Skip to main content
×
Home
    • Aa
    • Aa

RELIGIOUS DISAGREEMENT: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY AMONG ACADEMIC PHILOSOPHERS

Abstract
Abstract

Religious disagreement is an emerging topic of interest in social epistemology. Little is known about how philosophers react to religious disagreements in a professional context, or how they think one should respond to disagreement. This paper presents results of an empirical study on religious disagreement among philosophers. Results indicate that personal religious beliefs, philosophical training, and recent changes in religious outlook have a significant impact on philosophers' assessments of religious disagreement. They regard peer disagreement about religion as common, and most surveyed participants assume one should accord weight to the other's opinion. Theists and agnostics are less likely to assume they are in a better epistemic position than their interlocutors about religious questions compared with atheists, but this pattern only holds for participants who are not philosophers of religion. Continental philosophers think religious beliefs are more like preferences than analytic philosophers, who regard religious beliefs as fact-like.

Copyright
Corresponding author
helenldecruz@gmail.com
Linked references
Hide All

This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

D. Bourget and D. J. Chalmers 2014. ‘What do Philosophers Believe?Philosophical Studies, 170: 465500.

D. Christensen 2007. ‘Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.’ Philosophical Review, 116: 187217.

D. Christensen and J. Lackey (eds) 2013. The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

H. De Cruz 2015. ‘Where Philosophical Intuitions Come From.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 93: 233–49.

E. H. Ecklund and C. P. Scheitle 2007. ‘Religion among Academic Scientists: Distinctions, Disciplines, and Demographics.Social Problems, 54: 289307.

A. Elga 2005. ‘On Overrating Oneself … And Knowing It.’ Philosophical Studies, 123: 115–24.

A. Elga 2007. ‘Reflection and Disagreement.’ Noûs, 41: 478502.

B. Frances 2010. ‘The Reflective Epistemic Renegade.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81: 419–63.

N. Gross and S. Simmons 2009. ‘The Religiosity of American College and University Professors.’ Sociology of Religion, 70: 101–29.

P. L. Harris , E. S. Pasquini , S. Duke , J. J. Asscher and F. Pons (2006). ‘Germs and Angels: The Role of Testimony in Young Children's Ontology.’ Developmental Science, 9: 7696.

L. Heiphetz , E. S. Spelke , P. L. Harris and M. R. Banaji 2013. ‘The Development of Reasoning about Beliefs: Fact, Preference, and Ideology.’ Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 49: 559–65.

J. Lackey 2014. ‘Taking Religious Disagreement Seriously.’ In L. F. Callahan and T. O'Connor (eds), Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue, pp. 299316. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

J. Pittard 2014. ‘Conciliationism and Religious Disagreement.’ In M. Bergmann and P. Kain (eds), Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief. Disagreement and Evolution, pp. 8097. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

A. Plantinga 2000. Warranted Christian Belief. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

R. A. Rini 2015. ‘How Not to Test for Philosophical Expertise.’ Synthese, 192: 431–52.

E. Schwitzgebel and F. Cushman 2012. ‘Expertise in moral reasoning? Order effects on moral judgment in professional philosophers and non-philosophers.’ Mind and Language, 27: 135–53.

E. Schwitzgebel and F. Cushman 2015. ‘Philosophers’ Biased Judgments Persist Despite Training, Expertise and Reflection.’ Cognition, 141: 127–37.

H. Seyedsayamdost 2015. ‘On Gender and Philosophical Intuition: Failure of Replication and other Negative Results.’ Philosophical Psychology, 28: 642–73.

P. van Inwagen 2010. ‘We're Right. They're Wrong.’ In R. Feldman and T. A. Warfield (eds), Disagreement, pp. 1028. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

N. Van Leeuwen 2014. ‘Religious Credence is not Factual Belief.’ Cognition, 133: 698715.

Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

Episteme
  • ISSN: 1742-3600
  • EISSN: 1750-0117
  • URL: /core/journals/episteme
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *
×

Metrics

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 3
Total number of PDF views: 36 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 412 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between September 2016 - 26th September 2017. This data will be updated every 24 hours.