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Modeling Rational Players: Part I

  • Ken Binmore (a1)
  • DOI:
  • Published online: 01 December 2008

Game theory has proved a useful tool in the study of simple economic models. However, numerous foundational issues remain unresolved. The situation is particularly confusing in respect of the non-cooperative analysis of games with some dynamic structure in which the choice of one move or another during the play of the game may convey valuable information to the other players. Without pausing for breath, it is easy to name at least 10 rival equilibrium notions for which a serious case can be made that here is the “right” solution concept for such games.

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R. Aumann 1974. “Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Mixed Strategy.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 1:6796.

D. Bernheim 1984. “Rationalizable Strategic Behavior.” Econometrica 52:1007–28.

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  • ISSN: 0266-2671
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