Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
  • Cited by 240
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
September 2009
Print publication year:
2007
Online ISBN:
9780511491160

Book description

Unelected bodies, such as independent central banks, economic regulators, risk managers and auditors have become a worldwide phenomenon. Democracies are increasingly turning to them to demarcate boundaries between the market and the state, to resolve conflicts of interest and to allocate resources, even in sensitive ethical areas such as those involving privacy or biotechnology. This book examines the challenge that unelected bodies present to democracy and argues that, taken together, such bodies should be viewed as a new branch of government with their own sources of legitimacy and held to account through a new separation of powers. Vibert suggests that such bodies help promote a more informed citizenry because they provide a more trustworthy and reliable source of information for decisions. This book will be of interest to specialists and general readers with an interest in modern democracy as well as policy makers, think tanks and journalists.

Reviews

'This book is essential reading for all those concerned with the accountability of expert bodies, such as regulators, appointed with specific responsibilities and acting independently from ministers. Frank Vibert shows how an extension of the constitutional doctrines of the separation of powers provides a practical framework for their legitimacy. In a society increasingly dependent on knowledge, he highlights the importance of not focusing exclusively on politics as a means through which democratic societies engage in reasoned problem solving.'

Sir Ian Byatt - Chairman, Water Commission for Scotland and Former Director General of Water Services (Ofwat)

'Vibert is right that too little attention has been paid to the implications of widespread outsourcing of government functions to unelected bodies. Furthermore, he proposes practical ways in which the accountability gap can be filled. This is a very valuable book.'

Howard Davies - Director, LSE

'Frank Vibert's provocative and timely thesis represents a wake-up call to parliamentarians and all those who care about efficient, responsive and accountable public administration.'

Rt Hon Lord Holme of Cheltenham - Chairman, House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution

‘Vibert’s analysis is unapologetically sweeping and confrontational, and like all important books, it raises as many questions as it answers.’

Source: Political Studies Review

Refine List

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
×

Contents

Bibliography
Ackerman, B. 1984. ‘The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution’, Yale Law Journal, 93 (6): 1013–72.
Archibugi, Daniele (ed.) 2003. Debating Cosmopolitics. London: Verso.
Argyris, Chris, Putnam, Robert and McClain Smith, Diana (eds.) 1985. Action Science. San Francisco: Jossey Bass.
Arkes, Hal R. and Hammond, Kenneth R. (eds.) 1986. Judgement and Decision Making: An Interdisciplinary Reader. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1985. ‘The Economics of Agency’, in Pratt, John W. and Zeckhauser, Richard J., Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 37–51.
Barber, Benjamin R. 1984. Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Barberis, P. 1998. ‘The New Public Management and a New Accountability’, Public Administration, 76 (3): 451–70.
Barnett, Michael N. and Finnemore, Martha 1999. ‘The Politics, Power and Pathologies of International Organizations’, International Organization, 53: 699–732.
Bawm, Kathleen 1995. ‘Political Control versus Expertise: Congressional Choice about Administrative Procedures’, American Political Science Review, 89 (1): 62–73.
Beitz, Charles R. 1979. Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Bekke, Hans A. G. M., Perry, James L. and Toonen, Theo A. J. (eds.) 1996. Civil Service Systems in Comparative Perspective. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Bergman, Torbjörn, Müller, Wolfgang C. and Strøm, Kaare 2000. ‘Parliamentary Democracy and the Chain of Delegation’, European Journal of Political Research, 37 (3): 255–60.
Blaug, M. 1980. The Methodology of Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jean, Blondel, Sinnott, Richard and Svensson, Palle 1998. People and Parliament in the European Union: Participation, Democracy and Legitimacy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Bodin, Jean 1955 [1576]. Six Books of the Commonwealth (trans. M. J. Tooley). Oxford: Blackwell.
Bohman, James 1996. Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Bohman, James and Rehg, William (eds.) 1997. Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Boulding, Kenneth E. 1956. The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Braithwaite, John 1999. ‘Accountability and Governance under the New Regulatory State’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 58 (1): 90–3.
Brawley, Mark R. 1993. Liberal Leadership: Great Powers and their Challengers in Peace and War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Brennan, Geoffrey and Hamlin, Alan 2000. Democratic Devices and Desires. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brennan, Geoffrey and Hamlin, Alan 2002. ‘Expressive Constitutionalism’, Constitutional Political Economy, 13 (4): 300–11.
Breyer, Stephen G., Stewart, Richard B., Sunstein, Cass R. and Spitzer, Matthew L. 1998. Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy. New York: Aspen Law and Business.
Brione, Paul 2005. ‘Politicians’ Itch to Interfere’, Central Banking, 15 (3): 27–32.
Buchanan, James M. 1990. ‘The Domain of Constitutional Economics’, Constitutional Political Economy, 1 (1): 1–18.
Buzan, Barry, Jones, Charles and Little, Richard 1993. The Logic of Anarchy. New York: Columbia University Press.
Calvert, Randall, McCubbins, Mathew D. and Weingast, Barry R. 1989. ‘A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion’, American Journal of Political Science, 33 (3): 588–66.
Clark, Robert C. 1985. ‘Agency Costs versus Fiduciary Duties’, in Pratt, John W. and Zeckhauser, Richard J., Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 55–79.
Coen, David and Thatcher, Mark 2005. ‘The New Governance of Markets and Non-Majoritarian Regulators’, Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, 18 (3): 329–46.
Coleman, Jules L. 2001. The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Conant, Lisa 2002. Justice Contained: Law and Politics in the European Union. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Crouch, Colin 2004. Coping with Post Democracy. London: Polity Press.
Dahl, Robert A. 1970. After the Revolution? Authority in a Good Society. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Dahl, Robert A. 1989. Democracy and its Critics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Dahl, Robert A. 1998. On Democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Dahl, Robert A.1999. ‘Can International Organizations be Democratic? A Skeptic's View’, in Shapiro, Ian and Hacker-Cordon, C. (eds.), Democracy's Edges. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19–40.
Dalton, Russell 2004. Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dalton, Russell 2006 Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
Dehousse, Renaud 1997. ‘Regulation by Networks in the European Community: The Role of European Agencies’, Journal of European Public Policy, 4 (2): 246–61.
Denzou, Arthur T. and North, Douglass C. 2000. ‘Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions’, in Lupia, Arthur, McCubbins, Mathew D. and Popkin, Samuel L. (eds.), Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice and the Bounds of Rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 23–46.
Diggins, John Patrick 1994. The Promise of Pragmatism: Modernism and the Crisis of Knowledge and Authority. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Douglas, Mary 2002. Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory. London: Routledge.
Dworkin, Ronald 1977. Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (9th impression 1990).
Dworkin, Ronald 1996. Freedom's Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dworkin, RonaldElectoral Commission and Hansard Society 2006. An Audit of Political Engagement 3. Electoral Commission. London.
Elster, Jon 1992. Local Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Elster, Jon(ed.) 1998. Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Elster, Jon 1999. Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ely, John Hart 1980. Democracy and Distrust. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Epstein, David 1999. Delegating Powers: A Transactions Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Epstein, David and O'Halloran, Sharyn 1994. ‘Administrative Procedures, Information and Agency Discretion’, American Journal of Political Science, 38 (3): 697–722.
Epstein, David and O'Halloran, Sharyn 1999. ‘Asymmetric Information, Delegation and the Structure of Policy Making’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 11 (1): 37–56.
Florini, Ann 2003. The Coming Democracy: New Rules for Running a New World. Washington, DC: Island Press.
Froud, Julie and Boden, Rebecca 1998. Controlling the Regulators. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Fukuyama, Francis 1995. Trust: The Social Values and the Creation of Prosperity. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Gadamer, Hans Georg 1989. 1994 (2nd edn). Truth and Method. New York: Continuum Books.
Gigerenzer, Gerd 2002. Reckoning with Risk. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Gillroy, John Martin and Wade, Maurice (eds.) 1992. The Moral Dimension of Public Policy Choice. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Goddard, Eileen 2005. Public Confidence in Official Statistics. ONS Omnibus Survey, Office for National Statistics, London.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1986. Epistemology and Cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Green, Donald P. and Shapiro, Ian 1994. Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Greenawalt, Kent 2002. ‘Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation’, in Coleman, Jules and Shapiro, Scott (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 268–310.
Haas, Ernst B. 1989. When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Haas, Peter M. 1989. ‘Do Regimes Matter?International Organization, 43 (3): 377–403.
Haas, Peter M. 2004. ‘When Does Power Listen to Truth?Journal of European Public Policy, 2 (4): 569–92.
Hamilton, Alexander, Madison, James and Jay, John 1787/8. 1987 (2nd edn ed. Beloff). The Federalist. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Hammond, Kenneth R. and Adelman, Leonard 1986. ‘Science, Values and Human Judgement’, in Arkes, Hal R. and Hammond, Kenneth R. (eds.), Judgement and Decision Making: An Interdisciplinary Reader. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 127–43.
Harlow, Carol 2002. Accountability in the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Held, David 2003. ‘Cosmopolitanism: Ideas, Realities and Deficits’, in Held, David and McGrew, Anthony (eds.), Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance. Cambridge: Polity Press, 305–24.
Hempel, C. G. 1965. Aspects of Scientific Explanation. New York: Free Press.
Hesse, Mary 1978. ‘Theory and Values in the Social Sciences’, in Hookway, Christopher and Pettit, Philip (eds.), Action and Interpretation: Studies in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1–16.
Hoffman, Mark 1994. ‘Normative International Theory: Approaches and Issues’, in Groom, A. J. R. and Light, Margot (eds.), Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory. London: Pinter, 27–44.
Hollis, Martin 1994. The Philosophy of Social Science: An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hood, Christopher 1998. The Art of the State. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hood, Christopher 2002. ‘The Risk Game and the Blame Game’, Government and Opposition, 37 (1): 15–37.
Hood, Christopher, Rothstein, Henry and Baldwin, Robert 2001. The Government of Risk. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hood, Christopher and Schuppert, Gunnar Folke (eds.) 1988. Delivering Services in Western Europe. London: Sage Publications.
Horn, Murray J. 1995. The Political Economy of Public Administration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
House of Lords. Select Committee on the Constitution (2004). The Regulatory State: Ensuring its Accountability. London: The Stationery Office.
Huber, John D. and Pfahler, Madelaine 2001. ‘Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy’, American Journal of Political Science, 45 (2): 330–45.
Huber, John D. and Shipan, Charles R. 2000. ‘The Costs of Control: Legislators, Agencies and Transactions Costs’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 25 (1): 25–52.
Huber, John D. and Shipan, Charles R. 2002. Deliberate Discretion: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hughes, Owen 1998. Public Management and Administration. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kaplan, Mark 2002. ‘Decision Theory and Epistemology’, in Moser, Paul K. (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 434–62.
Kelsen, Hans 1986 [1964]. ‘The Function of a Constitution’ (trans. Stewart), in Tur, R. and Twining, W. (eds.), Essays on Kelsen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 109–19.
Keohane, Robert O. (ed.) 1986. Neorealism and its Critics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Keohane, Robert O.2002a. ‘Governance in a Partially Globalized World’, in Held, David and McGrew, Anthony (eds.), Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance. Cambridge: Polity Press, 325–47.
Keohane, Robert O. 2002b. Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World. London: Routledge.
Key, V. O. 1948. Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (2nd edn). New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co.
King, Gary, Keohane, Robert and Verba, Sidney 1994. Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Kingdon, J. W. 1984. 1995 (2nd edn). Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies. New York: Longman.
Kolm, Serge-Christophe 1996. Modern Theories of Justice. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Krehbiel, Keith 1998. Pivotal Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Krishna, A. 2002. ‘Enhancing Political Participation in Democracies: What is the Role of Social Capital?Comparative Political Studies, 35 (4): 437–60.
Kuhn, Thomas 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kydland, Finn and Prescott, E. 1977. ‘Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans’, Journal of Political Economy, 85 (3): 473–90.
Lane, Jan Erik 2005. Public Administration and Public Management: The Principal–Agent Perspective. London: Routledge.
Laslett, Peter 2003. ‘Environmental Ethics and the Obsolescence of Existing Political Institutions’, in Fishkin, James S. and Laslett, Peter (eds.), Debating Deliberative Democracy. Oxford: Blackwell, 212–24.
Lindblom, C. E. 1959. ‘The Science of Muddling Through’, Public Administration Review, 19: 79–88.
Lupia, Arthur and McCubbins, Mathew D. 1998. Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What they Need to Know. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lupia, Arthur, McCubbins, Mathew D. and Popkin, Samuel L. (eds.) 2000. Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice and the Bounds of Rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lynn, Laurence E. 1987. Managing Public Policy. Boston: Little Brown.
Lynn, Laurence E., Heinrich, Carolyn J. and Hill, Carolyn J. 2001. Improving Governance: A New Logic for Empirical Research. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Mair, P. and Biezen, I. 2001. ‘Party Membership in Twenty European Democracies 1980–2000’, Party Politics, 7 (1): 5–21.
Majone, Giandomenico 1997. ‘The New European Agencies: Regulation by Information’, Journal of European Public Policy, 4 (2): 262–75.
Majone, Giandomenico 2001. ‘Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance’, European Union Politics, 2: 103–21.
Majone, Giandomenico 2005. Dilemmas of Integration. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Marin, Bernd and Mayntz, Renate (eds.) 1991. Policy Networks. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Matheson, Alex and Hae-Sang, Kwon 2003. ‘Public Sector Modernisation: A New Agenda’, OECD Journal on Budgeting, 3 (1): 7–23.
Meersheimer, John 1994/5. ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, International Security, 19 (3): 5–49.
Mele, Alfred R. 2004. ‘Motivated Irrationality’, in Mele, Alfred R. and Rawling, Piers (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 240–56.
Misztal, Barbara A. 1996. Trust in Modern Societies. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Morgan, Bronwen 2003. ‘The Economization of Politics: Meta-Regulation as a Form of Nonjudicial Legality’, Social and Legal Studies, 12 (4): 489–523.
Morrow, James D. 1994. Games Theory for Political Scientists. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Norris, Pippa 2002. Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
North, Douglas C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Reform. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
OECD 2002. ‘Public Sector Modernisation: A New Agenda’. GOV/PUMA 2002, version 2 (Oct. 2002).
Office of Management and Budget 2004. ‘Progress in Regulatory Reform: 2004 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local and Tribal Entities’. Washington, DC.
Olsen, J. P. 2001. ‘Garbage Cans, New Institutionalism and the Study of Politics’, American Political Science Review, 95 (1): 191–7.
Osborne, David and Gaebler, Ted 1992. Reinventing Government. New York: Addison-Wesley.
Owens, Susan, Raynor, Tim and Bina, Olivia (2004). ‘New Agendas for Appraisal: Reflections on Theory, Practice and Research’, Environment and Planning, 36: 1943–59.
Pateman, Carole 1970. Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pattie, Charles, Seyd, Patrick and Whiteley, Paul 2004. Citizenship in Britain. Values, Participation and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Peters, B. Guy 1996. The Future of Governing: Four Emerging Models. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
Pettit, Philip 2001. A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Pettit, Philip and Smith, Michael 2004. ‘The Truth in Deontology’, in Jay, Wallace R., Pettit, Philip, Scheffler, Samuel and Smith, Michael (eds.), Reason and Value. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 153–75.
Pollack, Mark A. 2003. The Engines of European Integration. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pollitt, Christopher and Bouckaert, Geert 2000. Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pollitt, Christopher and Talbot, Colin (eds.) 2004. Unbundled Government: A Critical Analysis of the Global Trend to Agencies, Quangos and Contractualisation. London: Routledge.
Pollitt, Christopher, Talbot, Colin, Caulfield, Janice and Smullen, Amanda. 2004. Agencies. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Posner, Richard A. 2003. Law, Pragmatism and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Power, Michael 1997. The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Power Inquiry. 2006. The Report of Power: An Independent Inquiry into Britain's Democracy. York: York Publishing Distribution.
Pratt, John W. and Zeckhauser, Richard J. 1985a. ‘Principals and Agents: An Overview’, in Pratt, John W. and Zeckhauser, Richard J. (eds.), Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1–36.
Pratt, John W. and Zeckhauser, Richard J. 1985b. Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
Putnam, Hilary 2002. Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Putnam, Robert D. 2002. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Putnam, Robert D., Leonardi, Robert and Nanetti, Rafaella 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Rawls, John 1999. The Law of the Peoples. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Reitter, Dan and Stam, Allan C. 2002. Democracies at War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Riker, William H. 1990. ‘Political Science and Rational Choice’, in Alt, James E. and Shepsle, Kenneth A. (eds.), Perspectives on Positive Political Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 163–81.
Rose, Richard 1986. Giving Direction to Civil Servants: Signals from the Law, Expertise, the Market and the Electorate. Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde.
Rose, Richard2005. Learning from Comparative Public Policy. London: Routledge.
Rousseau, J. J. 1755, 1992. ‘Discourse on Political Economy’, in Masters, Roger D. and Kelly, Christopher (eds.), The Collected Writings of Rousseau, Vol. III. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England.
Ryan, Alan 1970. The Philosophy of the Social Sciences. London: Macmillan.
Ryan, Alan(ed.) 1973. The Philosophy of Social Explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sabatier, Paul A. (ed.) 1999. Theories of the Policy Process. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Sayer, Andrew 1984. Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach. London: Routledge.
Scharpf, Fritz 1999. Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schedler, Andreas 1999. ‘Conceptualizing Accountability’, in Schedler, Andreas, Diamond, Larry and Plattner, Marc F. (eds.), The Self-Restraining State. Boulder: Lynn Riesner, 13–28.
Schedler, Andreas, Diamond, Larry and Marc, Plattner F. (eds.) 1999. The Self-Restraining State. Power and Accountability in New Democracies. Boulder: Lynn Rienner.
Scheufele, D. and Shah, D. 2000. ‘Personality Strength and Social Capital: The Role of Dispositional and Informational Variables in the Production of Civic Participation’, Communication Research, 27: 107–31.
Shapiro, Ian and Hacker-Cordon, C. (eds.) 1999a. Democracy's Value. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shapiro, Ian and Hacker-Cordon, C.(eds.) 1999b. Democracy's Edges. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shelton, Dinah (ed.) 2000. Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Simon, Herbert A. 1986. ‘Alternative Visions of Rationality’, in Arkes, Hal R. and Hammond, Kenneth R. (eds.), Judgement and Decision Making: An Interdisciplinary Reader. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 97–113.
Skyrmes, Brian 1996. Evolution of the Social Contract. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Slaughter, Anne-Marie 2004. A New World Order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Slote, Michael 1989. Beyond Optimizing: A Study in Rational Choice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Solomon, Miriam 2001. Social Empiricism. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Statistics Commission. 2005. Report No. 24. ‘Official Statistics: Perceptions and Trust’. London.
Steunenberg, Bernard 1996. ‘Agency Discretion, Regulatory Policy Making and Differential Institutional Arrangements’, Public Choice, 86: 309–39.
Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2003. ‘Democratizing the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank: Governance and Accountability’, Governance, 16 (1): 111–39.
Strøm, Kaare, Müller, Wolfgang C. and Bergman, Torbjörn (eds.) 2005. Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sunstein, Cass R. 1996. Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sunstein, Cass R. 1999. One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Thatcher, Mark 1998. ‘The Development of Policy Network Analysis’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 10 (4): 389–416.
Thatcher, Mark 2005. ‘The Third Force? Independent Regulatory Agencies and Elected Politicians in Europe’, Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, 18 (3): 347–73.
Thatcher, Mark and Stone Sweet, Alec 2002. ‘Theory and Practice of Non-Majoritarian Institutions’, West European Politics, 25 (1): 1–22.
True, James L., Jones, Bryan D. and Baumgartner, Fred R. 1999. ‘Punctuated Equilibrium Theory’, in Sabatier, Paul A. (ed.), Theories of the Policy Process. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 97–115.
Tsebelis, George 2002. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Tuck, Richard 1999. The Rights of War and Peace. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Union of International Associations (ed.) 2004/5. Edition 41. Yearbook of International Organisations, Vol. V. Munich: K. G. Saur.
Vibert, Frank 2001. Europe Simple, Europe Strong. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Waltz, Kenneth 1979. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley.
Weaver, R. Kent 1986. ‘The Politics of Blame Avoidance’, Journal of Public Policy, 6 (4): 371–98.
Wendt, Alexander 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
West, William 1995. Controlling the Bureaucracy: Institutional Constraints in Theory and Practice. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
Zakaria, Fareed 2003. The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad. New York: W.W. Norton and Co.
Zaring, David 2005. ‘Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administration’, Chicago Journal of International Law, 5 (2): 547–603.

Metrics

Altmetric attention score

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

Book summary page views

Total views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between #date#. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Usage data cannot currently be displayed.