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  • Cited by 5
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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Handfield, Toby 2016. Essentially Comparative Value Does Not Threaten Transitivity. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 5, Issue. 1, p. 3.


    Handfield, Toby 2014. Rational Choice and the Transitivity of Betterness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 89, Issue. 3, p. 584.


    Voorhoeve, Alex 2013. VAULTING INTUITION: TEMKIN'S CRITIQUE OF TRANSITIVITY. Economics and Philosophy, Vol. 29, Issue. 03, p. 409.


    KURTULMUS, A. FAIK 2012. Uncertainty behind the Veil of Ignorance. Utilitas, Vol. 24, Issue. 01, p. 41.


    Rabinowicz, Wlodek 2012. VALUE RELATIONS REVISITED. Economics and Philosophy, Vol. 28, Issue. 02, p. 133.


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TRANSITIVITY AND VAGUENESS

  • MOZAFFAR QIZILBASH (a1)
  • DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0266267104000410
  • Published online: 01 April 2005
Abstract

Axiomatic utility theory plays a foundational role in some accounts of normative principles. In this context, it is sometimes argued that transitivity of “better than” is a logical truth. Larry Temkin and Stuart Rachels use various examples to argue that “better than” is non–transitive, and that transitivity is not a logical truth. These examples typically involve some sort of “discontinuity.” In his discussion of one of these examples, John Broome suggests that we should reject the claim which involves “discontinuity.” We can, I suggest, make sense of the examples which Temkin uses while sacrificing neither transitivity nor “discontinuity.” This response to Temkin's examples involves developing and modifying James Griffin's account of “discontinuity.” If the account of “discontinuity” seems implausible, that is because of a failure to allow for vagueness. A similar argument can be made in the context of the well-known “repugnant conclusion.”

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Economics & Philosophy
  • ISSN: 0266-2671
  • EISSN: 1474-0028
  • URL: /core/journals/economics-and-philosophy
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