 337–362
Herrnstein, R. J. (1970) “On the Law of Effect.” Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior 13: 243–266
Hobbes, T. (1668) Leviathan. Ed. and trans. E. Curley (1994). Indianapolis: Hackett
Hofbauer, J., and Sigmund, K. (1988) The Theory of Evolution and Dynamical Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Huberman, B., and Glance, N. (1993) “Evolutionary Games and Computer Simulations.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA 90: 7716–7718
Hume, D. (1739) A Treatise of Human Nature. Ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (1949). Oxford: Clarendon
Ioannides, Y. M. (1997) “Evolution of Trading Structures.” In The Economy as an Evolving Complex System II. Ed. W. B. Arthur, S. N. Durlauf, and D. A. Lane. Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley
Iwasa, Y., Nakamura, M., and Levin, S. (1998) “Allelopathy of Bacteria in a Lattice Population: Competition Between Colicin-Sensitive and Colicin-Producing Strains.” Evolutionary Ecology 12: 785–802
Jackson, M., and Watts, A. (2002a) “On the Formation of Interaction Networks in Social Coordination GamesGames and Economic Behavior 41: 265–291
Jackson, M., and Watts, A. (2002b) “The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks.” Journal of Economic Theory 106: 265– 295
Jervis, R. (1978) “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics 30: 167–214
Jiborn, M. (1999) Voluntary Coercion. Lund: Lund University
Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A. (1979) “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk.” Econometrica 47: 263–291
Kaiser, D. (1999) “Intercellular Signaling for Multicellular Morphogenesis.” In Microbial Signalling and Communication. Ed. R. R. England et al. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 140–160
Kalai, E., and Smordinski, M. (1975) “Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem.” Econometrica 43: 513–518
Kandori, M., Mailath, G., and Rob, R. (1993) “Learning, Mutation and Long-Run Equilibria in Games.” Econometrica 61: 29–56
Kavanaugh, M. (1980) “Invasion of the Forest by an African Savannah Monkey: Behavioral Adaptations.” Behavior 73: 238–260
Kim, Y-G., and Sobel, J. (1995) “An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-play Communication.” Econometrica 63: 1181–1193
Kirman, A. (1997) “The Economy as an Evolving Network.” Journal of Evolutionary Economics 7: 339–353
Kitcher, P. (1993) “The Evolution of Human Altruism.” Journal of Philosophy 90: 497–516
Kohler, T. A., and Gumerman, G. J. (2000) Dynamics in Human and Primate Societies. New York: Oxford University Press
Kropotkin, P. (1908) Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution. London: Heinemann. The chapters were originally published in Nineteenth Century: September and November 1890, April 1891, January 1892, August and September 1894, and January and June 1896
Kullback, S. (1959) Information Theory and Statistics. Wiley: New York
Kullback, S., and Leibler, R. A. (1951) “On Information and Sufficiency.” Annals of Mathematical Statistics 22: 79–86
Ledyard, J. O. (1995) “Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research.” In The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Ed. J. Kagel and A. Roth. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 111–194
Lewis, D. K. (1969) Convention: A Philosophical Study. Oxford: Blackwell
Lindgren, K., and Nordahl, M. (1994) “Evolutionary Dynamics in Spatial Games.” Physica D 75: 292–309
Lindley, D. (1956) “On a Measure of the Information Provided by an Experiment.” Annals of Mathematical Statistics 27: 986–1005
Luce, R. D. (1959) Individual Choice Behavior. New York: Wiley
Luce, R. D. (2000) Utility of Gains and Losses: Measurement-Theoretical and Experimental Approaches. Mahwah, N.J.: Erlbaum
Luce, R. D., and Raiffa, H. (1957) Games and Decisions. New York: Wiley
Macy, M. (1991) “Learning to Cooperate: Stochastic and Tacit Collusion in Social Exchange.” American Journal of Sociology 97: 808–843
Macy, M., and Flache, A. (2002) “Learning Dynamics in Social Dilemmas.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 99 (supplement 3): 7229–7236
Macy, M., and Sato, Y. (2002) “Trust, Cooperation and Market Formation in the U.S. and Japan.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 99 (supplement 3): 7214–7220
Mailath, G. J., Samuelson, L., and Shaked, A. (1997) “Correlated Equilibrium and Local Interactions.” Economic Theory 9: 551–556
Maynard, Smith J. (1964). “Group Selection and Kin Selection.” ;Nature 201: 1145–1146
Maynard, Smith J., and Parker, G. (1976) “The Logic of Asymmetric Contests.” Animal Behavior 24: 159–179
Maynard, Smith J., and Price, G. (1973) “The Logic of Animal Conflicts.” Nature 246: 15–18
Maynard Smith, J., and Szathmary, E. (1995) The Major Transitions in Evolution. New York: W. H. Freeman
Morris, S. (2000) “Contagion.” Review of Economic Studies 67: 57–78
My, K. B., Willinger, M., and Ziegelmeyer, A. (forthcoming) “Global Versus Local Interaction In Coordination Games: An Experimental InvestigationJournal of Evolutionary Economics
Nash, J. (1950) “The Bargaining Problem.” Econometrica 18: 155–162
Nowak, M. A., Bonhoeffer, S., and May, R. M. (1994) “Spatial Games and the Maintenance of Cooperation.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA 91: 4877–4881
Nowak, M. A., and May, R. M. (1992) “Evolutionary Games and Spatial Chaos.” Nature 359: 826–829
Nydegger, R. V., and Owen, G. (1974) “Two-Person Bargaining: An Experimental Test of the Nash Axioms.” International Journal of Game Theory 3: 239–250
Oechssler, J. (1997) “Decentralization and the Coordination Problem.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 32: 119–135
Othmer, H. G., and Stevens, A. (1997) “Aggregation, Blowup and Collapse: The ABC's of Taxis in Reinforced Random Walks.” SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics 57: 1044–1081
Pemantle, R. (1990) “Nonconvergence to Unstable Points in Urn Models and Stochastic Approximations.” Annals of Probability 18: 698–712
Pemantle R., and Skyrms, B. forthcoming a “Reinforcement Schemes May Take a Long Time to Exhibit Limiting Behavior.”
Pemantle R., and Skyrms B. forthcoming “Network Formation by Reinforcement Learning: The Long and the Medium Run.”
Pemantle, R., and Skyrms, B. (forthcoming c) “Time to Absorption in Discounted Reinforcement Models.” Stochastic Processes and Their Applications
Pollack, G. B. (1989) “Evolutionary Stability on a Viscous Lattice.” Social Networks 11: 175–212
Queller, D., Ponte, E., Bozzaro, S., and Strassman, J. (2003) “Single-Gene Greenbeard Effects in the Social Amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum.” Science 299: 105–106
Rankin, F. W., Huyck, J. B., and Battalio, R. (2000) “Strategic Similarity and Emergent Conventions: Evidence from Similar Stag Hunt Games.” Games and Economic Behavior 32: 315–337
Robson, A. J. (1990) “Efficiency in Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash and the Secret Handshake.” Journal of Theoretical Biology 144: 379–396
Robson, A. J., and Vega-Redondo, F. (1996) “Efficient Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Random Matching.” Journal of Economic Theory 70: 65–92
Roth, A. E., and Erev, I. (1995) “Learning in Extensive Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term.” Games and Economics Behavior 8: 164–212
Roth, A, E., and Malouf, M. (1979) “Game Theoretic Models and the Role of Information in Bargaining.” Psychological Review 86: 574–594
Rousseau, J. (1984) A Discourse on Inequality. Trans. M. Cranston. New York: Penguin Books
Ruby, E. G. (2000) “The Euprymna scolopes-Vibrio fischeri Symbiosis: A Biomedical Model for the Study of Bacterial Colonization of Animal Tissue.” In Molecular Marine Biology. Ed. Douglas H. Bartlett. Norfolk, U.K.: Horizon Scientific Press
Samuelson, L. (1997) Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
Schelling, T. (1960) The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
Schelling, T. (1971) “Dynamics Models of Segregation.” Journal of Mathematical Sociology 1: 143–186
Schelling, T. (1978) Micromotives and Macrobehavior. New York: Norton
Schlag, K. “Cheap Talk and Evolutionary Dynamics.” Working Paper, Bonn University, Department of Economics
Schlag, K. “When Does Evolution Lead to Efficiency in Communication Games?” Working Paper, Bonn University, Department of Economics
Schlag, K. (1996) “Why Imitate, and If So How? A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-Armed Bandits.” Journal of Economic Theory 78: 130–156
Schuster, P., and Sigmund, K. (1983) “Replicator Dynamics.” Journal of Theoretical Biology 100: 535–538
Sen, A. (1967) “Isolation, Assurance, and the Social Rate of Discount.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 81: 112–124
Shimkets, L. J. (1999) “Intercellular Signaling During Fruiting-Body Development of Myxococcus xanthus.” American Review of Microbiology 53: 525–49
Sigmund, K. (1993) Games of Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Skyrms, B. (1994) “Sex and Justice.” Journal of Philosophy 91: 305–20
Skyrms, B. (1996) Evolution of the Social Contract. New York: Cambridge University Press
Skyrms, B. (1998) “The Shadow of the Future.” In Rational Commitment and Social Justice: Essays for Gregory Kavka. Ed. J. Coleman and C. Morris. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 12–22
Skyrms, B. (1999) “Stability and Explanatory Significance of Some Simple Evolutionary Models.” Philosophy of Science 67: 94–113
Skyrms, B. (2000) “Evolution of Inference.” In Dynamics of Human and Primate Societies. Ed. T. Kohler and G. Gumerman. New York: Oxford University Press, 77–88
Skyrms, B. (2001) “The Stag Hunt.” Presidential Address of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association. In Proceedings and Addresses of the APA 75: 31–41
Skyrms, B. (2002) “Signals, Evolution and the Explanatory Power of Transient Information.” Philosophy of Science 69: 407–428
Skyrms, B., and Pemantle, R. (2000) “A Dynamic Model of Social Network Formation.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA 97: 9340–9346
Skyrms, B., and Vanderschraaf, P. (1997) “Game Theory.” In The Handbook of Practical Logic. Ed. Philippe Smets. Dordrecht: Kluwer
Slikker, M., and Nouweland, A. (2000) “Network Formation with Costs of Establishing Links.” Review of Economic Design 5: 333–362
Smith, A. (1761) “Considerations Concerning the First Formation of Languages.” Reprinted in Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. Ed. J. C. Bryce (1983). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 201–226
Sobel, J. (1993) “Evolutionary Stability and Efficiency.” Economic Letters 42: 301–312
Sober, E., and Wilson, D. S. (1998) Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
Spence, A. M. (1973) “Job Market Signaling.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 87: 355–374
Spence, A. M. (1974) Market Signaling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and Related Processes. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
Sugden, R. (1986) The Economics of Co-operation, Rights, and Welfare. New York: Blackwell
Suppes, P., and Atkinson, R. C. (1960) Markov Learning Models for Multiperson Interactions. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press
Taylor, M., and Ward, H. (1982) “Chickens, Whales and Lumpy Goods: Alternative Models of Public Goods Provision.” Political Science 30: 350–370
Taylor, P., and Jonker, L. (1978) “Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics.” Mathematical Biosciences 40: 145–156
Tesfatsion, L. (2002) “Economic Agents and Markets as Emergent Phenomena.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 99 (supplement 3): 7191–7192
Thorndike, E. L. (1907) The Elements of Psychology. 2d. ed. New York: A. G. Seiler
Vanderschraaf, P. (1998) “The Informal Game Theory in Hume's Account of Convention.” Economics and Philosophy 14: 251–257
Vanderschraaf, P. (2001) Learning and Coordination: Inductive Deliberation, Equilibrium and Convention. London: Routledge
Huyck, J. B., Battalio, R. C., and Beil, R. O. (1990) “Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty and Coordination Failure.” American Economic Review 80: 234–248
Huyck, J., Batallio, R., Mathur, S., Huyck, P., and Ortmann, A. (1995) “On the Origin of Convention: Evidence from Symmetric Bargaining Games.” International Journal of Game Theory 34: 187–212
Ward, H. (1990) “Three Men in a Boat, Two Must Row: An Analysis of a Three-Person Chicken Pregame.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 34: 371–400
Wärneryd, K. (1991) “Evolutionary Stability in Unanimity Games with Cheap Talk.” Economic Letters 39: 295–300
Wärneryd, K. (1993) “Cheap Talk, Coordination and Evolutionary Stability.” Games and Economic Behavior 5: 532–546
Watnick, P., and Kolter, R. (2000) “Biofilm, City of Microbes.” Journal of Bacteriology 182: 2675–2679
Watts, A. (2001) “A Dynamic Model of Network FormationGames and Economic Behavior 34: 331–341
Weibull, J. (1995) Evolutionary Game Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
Weisbuch, G., Kirman, A., and Herreiner, D. (2000) “Market Organization and Trading Relationships.” Economic Journal 110: 411–436
Williams, G. C. (1966) Adaptation and Natural Selection: A Critique of Some Current Evolutionary Thought. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press
Wilson, D. S. (1975) “A Theory of Group Selection.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA 72: 143–146
Wilson, E. O. (1971) The Insect Societies. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
Wright, S. (1943) “Isolation by Distance.” Genetics 28: 114–138
Wynne-Edwards, V. C. (1962) Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behavior. London: Oliver and Boyd
Yaari, M., and Bar-Hillel, M. (1981) “On Dividing Justly.” Social Choice and Welfare 1: 1–24
Young, H. P. (1993a) “The Evolution of Conventions.” Econometrica 61: 57–84
Young, H. P. (1993b) “An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining.” Journal of Economic Theory 59: 145–168
Young, H. P. (1998) Individual Strategy and Social Structure. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press
Young, H. P. (May 1999) “Diffusion in Social Networks.” Working Paper No. 2, Center on Social and Economic Dynamics, Brookings Institution
Zahavi, A. (1975) “Mate selection – a Selection for a Handicap.” Journal of Theoretical Biology 53: 205–214
Zahavi, A., and Zahavi, A. (1997) The Handicap Principle. Oxford: Oxford University Press


Altmetric attention score

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

Book summary page views

Total views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between #date#. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Usage data cannot currently be displayed.