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Design, Inference, and the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 May 2008

SCOTT ASHWORTH*
Affiliation:
Princeton University
JOSHUA D. CLINTON*
Affiliation:
Princeton University
ADAM MEIROWITZ*
Affiliation:
Princeton University
KRISTOPHER W. RAMSAY*
Affiliation:
Princeton University
*
Scott Ashworth is Assistant Professor of Politics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544 (sashwort@princeton.edu).
Joshua D. Clinton is Assistant Professor of Politics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544 (clinton@princeton.edu).
Adam Meirowitz is Associate Professor of Politics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544 (ameirowi@princeton.edu).
Kristopher W. Ramsay is Assistant Professor of Politics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544 (kramsay@princeton.edu).

Abstract

In “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” Robert Pape (2003) presents an analysis of his suicide terrorism data. He uses the data to draw inferences about how territorial occupation and religious extremism affect the decision of terrorist groups to use suicide tactics. We show that the data are incapable of supporting Pape's conclusions because he “samples on the dependent variable.”—The data only contain cases in which suicide terror is used. We construct bounds (Manski, 1995) on the quantities relevant to Pape's hypotheses and show exactly how little can be learned about the relevant statistical associations from the data produced by Pape's research design.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2008

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References

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