The traditional emphasis on human nature as the foundation of politics needs to be reexamined from the perspective of contemporary biology. Because biological processes operate independently on the individual, the social group, and the species, an evolutionary approach to both observational research and cost-benefit analysis does not entail reductionism. Selfishness and altruism, participation in social groups, languages and cultures, and the rise and fall of centralized states can all be illuminated by empirical evidence and theories in the life sciences. For political philosophy, a new “naturalism” points to a return to the Aristotelian view that values or standards of judgment have rationally intelligible foundations, thereby challenging the relativist or nihilistic orientation that has characterized most contemporary thought.

Recent developments in Eastern Europe have created expectations of a “peace dividend” associated with reduced levels of U.S. defense expenditures. We present and empirically estimate a two-equation model for assessing the direct and indirect, immediate and delayed effects of changes in defense spending on economic growth in the United States.

In the December 1988 issue of this Review, John Chubb and Terry Moe presented data comparing public and private schools, and made an argument concerning “politics, markets, and the organization of schools.” Chubb and Moe argue that private schools outperform public schools because they are more autonomous, advantaged by market forces rather than democratic political control. Jack Tweedie takes vigorous exception to this conclusion, arguing that the evidence does not support Chubb and Moe's conclusions about the efficacy of market forces. Dennis Riley directly attacks the virtues of market control of institutional choices in educational policy making. Chubb and Moe find their critics unconvincing.

Women have long faced special barriers in their efforts to gain election to political office. We show that the hurdles women encounter go beyond the often-described familial responsibilities and occupational disadvantages to include perceptual and political barriers unique to women. Using a two-wave, five-year panel of people serving on city councils, we find women likely to pursue higher office only under particular conditions—conditions that seem to matter little to men. Additionally, the success of women in pursuing higher office is more closely tied to the circumstances in which they find themselves than is the success of men. We suggest that the motivational circumstances of women and men in pursuing a political career are more complex than previously assumed. It is not just that men and women differ in their career attitudes and perceptions but that these attitudes and perceptions have different meaning for the two sexes.

The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935 represented a turning point in modern labor relations policy in the United States. In the December 1989 issue of this Review, Michael Goldfield examined the effects of worker insurgency and radical organization on the enactment of the new labor law and rejected theories that emphasized the autonomy of the state from societal forces. In this Controversy, Theda Skocpol and Kenneth Finegold argue that the growing strength of liberal Democrats in Congress following the 1934 election and the failure of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) as an economic recovery measure provided the most important causes for the passage of the NLRA in mid-1935. In response Goldfield argues that the results of the 1934 election were themselves influenced by the protest environment and that the passage of the NLRA was a foregone conclusion before the NIRA was struck down.

George Tsebelis argued in the March 1989 issue of this Review that decision theory is completely appropriate for analyzing games against nature but not appropriate for dissecting games against a rational opponent. Analysts who mistake a rational opponent for nature in constructing models commit what Tsebelis calls “the Robinson Crusoe fallacy.” In this controversy, William Bianco and Peter Ordeshook attack components of Tsebelis's argument. Bianco believes the model should be set up as an iterated, rather than a one-shot, game. Ordeshook feels that proper modeling cannot rely merely on two-person games and, in addition, he argues that Tsebelis commits some technical errors. In his reply, Tsebelis joins the issues and buttresses his original analysis.

We examine the role that one group of party units—county party organizations—play in electoral politics, based on electoral and county party organizational data collected during 1980–84. Local party chairs report their organizations are involved in a number of electorally relevant activities, including candidate recruitment, joint planning with candidate organizations, and various independent campaign activities. The data demonstrate that county party organizations are indeed effective. The probability of a minority party's running candidates for lower-level offices, which appears to contribute to higher vote totals for higher-level offices, is a function of the local strength and activity level of the party; whereas direct effects are seen to be small. These data suggest that even if mainly at the candidate recruitment stage of the process, party organizations play an important role in local electoral politics.

For centuries scholars have engaged in interpreting the meaning of Plato's Republic. In this exchange, Peter Steinberger and Christopher Duncan debate the role of guardians and philosopher-kings in the ancient city. This controversy is ignited by Steinberger's essay on Platonic rulers in the December 1989 issue of this Review.

In the December 1988 issue of this Review, John Dryzek and Stephen Leonard argued the need for “context-sensitive” histories of the discipline of political science. In their view, disciplinary history must guide practical inquiry if it is to be most useful. The course of their argument draws the criticisms of three political scientists concerned about the history of political science—James Farr, John Gunnell, and Raymond Seidelman. Dryzek and Leonard respond to their critics and underscore their own rationale for enhanced interest in the history of the discipline.

If candidates are uncertain about the policy position preferred by the median voter and therefore face the risk of stating an unpopular position, in equilibrium both candidates may prefer to make their positions ambiguous rather than to specify them. The incentives to be ambiguous are further increased if the position announced by one candidate allows the other candidate to estimate the preferences of the voters better.

In the September 1987 issue of this Review, we developed a game-theoretic model of committee or legislative decision making, showing the extent to which members may have incentives to share, or conceal, information. Because the formal analysis and statement of results for this model were in error, we offer this correction.