Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-768ffcd9cc-5rkl9 Total loading time: 0.468 Render date: 2022-12-06T20:25:37.496Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "useRatesEcommerce": false } hasContentIssue true

The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2004

BRANISLAV L. SLANTCHEV
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego

Abstract

If war results from disagreement about relative strength, then it ends when opponents learn enough about each other. Learning occurs when information is revealed by strategically manipulable negotiation behavior and nonmanipulable battlefield outcomes. I present a model of simultaneous bargaining and fighting where both players can make offers and asymmetric information exists about the distribution of power. In the Markov perfect sequential equilibrium, making and rejecting offers has informational value that outweighs the one provided by the battlefield. However, states use both sources of information to learn and settle before military victory. The Principle of Convergence posits that warfare ceases to be useful when it loses its informational content and that belief in defeat (victory) is not necessary to terminate (initiate) hostilities. Thus, the standard puzzle in international relations that seeks to account for prewar optimism on both sides may not be that relevant.

Type
ARTICLES
Copyright
© 2003 by the American Political Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Admati Anat R., and Motty Perry. 1987 Strategic Delay in Bargaining. Review of Economic Studies 54 (July): 345–64.Google Scholar
Blainey Geoffrey. 1988 The Causes of War. 3rd ed. New York: Free Press.
Calahan H. A. 1944 What Makes a War End? New York: Vanguard Press.
Cimbala Stephen J., and Keith A. Dunn, eds. 1987 Conflict Termination and Military Strategy: Coercion, Persuasion, and War. Boulder: Westview Press.
Fearon James D. 1995 Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organization 49 (Summer): 379414.Google Scholar
Fearon James D. 1998 Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation. International Organization 52 (2): 269305.Google Scholar
Filson Darren, and Suzanne Werner. 2002 A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War. American Journal of Political Science 46 (October): 819–38.Google Scholar
Forster Kent. 1941 The Failures of Peace: The Search for a Negotiated Peace During the First World War. Washington, DC: American Council on Public Affairs.
Foster James L., and Garry D. Brewer. 1976 And the Clocks Were Striking Thirteen: The Termination of War. Policy Sciences 7 (June): 225–43.Google Scholar
Fox William T. R. 1970 The Causes of Peace and Conditions of War. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 392 (November): 113.Google Scholar
Fudenberg Drew, and Jean Tirole. 1991 Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Fudenberg Drew, David Levine, and Jean Tirole. 1985 Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information. In Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining, ed. Alvin Roth. New York: Cambridge University Press, 7398.
Fuller J. F. C. 1961 The Conduct of War, 1789–1961. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Gartner Scott Sigmund. 1997 Strategic Assessment in War. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Goemans Hein E. 2000 War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Grimmett G. R., and D. R. Stirzaker. 1992 Probability and Random Processes. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Grossman Sanford J., and Motty Perry. 1986a Perfect Sequential Equilibrium. Journal of Economic Theory 39: 97119.Google Scholar
Grossman Sanford J., and Motty Perry. 1986b Sequential Bargaining under Asymmetric Information. Journal of Economic Theory 39: 120–54.Google Scholar
Harsanyi John C. 1968 Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players. Management Science 14 (March): 159–82, 320–34, 486502.Google Scholar
Hobbs Richard. 1979 The Myth of Victory: What Is Victory in War? Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Iklé Fred Charles. 1964 How Nations Negotiate. New York: Harper & Row.
Iklé Fred Charles. 1971 Every War Must End. New York: Columbia University Press.
Kecskemeti Paul. 1958 Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Kecskemeti Paul. 1970 Political Rationality in Ending War. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 392 (November): 105–15.Google Scholar
Kreps David, and Robert Wilson. 1982 Sequential Equilibrium. Econometrica 50: 863–94.Google Scholar
Manwaring Max G. 1987 Limited War and Conflict Control. In Conflict Termination and Military Strategy: Coercion, Persuasion, and War, ed. Stephen J. Cimbala and Keith A. Dunn. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 5976.
Merlo Antonio, and Charles Wilson. 1995 A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information. Econometrica 63 (March): 371–99.Google Scholar
Muthoo Abhinay. 1999 Bargaining Theory with Applications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Myerson Roger B., and Mark A. Satterthwaite. 1983 Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading. Journal of Economic Theory 28: 265–81.Google Scholar
Nicolson Harold G. 1954 The Evolution of Diplomatic Method. London: Constable.
Pillar Paul R. 1983 Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Powell Colin L. 1992 U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead. Foreign Affairs 71 (Winter): 3245.Google Scholar
Powell Robert. 1993 Guns, Butter and Anarchy. American Political Science Review 87 (March): 115–32.Google Scholar
Powell Robert. 1996 Stability and the Distribution of Power. World Politics 48 (January): 239–67.Google Scholar
Powell Robert. 2001 Bargaining While Fighting. Mimeo, University of California, Berkeley. October 7.
Reiter Dan. 2003 The Bargaining Model of War. Perspectives on Politics 1 (March): 2743.Google Scholar
Roth Alvin, ed. 1985 Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Rubinstein Ariel. 1982 Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model. Econometrica 50: 97110.Google Scholar
Rubinstein Ariel. 1985a A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences. Econometrica 53 (September): 1151–72.Google Scholar
Rubinstein Ariel. 1985b Choice of Conjectures in a Bargaining Game with Incomplete Information. In Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining, ed. Alvin Roth. New York: Cambridge University Press, 99114.
Rubinstein Ariel. 1991 Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory. Econometrica 59 (July): 909–24.Google Scholar
Schelling Thomas C. 1960 The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Schelling Thomas C. 1966 Arms and Influence. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Selten Reinhard. 1975 Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games. International Journal of Game Theory 4 (1): 2555.Google Scholar
Simon Carl P., and Lawrence Blume. 1994 Mathematics for Economists. New York: W. W. Norton.
Slantchev Branislav L. 2002 Markov Perfect Equilibrium in a Stochastic Bargaining Model. Typescript. University of California, San Diego.
Smith Alastair. 1998 Fighting Battles, Winning Wars. Journal of Conflict Resolution 42 (June): 301–20.Google Scholar
Smith Alastair, and Allan C. Stam III. 2001 Bargaining through Conflict. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, San Antonio, TX.
Smith James D. D. 1995 Stopping Wars: Defining the Obstacles to Cease-Fire. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
von Clausewitz Carl. (1832) 1984 On War, ed., transl. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Wagner R. Harrison. 1994 Peace, War, and the Balance of Power. American Political Science Review 88 (September): 593607.Google Scholar
Wagner R. Harrison. 2000 Bargaining and War. American Journal of Political Science 44 (July): 469–84.Google Scholar
Weinberger Caspar W. 1984 The Uses of Military Power. Remarks by Secretary of Defense Winberger to the National Press Club, Washington, DC, November 28.
Wittman Donald. 1979 How a War Ends: A Rational Model Approach. Journal of Conflict Resolution 23 (December): 743–63.Google Scholar
187
Cited by

Save article to Kindle

To save this article to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations
Available formats
×

Save article to Dropbox

To save this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you used this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Dropbox account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations
Available formats
×

Save article to Google Drive

To save this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you used this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Google Drive account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations
Available formats
×
×

Reply to: Submit a response

Please enter your response.

Your details

Please enter a valid email address.

Conflicting interests

Do you have any conflicting interests? *