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Complexity provides a better explanation than probability for confidence in syllogistic inferences

  • Graeme S. Halford (a1)
Abstract
Abstract

Bayesian rationality is an important contribution to syllogistic inference, but it has limitations. The claim that confidence in a conclusion is a function of informativeness of the max-premise is anomalous because this is the least probable premise. A more plausible account is that confidence is inversely related to complexity. Bayesian rationality should be supplemented with principles based on cognitive complexity.

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G. S. Halford , N. Cowan & G Andrews . (2007) Separating cognitive capacity from knowledge: A new hypothesis. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11(6):236–42.

M. Oaksford & N Chater . (2007) Bayesian rationality: The probabilistic approach to human reasoning. Oxford University Press.

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Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • ISSN: 0140-525X
  • EISSN: 1469-1825
  • URL: /core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences
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