¹ Party identification first appeared in Belknap, G. and Campbell, Angus, “Political Party Identification and Attitudes Toward Foreign Policy,” Public Opinion Quarterly (Winter 1952)Google Scholar; but better known discussions are Campbell, et al., The Voter Decides (Evanston, Ill. 1954)Google Scholar; The American Voter (New York 1960); and Elections and the Political Order (New York 1966). Some cross-national comparisons are in P. Converse and G. Dupeux, “Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States,” and A. Campbell and H. Valen, “Party Identification in Norway and the United States,” in Elections and the Political Order; Butler, D. and Stokes, D., Political Change in Britain (New York 1969)Google Scholar; Shively, W.P., “Voting Stability and the Nature of Party Attachments in the Weimar Republic,” American Political Science Review, 66 (December 1972), 1203–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jennings, M.K., “Partisan Commitment and Electoral Behaviour in the Netherlands,” Acta Politica, 7 (October 1972), 445–70Google Scholar; Borre, O. and Katz, D., “Party Identification and Its Motivational Base in a Multiparty System: A Study of the Danish General Election of 1971,” Scandinavian Political Studies, 8 (1973), 69–111.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² For a discussion of these criticisms and a counter-argument, see Miller, W.E., “The Cross-National Use of Party Identification as a Stimulus to Political Inquiry,” paper prepared for The Workshop on Participation, Voting, and Party Competition, European Consortium for Political Research, Joint Sessions, Strasbourg, 28 March – 2 April 1974.Google Scholar The source of some criticism is the observed instability of party loyalties in some polities. See, for example, Thomassen, J., “Party Identification as a Cross-Cultural Concept: Its meaning in the Netherlands,” paper prepared for A Workshop on Participation, Voting and Party Competition, ECPR Joint Sessions, Strasbourg, 28 March – 2 April, 1974.Google Scholar Others have questioned the meaning of the responses to the standard questions. See, for example, Johnston, J. Paul, “On the Psychological Basis of Party Identification: A Re-Assessment,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the CPSA, Edmonton, June 1975Google Scholar; and Jenson, J., Clarke, H., Leduc, L., and Pammett, J., “Patterns of Partisanship in Canada: Split Identification and Cross-Time Variation,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the APSA, San Francisco, September 1975.Google Scholar

³ Most explicit criticism is found in Meisel, J., Working Papers on Canadian Politics (Montreal, enlarged edition, 1973).CrossRefGoogle Scholar An argument for the concept is found in Sniderman, P. et al., “Party Loyalty and Electoral Volatility,” this Journal, VII, 2 (June 1974).Google Scholar

⁴ Miller, “Cross-National Use,” 1

⁵ See Campbell, The Voter Decides, passim, The American Voter, passim; and more recently, Miller, “Cross-National Use,” who reiterates that the real utility of the concept lies in under-standing the impact it has on structuring opinions about the elements of politics. He feels that this emphasis may have been lost in some recent work but emphasizes the need to look again at the effect of party identification in producing perceptual distortions.

⁶ Converse and Dupeux, “Politicization of the Electorate”

⁷ Butler and Stokes, Political Change, 41–2; Thomassen, “Party Identification”; and Jenson, J., “Party Loyalty in Canada: The Question of Party Identification,” this Journal, VIII (December 1975), 543–53Google Scholar

⁸ Downs, A., An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York 1957)Google Scholar

⁹ The Responsible Electorate (New York 1966), 7

¹⁰ For an example of this type of reconsideration see articles by Pomper, et al., “Issue Voting,” American Political Science Review, LXVI (June 1972), 415–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Repass, David E., “Issue Salience and Party Choice,” American Political Science Review, LXV (June 1970), 389–400Google Scholar; Pierce, John G., “Party Identification and the Changing Role of Ideology in American Politics,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, 14 (February 1970), 25–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Field, J.O. and Anderson, R.E., “Ideology in the Public's Conceptualization of the 1964 Election,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 33 (Fall 1969), 380–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The results have been mixed but with generally similar conclusions. These point to the need for a reevaluation of the analysis done in the 1950s and also to a consideration of the uniqueness of a particular period of political history. The view of the voter which seems to be emerging is that which is characterized by Pomper as “the meddling partisan,” see, Pomper, Gerald M., Elections in America: Control and Influence in Democratic Politics (New York 1971), 92ff.Google Scholar

¹¹ With all this reexamination of both the assumptions and the results of earlier voting studies, the part played by party identification has not been very thoroughly reexamined. For example, Pomper, who pays more attention to the role of continuing partisanship than do most authors, accepts the view of party identification as an affective tie, colouring the perception of the political world and remaining basically immutable, although the vote may change. The voter's partisan attachment is still one step removed from the actual vote. The parties must provide strong stimuli to attract the individual's support in any given election. Ibid., 92–7. See also the place assigned partisanship in the work of Boyd, Richard W., “Presidential Elections: An Explanation of Voting Defection,” American Political Science Review, LXIII (June 1969), 498–514.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹² “Social Determinism and Rationality as Bases of Party Identification,” American Political Science Review, LXII (March 1969), 5–25

¹³ He assumed that, ceteris paribus, the better educated would act with more effective rationality than the less well educated. He then went on to examine the relationship for the better educated and for the less well educated between sociological characteristics and both party affiliation and partisan attitudes. He found that in his sample it was possible to predict party affiliation and partisan attitudes from sociological characteristics better for those respondents with high education than for those with low. Where parental ties had been sociologically deviant, individuals corrected their own affiliations more often as education increased. Ibid., 14–20

¹⁴ The influence of party, usually operationalized as a party label, is seen in the discussion of politics in a nonpartisan setting. The conclusion of most of these studies is that a party label is a powerful cue for behaviour through its informational content. In the absence of party labels, voting behaviour tends to take on quite different configurations and produce different results. Most of this literature deals with politics at the municipal level, where nonpartisan contests are more common. See, for example, the literature cited and discussed in Greenstein, F.I., The American Party System and the American People (2nd ed.Englewood Cliffs 1970), 66–70.Google Scholar A specific Canadian study of the different behaviour is in Fowler, E.P. and Goldrick, M.D., “Patterns of Partisan and Nonpartisan Balloting,” in Emerging Party Politics in Canada, ed. Masson, Jack K. and Anderson, James D. (Toronto 1973).Google Scholar A fascinating report of an experiment on this subject is reported by Kamin, Leon J., “Ethnic and Party Affiliations of Candidates as Determinants of Voting” in Voting in Canada, ed. Courtney, John C. (Toronto 1967).Google Scholar

¹⁵ See, for example, Regenstreif, Peter, The Diefenbaker Interlude (Toronto 1965)Google Scholar, in which the effect of Diefenbaker's leadership is described as a “cataclysm.” See also Meisel, John, The Canadian General Election of 1957 (Toronto 1962)Google Scholar, esp. chap. 2, “The Diefenbaker Revolution.” The title of Newman's, Peter book points to his view of Diefenbaker as leader and prime minister: Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years (Toronto 1973).CrossRefGoogle Scholar It is Newman who says: “The ordinary Canadian Tory, who believed that his party stood for individual responsibility, the British connection, and free enterprise could hardly be blamed for concluding that these ideals had been placed in greater danger by Diefenbaker's tenure than by the preceding two decades of Liberal administration.” Ibid., xxii.

¹⁶ See Meisel, The Canadian General Election of 1957, 21; Camp, Dalton, Gentlemen, Players and Politicians (Toronto 1970)Google Scholar, and Newman, Renegade in Power, 46 and xxii; and Newman, Peter C., The Distemper of Our Times (Toronto 1968), 110–18Google Scholar and passim.

¹⁷ According to one of the descriptions of Conservative party ideology provided by a senior and eminent member, “the Conservative Party naturally has a profound interest in the traditions of the past and seeks to preserve those values which have made our nation great and free. But in their years of responsibility for Canadian affairs Conservatives have not hesitated to enter new paths and to initiate new policies if they appear practical and beneficial. Indeed at many decisive stages of our history the Conservative Party has been the party of reform.” Macquarrie, Heath, The Conservative Party (Toronto 1965), 1Google Scholar

¹⁸ There was a progressive wing of the party in 1942 which feared the threat of the CCF on the left and recognized the necessity of the Conservatives appealing to some of the same supporters through a more innovative social welfare policy. The Port Hope Conference was organized by this radical wing of the party and the document produced shows how different their way of thinking was from the past. While placing much emphasis on free enterprise as the solution to economic ills, it strongly recognized the need for state intervention, if necessary to prevent the recurrence of crises similar to the one just experienced. Included in the changes were important concessions to labour, farmers, and the disadvantaged – concessions heretofore absent from Conservative statements. The new position of the party vis-à-vis the competition was described by a journal of the time: “It will not, after Port Hope, be possible for the Conservative Party to attempt to insinuate itself to the Right of the Liberals. [Its only course] is to seek public approval as a party somewhat further Left than the Liberals but not so disturbingly Left as the CCF.” The party itself saw the CCF as the major threat and the way to counter it was to find a leader to match its new programs. Such a person was thought to be John Bracken, the Progressive leader in Manitoba. See Granatstein, J.L., The Politics of Survival (Toronto 1967)Google Scholar, passim, and esp. i, 27, 69, 129, 133–34. Also see Christian, W. and Campbell, C., Political Parties and Ideologies in Canada (Toronto 1974), 97–9.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Meisel, The Canadian General Election of 1957, 24–5, 27; Richardson, B.T., Canada and Mr, Diefenbaker (Toronto 1962), 7Google Scholar; Newman, Renegade in Power, 45–7. For a description of the “Toronto gang” opposed to Bracken, see Granatstein, Politics of Survival, 153. For a detailed discussion of his Quebec opponents see Johnston, James, The Party's Over (Toronto 1971), 3Google Scholar; Camp, Gentlemen, Players and Politicians, 251–2; Newman, Renegade in Power, 45, and The Distemper of Our Times, 104–7. For a more detailed description of the programmatic expression of Diefenbaker's opposition to business see Newman, Renegade in Power, 192—4. The extent of the alienation from the party due to Diefenbaker's leadership is described in Regenstreif, Diefenbaker Interlude, 51–5. For a discussion of his most important supporters see Meisel, The Canadian Election of 1957, 28; Newman, Renegade in Power, 45; and Regenstreif, Diefenbaker Interlude, 29.

²⁰ Meisel, The Canadian General Election of 1957, 24

²¹ Ibid., 39–40; Camp, Gentlemen, Players and Politicians, 250–1; Beck, J. Murray, The Pendulum of Power (Toronto 1968), 296Google Scholar

²² Newman, Renegade in Power, 182

²³ As Peter Newman observed: “Diefenbaker's overriding consideration was to avoid the identification with Bay Street that had brought the ruin of R.B. Bennett and hurled the Conservative Party into the political wilderness for twenty-two years. “It became obvious very early in the Diefenbaker years that his was a Conservative government in name only. Instead of moving to promote and strengthen the country's financial community Diefenbaker rushed in the opposite direction – harassing, curbing and discouraging free enterprise at every turn. In the privacy of their clubs, dismayed executives clucked their disapproval of Diefenbaker and all his works as a fundamentally disruptive force.” Renegade in Power, 8. One of the reasons for this opposition to the prime minister could have been the drop in corporate profits that occurred between 1956 and 1962. A discussion of the impact on voting patterns is found in Regenstreif, Diefenbaker Interlude, 39.

²⁴ For several descriptions of Diefenbaker's policy proposals see Macquarrie, The Conservative Party, 135–8, 144, 162; Regenstreif, Diefenbaker Interlude, 40; and Christian and Campbell, Political Parties, 102–5

²⁵ Regenstreif, Diefenbaker Interlude, 2, reports that this electoral instability did occur.

²⁶ There has been some recent analysis of instability in party identification in the United States. See, for example, Dryer, Edward C., “Change and Stability in Party Identifications,” Journal of Politics, 35 (August 1973), 712–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Dobson, Douglas and Angelo, Douglas St, “Party Identification and the Floating Vote: Some Dynamics,” American Political Science Review, 69 (June 1975), 481–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The rate of change reported there is about one-third that found in comparable Canadian data. See J. Jenson, H. Clarke, L. LeDuc and J. Pammett, “Patterns of Partisanship in Canada,” 25.

²⁷ It should be noted that, although this analysis is confined to partisans leaving the Progressive Conservative party, a similar argument might be made about the timing and reason for change into a PC identification. A parallel analysis produces results which are all in the proper direction. New Conservative identifiers moved more in the years 1956–61 than did new identifiers with other parties, and they tended to have a higher rate of mention of leadership as the reason for the move, especially in that time period. However, because the sample contains only half the number of switchers into that party as compared to switchers out, any detailed analysis cannot be reported because the numbers fall off much too quickly.

²⁸ It is for this reason that switching into the Progressive Conservative party cannot be examined, either with regard to the reaction of particular social groups or with regard to direction of movement.

²⁹ The hypothetical reaction was obtained from the answers to the following question: “Suppose there was an election in which the party you usually prefer was in favour of some policy you did not like or did not agree with. What would you be most likely to do? Vote for the party's candidate anyway? Consider another party's candidate? Or would you probably not vote?”