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The path not taken

  • Daniel Dennett (a1)
  • DOI:
  • Published online: 01 February 2010

The differences Block attempts to capture with his putative distinction between P-consciousness and A-consciousness are more directly and perspicuously handled in terms of differences in richness of content and degree of influence. Block's critiques, based on his misbegotten distinction, evaporate on closer inspection.

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