An American epistemic community played a key role in creating the international shared understanding and practice of nuclear arms control. In the absence of nuclear war, leaders' expectations of nuclear war and of its control were affected by causal theories and abstract propositions and models which, given their “scientific” and technical nature, were developed by an epistemic community. This study, which emphasizes the roles played by epistemic communities in policy innovation and in the diffusion of understandings across nations and communities, analyzes how the theoretical and practical ideas of the arms control epistemic community became political expectations, were diffused to the Soviet Union, and were ultimately embodied in the 1972 antiballistic missile (ABM) arms control treaty. In contrast to those studies that have concentrated primarily on the workings of international epistemic communities, this study stresses the notion that domestically developed theoretical expectations, which were worked out by a national group of experts and selected by the American government as the basis for negotiations with the Soviets, became the seed of the ABM regime. Moreover, by suggesting that the arms control epistemic community was really an aggregation of several factions that shared common ground against various intellectual and policy rivals, this study sheds light on the question of how much coherence an epistemic community requires. The political selection of new conceptual understandings, followed by their retention and diffusion at national and international levels, suggests an evolutionary approach at odds with explanations of international change advanced by structural realism and approaches based on it.
For their comments and insights, I am grateful to the members of the review committee of International Organization; to the other contributors to this special issue, especially Peter Haas and M. J. Peterson; to my colleagues at the Center for Science and International Affairs, especially Joseph Nye; and to Hayward Alker, Stephen Graubard, Joseph Grieco, Ernst Haas, and Thomas Schelling. Research funds were provided by the Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, and by the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1988.
1. An epistemic community, as defined in this issue of IO, is a network of individuals or groups with an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within their domain of expertise. The community members share knowledge about the causation of social and physical phenomena in an area for which they have a reputation for competence, and they have a common set of normative beliefs about what will benefit human welfare in such a domain. While members are often from a number of different professions and disciplines, they adhere to the following: (1) shared consummatory values and principled beliefs; (2) shared causal beliefs or professional judgment; (3) common notions of validity based on intersubjective, internally defined criteria for validating knowledge; and (4) a common policy project.
2. Freedman, Lawrence, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 191.International Organization 46, 1, Winter 1992 by the World Peace Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
3. See Posvar, Wesley W., “The New Meaning of Arms Control,” Air Force Magazine, 06 1963, p. 38. For another study on intellectuals and nuclear weapons, see Kolkowicz, Roman, “Intellectuals and the Nuclear Deterrence System,” in Kolkowicz, Roman, ed., The Logic of Nuclear Terror (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), pp. 15–46.
4. Krasner has defined international regimes as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” Whether the regime concept applies to international security, however, has been debated. On the one hand, Jervis and others have argued that the anarchic characteristics of this issue-area tend to lower incentives for cooperation and regime building. On the other hand, Nye has shown that once we take the set of agreements, injunctions, and institutions as forming not just one comprehensive security regime but an incomplete mosaic of partial security regimes, the notion of security regimes makes sense. These partial security regimes have led to the creation of understandings about what it takes to negotiate security agreements, what type of norms and rules can be applied, and how. In some cases, they have helped to institutionalize rules of reciprocity, limit competition, transfer information needed to comply with the agreements, and enhance crisis stability by generating stable expectations, including the expectation that diplomacy and negotiations should not be interrupted in the event of international crises. Taken together, and regardless of their various degrees of success, partial security regimes have amounted to a discreet yet significant effort to limit and control autonomous action in the security area. See Krasner, Stephen, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” in Krasner, Stephen D., ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 2;Jervis, Robert, “Security Regimes,” in Krasner, International Regimes, pp. 173–94; and Nye, Joseph S. Jr, “Nuclear Learning,” International Organization 41 (Summer 1987), pp. 371–402.
5. Ranger, Robin, Amis and Politics, 1958–1978: As Control in a Changing Political Context (Toronto: Macmillan, 1979).
6. See Putnam, Robert D., “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42 (Summer 1988), p. 434. My approach is further developed in “Cognitive Evolution: A Dynamic Approach for the Study of International Relations and Their Progress,” in Adler, Emanuel and Crawford, Beverly, eds., Progress in Postwar International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 43–88. See also Adler, Emanuel, The Power of Ideology: The Quest for Technological Autonomy in Argentina and Brazil (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987). For other approaches dealing with the role of ideas in world politics, see Goldstein, Judith, “Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy,” International Organization 42 (Winter 1988), pp. 179–217; Odell, John S., U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as Sources of Change (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982); Ruggie, John G., “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” in Krasner, International Regimes, pp. 195–231; and Hall, Peter A., ed., The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism Across Nations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). For key structural realist studies, see Waltz, Kenneth N., Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979); and Gilpin, Robert, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
7. Weber, Steve, “Realism, Detente and Nuclear Weapons,” International Organization 44 (Winter 1990), p. 77.
8. The conventional structural analysis refers to the approach outlined by Waltz, in Theory of International Politics. According to Weber, the new structural organizing principle “follows from joint custodianship, a function that was acquired by the United States and Soviet Union and which fundamentally differentiates them from other states.” See Weber, , “Realism, Detente and Nuclear Weapons,” p. 77.
9. Structuration theory, as defined by Wendt, is “a relational solution to the agent-structure problem that conceptualizes agents and structures as mutually constituted or co-determined entities.” See Wendt, Alexander E., “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” international Organization 41 (Summer 1987), p. 350. See also Giddens, Anthony, Central Problems in Social Theory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); and Giddens, Anthony, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984).
10. Weber, , “Realism, Detente and Nuclear Weapons,” p. 69.
11. This framework is partly inspired by Stephen Toulmin's discussion in Human Understanding (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 122–23.
12. Rotblat, J., History of the Pugwash Conferences (London: Taylor & Francis, 1962).
13. Ruggie, John G., “Changing Frameworks of International Collective Behavior: On the Complementarity of Contradictory Tendencies,” in Choucri, Nazli and Robinson, Thomas W., eds., Forecasting in International Relations: Theory, Methods, Problems, Prospects (San Francisco: Freeman, 1978), p. 403.
14. Brenner, Michael J., “The Theorist as Actor, the Actor as Theorist: Strategy in the Nixon Administration,” Stanford Journal of International Studies 7 (Spring 1972), pp. 109–10.
15. See Posvar, Wesley W., “The Impact of Strategy Expertise on the National Security Policy of the United States,” Public Policy, vol. 13, 1964, p. 39. See also Gowing, Margaret, “An Old and Intimate Relationship,” in Bogdanor, Vernon, ed., Science and Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 68. According to Gowing, “The scientists of the atomic era indeed became acutely conscious of phenomena which rule political life: the conflict of desires and aims, the conflict between the interests of different generations, the difficulty of calculating consequences. In the years of their ascendency they proved that they were not all-wise nor indeed all-wicked but infinitely human. They could change their minds with devastating speed. They could be both wise and foolish, both myopic and far-sighted, both judicious and ridiculous, both clear-headed and muddled. They turned out to be, indeed remarkably like the politicians.”
16. See Posvar, , “The Impact of Strategy Expertise on the National Security Policy of the United States,” p. 40. See also Garnett, John, “Strategic Studies and Its Assumptions,” in Baylis, John et al. , eds., Contemporary Strategy (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1987).
17. Reynolds, Charles, The Politics of War: A Study of the Rationality of Violence in International Relations (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), p. 28.
18. I owe this insight to Hayward Alker. On the nonscientific basis of strategy, see Reynolds, , The Politics of War; and Skolnikoff, Eugene B., Science, Technology and American Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1967), p. 110.
19. Wildavsky, Aaron, “Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation,” American Political Science Review 81 (03 1987), p. 9.
20. Probably the most succinct and best exposition of Schelling's arms control theory is “Reciprocal Measures for Arms Stabilization,” in Brennan, Donald G., ed., Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security (New York: Brazillier, 1961), pp. 167–86.
21. Adler, , “Cognitive Evolution,” p. 61.
22. These two communities have been the most, though certainly not the only, influential ones from a policy point of view in the nuclear debate. Also involved were communities that strove for nuclear abolition and total disarmament and for solving the nuclear predicament through international institutions and world government. See Levine, Robert A., The Arms Debate (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963); Herzog, Arthur, The War-Peace Establishment (New York: Harper & Row, 1965); and Osgood, Robert E., The Nuclear Dilemma in American Strategic Thought (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988). For example, the peace movement, institutionally represented by the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE), promoted a vision of peace radically different from that of the arms controllers. On some occasions, however, SANE came to the help of arms control. And the peace movement also played a significant role in efforts to set aside disarmament ideas and make room for arms control during the period when scientists who were generally favorable to disarmament agreed nevertheless to support arms control as a temporary measure. On SANE, see Katz, Milton S., Ban the Bomb: A History of SANE, the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, 1957–1985 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986).
23. Brodie augured this approach, arguing (for the wrong reasons, as it later emerged) that nuclear weapons should be used only to deter the adversary. In what is probably the most quoted sentence in the field of national security, Brodie summarized the message of his book: “Thus far, the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on, its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have no other useful purpose.” See Brodie, Bernard, The Absolute Weapon (New York: Hartcourt Brace, 1946), p. 76. See also Levine, , The Amts Debate, p. 240.
24. Jervis, Robert, “Arms Control, Stability, and Causes of War,” Daedalus 120 (Winter 1991), p. 172.
25. Borden's, WilliamThere Will Be No Time (New York: Macmillan, 1946) also made early references to the usability of nuclear weapons in war, to the expectation that nuclear wars could be won, and to counterforce targeting, active defenses, and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM s). Borden did not expect nuclear weapons to revolutionize strategy; he expected them only to reinforce some of the oldest and most classic elements of strategy. Believing that the nuclear adversaries would spare each other's cities because of their vulnerability, Borden expected that nuclear weapons would be used against military installations. See Jervis, Robert, “Strategic Theory: What's New and What's True,” in Kolkowicz, The Logic of Nuclear Terror, p. 48; and Levine, , The Arms Debate, p. 240.
26. Jervis, , “Arms Control, Stability, and Causes of War,” p. 173.
27. Levine, , The Arms Debate, pp. 61 and 89–90.
28. Posvar, , “The New Meaning of Arms Control,” pp. 39–40.
29. Thomas Schelling, personal communication.
30. Herzog, , The War-Peace Establishment, p. 4.
31. Hornig, Donald F., “Science and Government in the USA,” in Brooks, Harvey and Cooper, Chester L., eds., Science for Public Policy (New York: Pergamon Press, 1987), p. 20.
33. Posvar, , “The Impact of Strategy Expertise on the National Security Policy of the United States,” p. 49.
34. See Talbott, Strobe, The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988).
35. Sims, Jennifer E., “The Development of American Arms Control Thought, 1945–1960,” Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md., 1985, p. 284.
36. Kaplan, Fred, Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), pp. 123–24.
37. Schelling, Thomas C., The Strategy of Conflict (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. vi.
38. See Neumann, John von and Morgenstern, Oscar, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 2d ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1947).
39. The economists tended to treat strategic problems in a formal, detached, and almost apolitical manner. This approach elicited a strong reaction and even led some writers to portray the nuclear strategists as lesser human beings. See, for example, Rapoport, Anatol, Strategy and Conscience (New York: Harper & Row, 1964); Lapp, Ralph, The New Priesthood: The Scientific Elite and the Uses of Power (New York: Harper & Row, 1965); and Horowitz, Irving L., The War Game: Studies of the New Civilian Militarists (New York: Ballantine Books, 1963).
40. Schelling, Thomas, cited by Herzog in The War-Peace Establishment, p. 49.
41. Sims, , “The Development of American Arms Control Thought,” p. 286.
42. Twenty or more physicists were recruited from MIT to participate in Project Charles and work on continental air defense. The project's product was a three-volume report which concluded that a defense of the United States against Soviet bombers was feasible and should be undertaken promptly. Project Vista dealt with the nonnuclear defense of Europe. See Herken, Gregg, Counsels of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 61, 63, and 65.
43. Experience in one of the major wartime laboratories, especially the MIT Radiation Laboratory and the Laboratories of the Manhattan Project, or an apprenticeship with one or more of the military “summer studies” still appears to be a useful qualification for scientific advising. See Herken, , Counsels of War, pp. 116–21; and Jacobson, Harold K. and Stein, Eric, Diplomats, Scientists and Politicians: The United States and the Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966).
44. Business Week, Special Report, 13 07 1963, p. 75.
45. Wiesner, Jerome B., Where Science and Politics Meet (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 176.
46. Sims, , “The Development of American Arms Control Thought,” pp. 303–4.
47. On the question of whether nuclear strategy is a profession, see Licklider, E., The Private Nuclear Strategists (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1971), chap. 7. See also Posvar, Wesley, ‘trategy Expertise and National Security,” Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., 1964.
48. Licklider, , The Private Nuclear Strategists, pp. 119–22, 130, and 135.
49. See Price, Don K., The Scientific Estate (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1965). See also Gilpin, Robert and Wright, Christopher, eds., Scientists and National Policy Making (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964).
50. For a discussion of the group and a description of the RAND Corporation, see Kaplan, , Wizards of Armageddon, especially pp. 51–73. See also Dickson, Paul, Think-Tanks (New York: Atheneum, 1971).
51. Wohlstetter was a logician-mathematician at RAND. His studies prompted two important reports, R-266 and R-290, dealing with the vulnerability of bombers and the vulnerability of ballistic missiles, respectively. These studies expressed the triumph of quantitative economics oriented study at RAND. As Kaplan noted, “Through Wohlstetter's own personal influence within RAND, vulnerability began to loom as the preoccupying issue, the virtual obsession, of strategic analysis.” See Kaplan, , Wizards of Armageddon, pp. 121–22.
52. Bundy recently characterized the 1955 report as “one of the most influential in the history of American nuclear policy.” See Bundy, McGeorge, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988), p. 325.
53. For a discussion of the Gaither Committee report and its influence, see Halperin, Morton, “The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process,” World Politics 13 (04 1961), especially pp. 382–83.
54. Killian, James R. Jr, Sputnik, Scientists and Eisenhower (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977), p. 7.
55. Talbott, , The Master of the Game, p. 70.
56. The members of the first PSAC were Robert Bacher, William Baker, Hoyd Berkner, Hans Bethe, Detler Bronk, James Doolittle, James Fisk, Caryl Haskins, James R. Killian, George Kistiakowsky, Edwin Land, Emanuel Piore, Edward Purcell, Isador Rabi, H. P. Robertson, Jerome Wiesner, Herbert York, and Jerrold Zacharias. On the PSAC, see Killian, , Sputnik, Scientists and Eisenhower, pp. 107–217.
57. In Counsels of War, p. 116, Herken quotes Eisenhower's reaction to the idea of a nuclear war: “You can't have this kind of war; there just aren't enough bulldozers to scrape the bodies off the streets.”
58. Spurgeon Keeny, cited by Herken, in Counsels of War, p. 117. Jerome Wiesner, another community member, offered the following view: “I first became involved in the disarmament problem as a member of the President's Science Advisory Committee. Prior to that I had been the Staff Director of the Gaither Study. The conclusions of this study convinced me that it was not really feasible to protect the American people if a global nuclear war occurred, and that both the Russians and ourselves would suffer terribly. In fact, I became convinced that as long as the Soviet Union was prepared, as it seemed to be, to attempt to match our military effort, there was no help of avoiding an enormous loss of life in the event of a major nuclear war, regardless of the magnitude of our defense effort” (emphasis added). See Wiesner, , Where Science and Politics Meet, p. 174.
59. Davis, Saville R., “Recent Policy Making in the United States Government,” in Brennan, Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security, p. 385.
60. See Holst, Johan J., “Strategic Arms Control and Stability: A Retrospective Look,” in Holst, Johan J. and Schneider, William, eds., Why ABM: Policy Issues in the Missile Defense Controversy (New York: Pergamon Press, 1969), p. 282. On the test ban conference, see Strickland, Donald A., “Scientists as Negotiators: The 1958 Geneva Conference of Experts,” Midwest Journal of Political Science 13 (11 1964), pp. 372–84.
61. Sims, , “The Development of American Arms Control Thought,” p. 302.
62. See Holst, , “Strategic Arms Control and Stability,’ p. 268. “The Westerners,” observed Holst, , “frequently voiced the expectation that they should be able to convince the Easterners by logical argument” (p. 263). Regarding the Soviet reaction to the American technical approach, see p. 260.
63. See Bechhoefer, Bernard G., Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1961), p. 475. See also Holst, , “Strategic Arms Control and Stability,” pp. 261 and 282.
64. Sims, “The Development of American Arms Control Thought,” chap. 5.
65. In fact, the majority of the “brass” thought these theories to be quite “odd,” since “it seemed to follow [from the theories] that Soviet forces should perhaps not even be targeted, and maybe American cities should not be defended, even if a defense of populations some day became feasible. For if the vulnerability of our forces made us more trigger-happy and was thus a danger to them, then by the same logic their vulnerability was a danger to us: we should therefore not threaten their strategic forces, either directly, by targeting them, or indirectly, by defending our cities and thus effectively neutralizing them.” See Trachtenberg, Marc, “Strategic Thought in America, 1952–1966,” in Trachtenberg, Marc, ed., The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1961–1969 and Retrospectives (New York: Garland, 1988), p. 456.
66. See Freedman, , The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p. 197. The most comprehensive study to date on the intellectual basis of arms control is Sims's “The Development of American Arms Control Thought.” This section builds substantially on her study.
67. See Bull, Hedley, The Control of the Arms Race (London: Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1961); and Bull, Hedley, Hedley Bull on Arms Control, selected and introduced by Robert O'Neill and David N. Schwartz (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987).
68. Cousins, Norman, “Foreword,” in Hawkins, Helen S., Greb, G. Allen, and Szilard, Gertrud Weiss, eds., Toward a Livable World: Leo Szilard and the Crusade for Nuclear Arms Control (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987), p. xii.
69. See Berenstein, Barton J., “Introduction,” in Hawkins, Greb, and Szilard, Toward a Livable World, pp. xvii–xxiv; and Szilard, Leo, “Shall We Face the Facts? An Appeal for a Truce Not a Peace,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 5 (05 1949), pp. 269–73. See also Counsels of War, p. 206, in which Herken discusses the doomsday machine, a fanciful device to ensure peace by blowing up the world as the penalty for aggression.
70. See Shils, Edward, “American Policy and the Soviet Policy Ruling Group,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 3 (09 1947), pp. 237–39; and Fox, William T. R., “Atomic Energy and International Control,” in Ogburn, William F., ed., Technology and International Relations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), pp. 102–25. See also Sims, , “The Development of American Arms Control Thought,” pp. 228 and 308. The Acheson-Lilienthal report is cited as U.S. Department of State, Committee on Atomic Energy, A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy, 03 1946. In Danger and Survival, p. 159, Bundy described this report as “the high water-mark of the American effort to grapple with the issue of international control.” See also Bundy, McGeorge, “Early Thoughts on Controlling the Nuclear Arms Race: A Report to the Secretary of State, January 1953,” International Security 7 (Fall 1982), pp. 3–27.
71. See Gilpin, Robert, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962), chap. 4. See also Bechhoefer, , Postwar Negotiations for As Control, parts 2 and 3.
72. See Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978); Morgenthau, Hans J., Scientific Man Versus Power Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946); Niebuhr, Reinhold, “The Illusion of World Government,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 5 (10 1949), p. 289; and Niebuhr, Reinhold, The Structure of Nations and Empires (New York: Scribner)
73. See Inglis, David R. and Flanders, Donald A., “A Deal Before Midnight,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 7 (10 1951), pp. 305–6 and 317;Newman, James R., “Toward Atomic Agreement,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 10 (04 1954), pp. 121–22;Inglis, David R., “Ban the H-Bomb and Favor the Defense,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 10 (11 1954), pp. 353–56; and Hart, Hornell, “The Remedies Versus the Menace,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 10 (06 1954), pp. 197–205.
74. See Meier, R. L., “Beyond Atomic Stalemate,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 12 (05 1956), pp. 147–53;Sherwin, C. W., “Securing Peace Through Military Technology,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 12 (05 1956), pp. 159–64;Amster, Warren, “Design for Deterrence,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 12 (05 1956), pp. 164–65; and Sims, Jennifer, “The American Approach to Nuclear Arms Control: A Retrospective,” Daedalus 120 (Winter 1991), p. 258.
75. See Rotblat, , History of the Pugwash Conferences;Rotblat, Joseph, “Movements of Scientists Against the Arms Race,” in Rotblat, Joseph, ed., Scientists, the Arms Race and Disarmament (London: Taylor & Francis, 1982), pp. 115–57.
76. Schelling, Thomas, cited by Herzog in The War-Peace Establishment, p. 52.
77. Rotblat, , History of the Pugwash Conferences, pp. 14–15.
78. Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 301.
79. See Bechhoefer, , Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control, part 2; and Bundy, , Danger and Survival, chap. 4. In 06 1946, Bernard Baruch, the U.S. negotiator at the United Nations, proposed the following plan for the international control of nuclear energy: the United States would place its entire atomic weapons production under an international authority, and other nations would be barred from producing nuclear weapons and would allow their facilities to be placed under the international authority. The plan also promoted the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
80. Sims, , “The Development of American Arms Control Thought,” p. 244.
81. Dulles supported arms control only on the condition that the price was right and that American prestige abroad would be enhanced.
82. By developing plans for air reconnaissance, a nuclear freeze, nuclear arms reductions, and a set of objectives for arms control, Stassen augured the “golden era of arms control.”
83. Schelling, , The Strategy of Conflict, p. 207.
84. Freedman, , The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p. 199.
85. See Schelling, Thomas and Halperin, Morton, Strategy and Arms Control, 2d ed. (New York: Pergamon-Brassey, 1985); Brennan, , Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security;Bull, , The Control of the Arms Race;Henkin, Louis, ed., Arms Control: Issues for the Public (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1961); Frisch, David H., ed., Arms Reduction: Program and Issues (New York: Twentieth Century, 1961); and Lefever, Ernst W., ed., Arms and Arms Control (New York: Praeger, 1962). See also Ranger, Robin, “The Four Bibles of Arms Control,” in Shepard, Susan J., ed., Books and the Pursuit of American Foreign Policy, special issue of Book Forum, vol. 6, 1984, pp. 416–32.
86. See Holton, Gerald, ed., Arms Control, special issue of Daedalus, published in Fall 1960 and issued as vol. 89, no. 4, of the Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. The impact of the special Daedalus issue on arms control was so great that a revised and enlarged edition was rushed into print in early 1961. After this printing of 20,000 copies was sold out, it went into a second printing. Such sales were unprecedented for a specialized work of this kind. See Ranger, , “The Four Bibles of Arms Control,” pp. 417–18.
87. See Schelling, Thomas C., “What Went Wrong with Arms Control,” Foreign Affairs 65 (Winter 1985–1986), p. 223. Schelling had made the following statement in 1969: “Whatever the prospects for successful negotiations with the Soviet Union during the coming months and years, on the subject of strategic weapons, there could not be a greater contrast between the serious and businesslike prospects for realistic negotiations in 1969 and all the fantasy and pretense about ‘general and complete disarmament’ that characterized the beginning of our decade… We think differently now, partly because technological progress obliges us to but partly because we have been thinking and talking and writing and holding hearings and preparing budget justifications and negotiating with allies and enemies during this past decade.… [The] concern with vulnerability of retaliatory systems … became the primary criterion for the selection of a weapons system itself [and] it has become also the primary criterion for the design of an arms agreement between the United States and the USSR … The problem of ‘accidental war’ was recognized to be primarily one of information and decision rather than sheer mechanical accident, [and the] tradition of non-use, the somewhat self confirming expectations of non-use, grows stronger every year.” See testimony of Thomas Schelling, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Strategy and Science: Toward a National Security Policy for the 1970s: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, 91st Congress, 1st sess., 03 1969, pp. 123–24.
88. Gray, Colin S., Strategic Studies and Public Policy: The American Experience (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1982), p. 26.
89. According to Gray, “Contemporary arms-control theory was an invention of the strategic studies community in the period 1958–60.” See ibid., p. 72.
90. Firestone notes that the Committee of Principals was “a high-level interagency group designed to coordinate and ultimately ratify arms control policy. Founded in August 1958, the committee was initially composed of the secretary of state as chairman, the secretary of defense, the chairman of the AEC [Atomic Energy Commission], the director of the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], and the president's special adviser on science and technology.” See Firestone, Bernard J., The Quest for Nuclear Stability: John F. Kennedy and the Soviet Union (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), p. 76.
91. Licklider, , The Private Nuclear Strategists, p. 155.
92. Schlesinger, , A Thousand Days, p. 104; and Kaufmann, William W., The McNamara Strategy (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 1.
93. Firestone, , The Quest for Nuclear Stability, p. 153.
94. Gray, Strategic Studies and Public Policy, p. 97.
95. See Weber, Steve and Drell, Sidney, “Attempts to Regulate Military Activities in Space,” in George, Alexander L., Farley, Philip J., and Dallin, Alexander, eds., U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 388. On ACDA, see Walker, Paul F., “The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: Policy-Making in Strategic Arms Limitations,” Ph.D. diss., MIT, Cambridge, Mass., 1978.
96. York, Herbert F., Making Weapons, Talking Peace: A Physicist's Odyssey from Hiroshima to Geneva (New York: Basic Books, 1987), p. 119.
97. Kaplan, , Wizards of Armageddon, pp. 332–33.
98. Schlesinger, AThousand Days, p. 494.
99. See York, , Making Weapons, Talking Peace, pp. 222–26; and Kaplan, , Wizards of Armageddon, p. 345.
100. Ball, Desmond, Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 82–85.
101. My discussion of the hotline idea is based on Ury's, William L.Beyond the Hotline: How Crisis Control Can Prevent Nuclear War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), pp. 142 and 44, and on interviews.
102. See Talbott, , The Master of the Game, p. 79; and Schlesinger, , A Thousand Days, p. 475.
103. See Adler, , The Power of Ideology. See also Hyland, William L., “Institutional Impediments,” in Burt, Richard, ed., Arms Control and Defense in the 1980s (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), p. 101.
104. Schlesinger, , A Thousand Days, p. 504.
105. Newhouse, John, Cold Down: The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1973), p. 69.
106. In Counsels of War, pp. 197–98, Herken quotes some of McNamara's concerns: “There is a kind of mad momentum intrinsic to the development of all nuclear weaponry.… If a system works-and works well-there is a strong pressure from all directions to procure and deploy the weapon out of all proportion to the prudent level required.” Herken points out that what McNamara termed “an action-reaction phenomenon” dominated and escalated the arms race.
107. In November 1964, the Soviets first paraded what appeared to be an ABM system. The system, called Galosh, “was believed to be composed of a network of radars and a two- or three-stage, solid-fueled interceptor missile designed for long-range, ex-atmospheric interception of incoming ICBM s.” See Yanarella, Ernst J., The Missile Defense Controversy: Strategy, Technolog, and Politics, 1955–1972 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1977), p. 118.
108. On the politics of ABM control up to 1972, see Yanarella, , The Missile Defense Controversy;Adams, Benson D., Ballistic Missile Defense (New York: American Elsevier, 1971); Halperin, Morton, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974); Newhouse, , Cold Down;Smith, Gerard, The Story of SALT, 2d ed. (New York: Pergamon-Brassey, 1989); Kaplan, , Wizards ofArmageddon; and Herken, , Counsels of War.
109. See Schwartz, David N., “Past and Present: The Historical Legacy,” in Carter, Ashton B. and Schwartz, David N., eds., Ballistic Missile Defense (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984), pp. 332–33.
110. York, , Making Weapons, Talking Peace, pp. 222–23.
111. For a discussion of Wiesner and York's article, see Herken, , Counsels of War, p. 193. Herken notes that Paul Nitze called the article “outrageous, an incitement, an example of dirty pool.”
112. Sentinel was a light area missile defense system set to be deployed in fifteen sites in the continental United States, one site in Hawaii, and one in Alaska. The system consisted of various radars and either a Spartan missile or a Sprint missile, depending on the site. See Adams, , Ballistic Missile Defense, p. 177.
113. Newhouse, , Cold Down, pp. 50 and 115–16.
114. Adams, , Ballistic Missile Defense, p. 186.
115. Yanarella, , The Missile Defense Controversy, pp. 144–47.
116. Adams, , Ballistic Missile Defense, p. 193.
117. Kahn said that the public debate had been one-sided because about “ninety percent of the scientists who normally speak in public, or who consult part-time for the government on defense issues, as well as the vast preponderance of the public literature on the subject, opposed ABM.” See Herman, Kahn, “The Missile Defense Debate in Perspective,” in Holst and Schneider, Why ABM, p. 285. For a good source on the involvement of pro- and anti- ABM scientists in the ABM debate, see Cahn, Anne Hessing, Eggheads and Warheads: Scientists and the ABM (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Center for International Studies, 1971). In the “battle of books,” the counterpart to Why ABM was the anti-ABM work edited by Chayes, Abram and Wiesner, Jerome B., ABM: An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Antiballistic Missile System (New York: Signet, 1969).
118. Safeguard incorporated both area and terminal defense capabilities, using the same components as Sentinel but deploying these components with the aim of defending Minuteman silos. For command and control reasons, Washington, D.C., would be defended as well. Adams, , Ballistic Missile Defense, p. 200.
119. According to Brenner, “Each testimony [before Congress] delineated the technical and political aspects of the issue while assiduously drawing the necessary distinctions between those questions amenable to scientific judgment and those requiring subjective estimates. By stipulating the logical connections between acceptance of ABM and its multiple consequences, these analyses heightened awareness of the issue's subtle interdependencies. They discredited the Administration's casual use of the syllogistic argument that in the past had relied successfully on faith (in the simple equation that more arms means more security) and fear (of Soviet aggression).” See Brenner, , “The Theorist as Actor,” pp. 115–16.
120. Sims, , “The Development of American Arms Control Thought,” pp. 13–14.
121. Firestone, , The Quest for Nuclear Stability, p. 150.
122. See testimony of Marshal Shulman, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs, part 1, 91st Congress, 1st sess., 03 1969, p. 154. See also the testimony of Vincent Rock, P., in U.S. Congress, Strategy and Science: Hearings, p. 224, which included the following argument: “In terms of aid, in terms of weapons … there is a great deal of copying, of action and reaction, reciprocal action of a kind, between the nations of the world. … As we know, all nations collect each other's basic and applied scientific output. There is a tremendous interaction going on as a result of having to read and cope with the ideas the other fellow is putting out.…
123. The Soviet-American Disarmament Studies Group, referred to as the Doty group, started to meet in 1965 and met for ten years. The first conference of the Darmouth group took place in 1959. An official collaboration between the American and Soviet academies of sciences has taken place under the guidance of W. Panofsky and S. Sagdeev.
124. Clemens, Walter C. Jr, Can Russia Change? The USSR Confronts Global Interdependence (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990), p. 67.
125. Holst, , “Strategic Arms Control and Stability,” pp. 258, 264, and 268.
126. The Soviet views were cited by Allyn, Bruce J. in “Toward a Common Framework: Avoiding Inadvertent War and Crisis,” in Allison, Graham T. and Ury, William L. (with Bruce J. Allyn), eds., Windows of Opportunity: From Cold War to Peaceful Competition in US-Soviet Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1989), p. 188.
127. Holst, , “Strategic Arms Control and Stability,” p. 282.
128. See Allyn, , “Toward a Common Framework,” p. 188; and Gaddis, John L., The Long Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 204.
129. See Stein, Peter and Feaver, Peter, Assuring Control of Nuclear Weapons: The Evolution of Permissive Action Links (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Center for Science and International Affairs, 1987).
130. See Ranger, , Arms and Politics, p. 7. Dinerstein and his colleagues at RAND noted in the early 1960s that the technical arms control approach seemed to hold no interest for Soviet military planners. According to Dougherty, however, “Some change was noticeable after the Cuban missile crisis. … During the past decade [1963–1973], there have been signs that the Soviets have begun to take more seriously the Western ideas of ‘arms control.’ “ See Dinerstein, Herbert S., Goure, Leon, and Wolfe, Thomas W., “Introduction” to the English translation of Soviet Military Strategy, ed. by Sokolovskiy, Soviet marshal V. D. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 77; and Dougherty, James E., How to Think About Arms Control and Disarmament (New York: Crane, Russak, 1973), p. 71.
131. Ranger, , Arms and Politics, p. 209.
132. Payne, Samuel B., The Soviet Union and SALT (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980), p. 75.
133. Schlesinger, , A Thousand Days, p. 505.
134. See Mandelbaum, Michael, “Western Influence on the Soviet Union,” in Bialer, Seweryn and Mandelbaum, Michael, eds., Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988), p. 364;Holst, , “Strategic Arms Control and Stability,” p. 245; and Yanarella, , The Missile Defense Controversy, pp. 197–98.
135. Hippel, Frank von, “Arms Control Physics: The New Soviet Connection,” Physics Today, 11 1989, p. 39.
136. See York, , Making Weapons, Talking Peace, p. 223;Ruina, J. P. and Gell-Mann, M., “Ballistic Missile Defense and the Arms Race,” in Proceedings of the Twelfth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, Udaipur, India, 27 01 to 1 02 1964, pp. 232–35;Hippel, Von, “Arms Control Physics,” p. 39; and Doty, Paul, “Arms Control: 1960, 1990, 2020,” Daedalus 120 (Winter 1991), p. 40.
137. Regarding the Soviet reactions, see Newhouse, , Cold Down, p. 102.
138. Holloway, David, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, 2d ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 44.
139. See MccGwire, Michael, “Why the Soviets Are Serious About Arms Control,” Brookings Review, Spring 1987, p. 11. In a review of MccGwire's book, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987), Bluth argued that the changes which MccGwire said occurred at the end of 1966 actually started in 1964 and 1965. Bluth's point was indeed proved by a flurry of Soviet articles discussing the possibility of doctrinal change in the 1964–65 period. See Bluth, Christopher, “The Evolution of Soviet Military Doctrine,” Survival 30 (03–04 1988), p. 149.
140. Payne, , The Soviet Union and SALT, p. 18.
141. Ibid., p. 7.
142. Arbatov, Georgi A. and Oltman, William, Soviet Viewpoint (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1981), p. 130.
143. Andrei Kokoshin, personal communication.
144. Payne, , The Soviet Union and SALT, pp. 46 and 59.
145. See ibid., p. 126. Larionov, V. V. made the statement in “Transformatsüa kontseptsii ‘strategicheskoi dostatochnosti,’“ SShA, 11 1971. Gromyko later made this same point, as did the minister of foreign affairs. It was almost an official statement of the Soviet government's position.
146. Payne, , The Soviet Union and SALT, pp. 40–41, 47, and 76.
147. Ibid., p. 76.
148. Ibid., p. 66.
149. Other reasons that led the Soviet leaders to sign a Soviet–U.S. strategic arms control treaty included the following: they perceived that the Americans held a strong edge in the technological race; they realized that multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV s) were entering into the strategic equation; they wanted to institutionalize parity with the United States and, if possible, improve their strategic situation in areas unrestricted by SALT; they wanted to project power; they wished to strengthen detente with the West; and they hoped that the resulting economic savings could be directed back to the civilian sector.
150. See Garthoff, Raymond L., “Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy,” International Security 2 (Summer 1978), p. 126; and Halperin, Morton, “The Decision to Deploy the ABM: Bureaucratic and Domestic Politics in the Johnson Administration,” World Politics 25 (10 1972), p. 95.
151. The faces refer to complementary and mutually reinforcing processes. They are ideal types, and “the distinction between ‘faces’ tends to break down at the margin.” See James, Scott C. and Lake, David A., “The Second Face of Hegemony: Britain's Repeal of the Corn Laws and the American Walker Tariff of 1846,” International Organization 43 (Winter 1989), p. 4.
153. Herken, , Counsels of War, p. 247.
154. Warner, Edward L. III, “New Thinking and Old Realities in Soviet Defence Policy,” Survival 31 (01–02 1989), pp. 18–20.
155. Jervis, Robert, “Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation,” World Politics 40 (04 1988), p. 325.
156. This awareness of the value of cooperation for national security was essential. According to Davis, “As the naive type of unsafeguarded arms control of the 1920's became clearly inappropriate to the problems of the next three decades, there developed a relatively harmless tradition in politics of paying it lip service, so as not to offend the gentler elements of public opinion, and of ignoring it in practice. This tradition of the white lie [was] carried over into the nuclear age. … For several critical years the habit of pretending to work for disarmament served to mask the fact that the political leadership of the United States did not want disarmament. More specifically, those in Washington who considered arms control undesirable or impractical clearly had the upper hand in the process of making and administering policy, with the help of others who thought the Russians would never sign anyway, or would sign and cheat.” See Davis, , “Recent Policy Making in the United States Government,” pp. 379–80.
157. Walker, , “The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,” p. 13.
158. Gilpin, , American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy, p. 299.
159. See Holloway, , The Soviet Union and the As Race, p. 40.
160. Garthoff, Raymond L., “On Mutual Deterrence: A Reply to Donald Brennan,” International Security 3 (Spring 1979), p. 198.
161. Weber, , “Realism, Detente and Nuclear Weapons,” p. 72.
162. Nardin, Terry, Law, Morality, and the Relations of States (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 14.
163. I owe this insight to Craig Murphy. See Murphy, Craig N., “Color It Mitrany: Two Patterns of Progress in International Relations,” working paper, Wellesley College, Wellesley, Mass., 1989.
164. Nardin, , Law, Morality, and the Relations of States, p. 9.
165. Schelling, , The Strategy of Conflict, pp. 106–7.
166. See Stein, Arthur A., “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World,” in Krasner, International Regimes, pp. 125–27.
167. See Smith, Roger K., “Explaining the Nonproliferation Regime: Anomalies for Contemporary International Relations Theory,” International Organization 41 (Spring 1987), pp. 253–81.
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.
* Views captured on Cambridge Core between <date>. This data will be updated every 24 hours.
Usage data cannot currently be displayed