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Monotonicity in Electoral Systems

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

David Austen-Smith
Affiliation:
University of Rochester
Jeffrey Banks
Affiliation:
University of Rochester

Abstract

Much of the literature concerning the relative merits of alternative electoral rules is centered around the extent to which particular rules select “representative” legislatures. And an important concern in evaluating the “representativeness” of an electoral rule is whether or not the rule responds positively to changes in individuals' preferences, that is, whether or not the rule is monotonic. By explicitly considering electoral rules in the context of a complete electoral system—voting, selection of legislature, and legislative choice of policy—we argue that monotonicity in electoral systems is a nonissue: depending on the behavioral model governing individual decision making, either everything is monotonic or nothing is monotonic.

Type
Research Notes
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1991

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References

Austen-Smith, David, and Banks, Jeffrey. 1988. “Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes.American Political Science Review 82: 405–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Austen-Smith, David, and Banks, Jeffrey. 1990. “Stable Governments and the Allocation of Policy Portfolios.American Political Science Review 84:891906.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brams, Steven J., and Rshburn, Peter C.. 1984. “Some Logical Defects of the Single Transferable Vote.” In Choosing an Electoral System, ed. Lijphart, Arend and Grofman, Bernard. New York: Praeger.Google Scholar
Doron, Gideon, and Kroniek, Richard. 1977. “Single Transferble Vote: An Example of a Perverse Social Choice Function.American Journal of Political Science 21:303–11.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fishburn, Peter C. 1982. “Monotonicity Paradoxes in the Theory of Elections.Discrete Applied Mathematics 4:119–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Muller, Eitan, and Satterthwaite, Mark. 1977. “Equivalence of Strong Positive Association and Strategy Proofness.Journal of Economic Theory 14:412–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Riker, William H. 1982. Liberalism against Populism. San Francisco: Freeman.Google Scholar
Saijo, Tatsuyoshi. 1987. “On constant Maskin Monotonic Social Choice Functions.Journal of Economic Theory 42:382–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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