Quaglia, Lucia and Spendzharova, Aneta 2017. Post-crisis reforms in banking: Regulators at the interface between domestic and international governance. Regulation & Governance,
Silvestre, Bruno S. Gimenes, Felipe Augusto P. and e Silva Neto, Romeu 2017. A sustainability paradox? Sustainable operations in the offshore oil and gas industry: The case of Petrobras. Journal of Cleaner Production, Vol. 142, p. 360.
Copelovitch, Mark and Singer, David A. 2017. Tipping the (Im)balance: Capital inflows, financial market structure, and banking crises. Economics & Politics, Vol. 29, Issue. 3, p. 179.
Maxfield, Sylvia Winecoff, W. Kindred and Young, Kevin L. 2017. An empirical investigation of the financialization convergence hypothesis. Review of International Political Economy, p. 1.
Copelovitch, Mark Frieden, Jeffry and Walter, Stefanie 2016. The Political Economy of the Euro Crisis. Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 49, Issue. 7, p. 811.
Frieden, Jeffry 2016. The Governance of International Finance. Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 19, Issue. 1, p. 33.
Wright, Sue Sheedy, Elizabeth Magee, Shane and Smith, Tom 2016. International compliance with new Basel Accord principles for risk governance. Accounting & Finance,
Howarth, David and Quaglia, Lucia 2016. The Comparative Political Economy of Basel III in Europe. Policy and Society,
Fernández-Albertos, José 2015. The Politics of Central Bank Independence. Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 18, Issue. 1, p. 217.
Quaglia, Lucia 2015. The Politics of ‘Third Country Equivalence’ in Post-Crisis Financial Services Regulation in the European Union. West European Politics, Vol. 38, Issue. 1, p. 167.
Kleibl, Johannes 2015. Coercion and the Global Spread of Securities Regulation. International Interactions, Vol. 41, Issue. 1, p. 1.
Greenwood, Justin and Roederer-Rynning, Christilla 2015. The “Europeanization” of the Basel process: Financial harmonization between globalization and parliamentarization. Regulation & Governance, Vol. 9, Issue. 4, p. 325.
Bach, David and Newman, Abraham 2014. Domestic drivers of transgovernmental regulatory cooperation. Regulation & Governance, Vol. 8, Issue. 4, p. 395.
Spendzharova, Aneta B. 2014. Banking union under construction: The impact of foreign ownership and domestic bank internationalization on European Union member-states’ regulatory preferences in banking supervision. Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 21, Issue. 4, p. 949.
Kindred Winecoff, W. 2014. Bank Regulation, Macroeconomic Management, and Monetary Incentives in OECD Economies. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 58, Issue. 3, p. 448.
Quaglia, Lucia 2014. The European Union, the USA and International Standard Setting by Regulatory Fora in Finance. New Political Economy, Vol. 19, Issue. 3, p. 427.
Sennholz-Weinhardt, Barbara 2014. Regulatory competition as a social fact: Constructing and contesting the threat of hedge fund managers’ relocation from Britain. Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 21, Issue. 6, p. 1240.
Rixen, Thomas 2013. Why reregulation after the crisis is feeble: Shadow banking, offshore financial centers, and jurisdictional competition. Regulation & Governance, Vol. 7, Issue. 4, p. 435.
Bengtsson,, Elias 2013. The Political Economy of Banking Regulation – Does the Basel 3 Accord Imply a Change?. Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 46, Issue. 3, p. 303.
In the past fifteen years, financial regulators from the developed
world have attempted to create international regulatory standards in a
variety of financial issue areas. Their negotiations are notable for
the stark variation in the preferences of regulators toward
international regulatory harmonization. Certain regulators actively
resist any attempts at regulatory harmonization, while others are vocal
in their advocacy for an international agreement. When will regulators
seek to harmonize their rules with their foreign counterparts? I
propose a principal-agent framework for analyzing regulator behavior
that views international harmonization as a means of satisfying
domestic political pressures. The framework predicts that regulators
are more likely to seek international regulatory harmonization when
confidence in the stability of financial institutions is declining, and
when competitive pressures are increasing from foreign firms facing
less stringent regulations. I explore the consistency of the framework
with two important cases in the history of international financial
regulation: the negotiations among bank regulators leading up to the
1988 Basel Accord on bank capital adequacy, and the negotiations among
securities regulators over capital adequacy for securities firms
between 1988 and 1992.
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.
Full text views reflects the number of PDF downloads, PDFs sent to Google Drive, Dropbox and Kindle and HTML full text views.
* Views captured on Cambridge Core between September 2016 - 24th November 2017. This data will be updated every 24 hours.