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  • Print publication year: 2012
  • Online publication date: June 2012

6 - Market Discipline and U.S. Federalism

from Part II - The Legal and Political Context of Public Debt
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When States Go Broke
  • Online ISBN: 9781139150835
  • Book DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139150835
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References

Aizenman, Joshua and GurnainPasricha. 2011. Net Fiscal Stimulus During the Great Recession. NBER Working Paper 16779.
Bayoumi, Tamim, MorrisGoldstein, and GeoffreyWoglom. 1995. Do Credit Markets Discipline Sovereign Borrowers? Evidence from the U.S. States. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 27(4):1046–1059.
Levitin, Adam. 2011. In Defense of Bailouts. Georgetown Law Journal 99:435–514.
Poterba, James. 1994. State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary Institutions and Politics. Journal of Political Economy 102(4):799–821.
Ratchford, Benjamin. 1941. American State Debts. Durham,NC: Duke University Press.
Rodden, Jonathan. 2006. Hamilton’s Paradox: The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rodden, Jonathan and ErikWibbels. 2010. Fiscal Decentralization and the Business Cycle: An Empirical Study of Seven Federations. Economics and Politics 22(1):37–67.
Von Hagen, Juergen and BarryEichengreen. 1996. Federalism, Fiscal Restraints, and European Monetary Union. American Economic Review 86(2):134–138.
Wibbels, Erik. 2003. Bailouts, Budget Constraints, and Leviathans: Comparative Federalism and Lessons from the Early U.S. Comparative Political Studies 36(5):475–508.