Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-cf9d5c678-p4zth Total loading time: 0.472 Render date: 2021-08-02T16:46:12.606Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, "shouldUseHypothesis": true, "isUnsiloEnabled": true, "metricsAbstractViews": false, "figures": true, "newCiteModal": false, "newCitedByModal": true, "newEcommerce": true, "newUsageEvents": true }

Elite Competition and State Capacity Development: Theory and Evidence from Post-Revolutionary Mexico

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 April 2018

FRANCISCO GARFIAS
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego
Corresponding
E-mail address:

Abstract

International wars and interstate rivalry have been at the center of our understanding of the origin and expansion of state capacity. This article describes an alternative path to the development of state capacity rooted in domestic political conflict. Under conditions of intra-elite conflict, political rulers seize upon the temporary weakness of their rivals, expropriate their assets, and consolidate authority. Because this political consolidation increases rulers’ chances of surviving an economic elite’s challenge, it enhances their incentives to develop state capacity. These ideas are evaluated in post-revolutionary Mexico, where commodity price shocks induced by the Great Depression affected the local economic elite differentially. Negative shocks lead to increased asset expropriation and substantially higher investments in state capacity, which persist to the present.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2018 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

Fieldwork for this project was supported by the Stanford Graduate Fellowship. I am grateful to Ran Abramitzky, Avi Acharya, John Ahlquist, Lisa Blaydes, Darin Christensen, Alberto Díaz-Cayeros, Simon Ejdemyr, Nick Eubank, Adriane Fresh, Nikhar Gaikwad, Steve Haber, Stephan Haggard, Jens Hainmueller, Saumitra Jha, Dorothy Kronick, David Laitin, Gordon McCord, Beatriz Magaloni, Agustina Paglayan, Ramya Parthasarathy, Zaira Razú, Ken Scheve, Jeffrey Timmons, and seminar participants at MPSA 2015, Berkeley, CIDE, APSA 2015, LACEA 2015, Stanford, UCSD, ITAM, ITESM Campus Monterrey, and IPEG for comments and suggestions. I thank the APSR editors and four anonymous referees for their careful and constructive reviews.

References

Aboites, Luis. 2003. Excepciones y Privilegios: Modernización Tributaria y Centralización en México, 1922–1972. Mexico City: El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Históricos.Google Scholar
Acemoglu, Daron, Garcia-Jimeno, Camilo, and Robinson, James A.. 2015. “State Capacity and Economic Development: A Network Approach.” The American Economic Review 105 (8): 2364–409.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Acemoglu, Daron, and Robinson, James A.. 2008. “Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions.” The American Economic Review 98 (1): 267–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Albertus, Michael. 2015. Autocracy and Redistribution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Albertus, Michael, Díaz-Cayeros, Alberto, Magaloni, Beatriz, and Weingast, Barry R.. 2016. “Authoritarian Survival and Poverty Traps: Land Reform in Mexico.” World Development 77: 154–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Albertus, Michael, and Menaldo, Victor. 2012. “If You’re Against Them You’re With Us: The Effect of Expropriation on Autocratic Survival.” Comparative Political Studies 45 (8): 9731003.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Arias, Luz Marina. 2013. “Building Fiscal Capacity in Colonial Mexico: From Fragmentation to Centralization.” The Journal of Economic History 73 (3).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bates, Robert, and Lien, Da-Hsiang. 1985. “A Note on Taxation, Development, and Representative Government.” Politics & Society 14 (1): 5370.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Besley, Timothy, and Persson, Torsten. 2009. “The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation and Politics.” The American Economic Review 99 (4): 1218–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Besley, Timothy, and Persson, Torsten. 2011. Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bhavnani, Rikhil, and Jha, Saumitra. 2014. “Forging a Non-Violent Mass Movement: Economic Shocks and Organizational Innovations in India’s Struggle for Democracy.” Working paper. https://web.stanford.edu/~saumitra/papers/BhavnaniJhaIndependence.pdf.Google Scholar
Brading, David A., ed. 1980. Caudillo and Peasant in the Mexican Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Calderón, Marco Antonio. 2005. Caciquismo and Cardenismo in the Sierra P’urhépecha, Michoacán. In Caciquismo in Twentieth-Century Mexico, eds. Knight, Alan and Pansters, Will. London: Institute for the Study of the Americas.Google Scholar
Censo de funcionarios y empleados públicos, 1930. 1934. Secretaría de la Economía Nacional, Dirección de Estadística.Google Scholar
Centeno, Miguel Angel. 2003. Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America. University Park, PA: Penn State Press.Google Scholar
Collier, Simon, and Sater, William. 1996. A History of Chile, 1808–1994. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Cordero Michel, Emilio. 2009. “Movimientos de Oposición a Trujillo en la Década 1930–1939.” Clio (178): 149–74.Google Scholar
Cox, Gary. 2016. Marketing Sovereign Promises: Monopoly Brokerage and the Growth of the English State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Craig, Ann. 1983. The First Agraristas. Oakland, CA: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Dell, Melissa. 2012. “Path Dependence in Development: Evidence from the Mexican Revolution.” Working paper. https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/dell/files/revolutiondraft.pdf.Google Scholar
Dincecco, Mark. 2011. Political Transformations and Public Finances: Europe, 1650–1913. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dincecco, Mark, and Katz, Gabriel. 2014. “State Capacity and Long-Run Economic Performance.” The Economic Journal 126 (590): 189218.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dippel, Christian, Greif, Avner, and Trefler, Daniel. 2015. “The Rents from Trade and Coercive Institutions: Removing the Sugar Coating.” NBER Working Paper 20958. https://www.nber.org/papers/w20958.pdf.Google Scholar
Dube, Oeindrila, and Vargas, Juan. 2013. “Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia.” The Review of Economic Studies 80 (4): 1384–421.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Evans, Peter. 1995. Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Fergusson, Leopoldo, Larreguy, Horacio, and Riaño, Juan Felipe. 2015. “Political Competition and State Capacity: Evidence from a Land Allocation Program in Mexico.” CAF Working Paper 2015/03. http://scioteca.caf.com/bitstream/handle/123456789/764/PaperFergusonFinal.pdfGoogle Scholar
Fowler-Salamini, Heather. 1978. Agrarian Radicalism in Veracruz, 1920–1938. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.Google Scholar
Frankema, Ewout, and Masé, Aline. 2014. “An Island Drifting Apart. Why Haiti is Mired in Poverty while the Dominican Republic Forges Ahead.” Journal of International Development 26: 128–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gaona, Pedro Hernández. 1991. “Evolución y Proyección de la Legislación Agraria Mexicana.” Anuario Mexicano de Historia del Derecho (3): 82–94.Google Scholar
García-Treviño, Rodrigo. 1953. “Agrarismo Revolucionario y Ejidalismo Burocrático.” Problemas Agrícolas e Industriales de México V (4): 2966.Google Scholar
Garfias, Francisco. Forthcoming. “Elite Coalitions, Limited Government, and Fiscal Capacity Development: Evidence from Bourbon Mexico.” The Journal of Politics.Google Scholar
Gomez Tagle, Gustavo. 1939. “La Contribución Federal.” Revista de Hacienda, Junio, 15–34.Google Scholar
Haber, Stephen, Maurer, Noel, and Razo, Armando. 2003. The Politics of Property Rights: Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876–1929. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hamilton, James D. 1992. “Was the Deflation during the Great Depression Anticipated? Evidence from the Commodity Futures Market.” The American Economic Review 82 (1): 157–78.Google Scholar
Harper, Kristin. 2009. Tomás Garrido Canabal of Tabasco: Road Building and Revolutionary Reform. In State Governors in the Mexican Revolution, 1910–1952: Portraits in Conflict, Courage, and Corruption. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.Google Scholar
Herbst, Jeffrey. 2000. States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
IIASA/FAO. 2012. Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ v3.0). IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria and FAO, Rome, Italy.Google Scholar
Khan, Wasiq N. 2010. “Economic Growth and Decline in Comparative Perspective: Haiti and the Dominican Republic, 1930–1986.” Journal of Haitian Studies 16 (1): 112–25.Google Scholar
Knight, Alan. 1992. “Cardenismo: Juggernaut or Jalopy.” Journal of Latin American Studies 26 (1): 73107.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Knight, Alan, ed. 2005. Caciquismo in Twentieth-Century Mexico. London: Institute for the Study of the Americas.Google Scholar
Kurtz, Marcus. 2013. Latin American State Building Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Lapp, Nancy D. 2004. Landing Votes: Representation and Land Reform in Latin America. London: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lardy, Nicholas. 2014. Markets Over Mao: The Rise of Private Business in China. Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics.Google Scholar
Levi, Margaret. 1988. Of Rule and Revenue. Oakland, CA: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Mann, Michael. 1986. The Sources of Social Power, Volume I. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mares, Isabela, and Queralt, Didac. 2015. “The Non-Democratic Origins of Income Taxation.” Comparative Political Studies 48 (14): 19742009.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Margolies, Barbara. 1975. The Princes of the Earth. Subcutural Diversity in a Mexican Municipality. American Anthropoligical Association.Google Scholar
Mayshar, Joram, Moav, Omer, and Neeman, Zvika. 2017. “Geography, Transparency, and Institutions.” American Political Science Review 111 (3): 622–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Migdal, Joel. 1988. Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
North, Douglass C., Wallis, John Joseph, Webb, Steven B., and Weingast, Barry R., eds. 2012. In the Shadow of Violence: Politics, Economics, and the Problems of Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
North, Douglass, Wallis, John Joseph, and Weingast, Barry R.. 2009. Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ortega Martínez, Luis, and Apiolaza, Pablo Rubio. 2006. “La Guerra Civil de 1859 y Los Límites de la Modernización de Atacama y Coquimbo.” Revista de Historia Social y de las Mentalidades 2 (10): 1139.Google Scholar
Paglayan, Agustina. 2017. “Civil War, State Consolidation, and the Spread of Mass Education.” Working paper. https://www.dropbox.com/s/g4vc5u0dm7a39yx/CivilWarStateConsolidationandtheSpreadofMassEducation_Paglayan_mostrecent.pdf.Google Scholar
Pincus, Steven C. A., and Robinson, James A.. 2011. “What Really Happened During the Glorious Revolution?” NBER Working Paper 17206. http://www.nber.org/papers/w17206.Google Scholar
Saffon, Maria Paula. 2015. “When Theft Becomes Grievance: Dispossessions as a Cause of Redistributive Land Claims in 20th Century Latin America.” PhD dissertation, Department of Political Science, Columbia University.Google Scholar
Sánchez de la Sierra, Raúl. 2015. “On the Origin of States: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo.” Working paper. https://raulsanchezdelasierra.files.wordpress.com/2013/09/revised-manuscript.pdf.Google Scholar
Sanderson, Susan Walsh. 1984. Land Reform in Mexico, 1910–1980. Academic Press.Google Scholar
San Miguel, Pedro L. 2012. Los Campesinos del Cibao. Economía de Mercado y Transformación Agraria en la República Dominicana 1880–1960. Santo Domingo: Archivo General de la Nación.Google Scholar
Santoyo, Antonio. 1995. Poder regional y estado en México: Veracruz, 1928–1943. Mexico: Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes.Google Scholar
Saylor, Ryan. 2014. State Building in Boom Times: Commodities and Coalitions in Latin America and Africa. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Scheve, Kenneth, and Stasavage, David. 2012. “Democracy, War, and Wealth: Lessons From Two Centuries of Inheritance Taxation.” American Political Science Review 106 (1): 81102.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sellars, Emily. 2017. “Does Emigration Inhibit Political Reform? Evidence from the Mexican Agrarian Movement, 1916–1945.” Working paper. https://www.dropbox.com/s/s814fa8w9zhm9qw/SellarsMigReform.pdf.Google Scholar
Sellars, Emily, and Alix-Garcia, Jennifer. 2017. “Labor Scarcity, Land Tenure, and Historical Legacy: Evidence from Mexico.” Working Paper. https://www.dropbox.com/s/hxrzq2cq56s3y3t/SellarsAlixGarcia_September2017.pdf.Google Scholar
Singer, Marion. 1988. El Agrarismo en Chiapas (1524–1940). México: INAH.Google Scholar
Slater, Dan. 2010. Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Soifer, Hillel. 2008. “State Infrastructural Power: Approaches to Conceptualization and Measurement.” Studies in Comparative International Development 43 (3-4): 231–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Southworth, John R. 1910. The Official Directory of Mines & Estates of Mexico. Mexico, DF: John R. Southworth F.R.G.S.Google Scholar
Thies, Cameron. 2005. “War, Rivalry, and State Building in Latin America.” American Journal of Political Science 49 (3): 451–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tilly, Charles. 1992. Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Timmons, Jeffrey F. 2005. “The Fiscal Contract: States, Taxes, and Public Services.” World Politics 4 (57): 530–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Topalova, Petia. 2010. “Factor Immobility and Regional Impacts of Trade Liberalization: Evidence on Poverty from India.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2 (4): 141.Google Scholar
Torres-Mazuera, Gabriela. 2012. La Ruralidad Urbanizada en el Centro de México. Mexico: UNAM.Google Scholar
Turits, Richard Lee. 2003. Foundations of Despotism: Peasants, the Trujillo Regime, and Modernity in Dominican History. Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press.Google Scholar
Velasco Toro, José. 2010. “Reforma Agraria y Movilización Campesina en Veracruz (México) Durante el Siglo XX.” Revista del CESLA 2 (13): 579–94.Google Scholar
Wasserman, Mark. 1993. Persistent Oligarchs. Elites and Politics in Chihuahua, Mexico, 1910–1940. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.Google Scholar
Supplementary material: Link

Garfias Dataset

Link
Supplementary material: PDF

Garfias supplementary material

Garfias supplementary material

Download Garfias supplementary material(PDF)
PDF 2 MB
9
Cited by

Send article to Kindle

To send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle.

Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Elite Competition and State Capacity Development: Theory and Evidence from Post-Revolutionary Mexico
Available formats
×

Send article to Dropbox

To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox.

Elite Competition and State Capacity Development: Theory and Evidence from Post-Revolutionary Mexico
Available formats
×

Send article to Google Drive

To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive.

Elite Competition and State Capacity Development: Theory and Evidence from Post-Revolutionary Mexico
Available formats
×
×

Reply to: Submit a response

Please enter your response.

Your details

Please enter a valid email address.

Conflicting interests

Do you have any conflicting interests? *