Skip to main content
×
Home
    • Aa
    • Aa
  • Get access
    Check if you have access via personal or institutional login
  • Cited by 4
  • Cited by
    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Lohse, Karoline Kalitschke, Theresa Ruthmann, Katja and Rakoczy, Hannes 2015. The development of reasoning about the temporal and causal relations among past, present, and future events. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, Vol. 138, p. 54.


    Peatfield, Nicholas A. Turnbull, Oliver H. Parkinson, John and Intriligator, James 2012. Quick as a BLINK: An ultrarapid analogue of Iowa Gambling Task decision making. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, Vol. 34, Issue. 3, p. 243.


    Kaufman, Scott Barry DeYoung, Colin G. Reis, Deidre L. and Gray, Jeremy R. 2011. General intelligence predicts reasoning ability even for evolutionarily familiar content. Intelligence, Vol. 39, Issue. 5, p. 311.


    De Neys, Wim 2006. Automatic–heuristic and executive–analytic processing during reasoning: Chronometric and dual-task considerations. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, Vol. 59, Issue. 6, p. 1070.


    ×

The rationality debate as a progressive research program

  • Keith E. Stanovich (a1) and Richard F. West (a2)
  • DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X03240115
  • Published online: 01 August 2003
Abstract

We did not, as Brakel & Shevrin imply, intend to classify either System 1 or System 2 as rational or irrational. Instrumental rationality is assessed at the organismic level, not at the subpersonal level. Thus, neither System 1 nor System 2 are themselves inherently rational or irrational. Also, that genetic fitness and instrumental rationality are not to be equated was a major theme in our target article. We disagree with Bringsjord & Yang's point that the tasks used in the heuristics and biases literature are easy. Bringsjord & Yang too readily conflate the ability to utilize a principle of rational choice with the disposition to do so. Thus, they undervalue tasks in the cognitive science literature that compellingly reveal difficulties with the latter. We agree with Newton & Roberts that models at the algorithmic level of analysis are crucial, but we disagree with their implication that attention to issues of rationality at the intentional level of analysis impedes work at the algorithmic level of analysis.

Copyright
Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • ISSN: 0140-525X
  • EISSN: 1469-1825
  • URL: /core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *
×