We develop a model of international negotiation in which states
anticipate that the agreements they sign will only be partly implemented.
The results differ significantly from theories of domestic ratification
that have previously been applied to this problem. Negotiators do not try
to satisfy the implementer and may even choose agreements that the
implementer would explicitly reject in a ratification model. Partial
implementation also makes it possible for two negotiators to reach
agreements outside their usual win-set. This situation may allow one
country to make extraordinary concessions, knowing that some provisions
will never be fully implemented. We apply these claims to Sino-American
negotiations over intellectual property rights, where implementation has
been a recurrent issue. The theory enriches the theory of two-level games,
which has focused much too narrowly on formal ratification without
amendment as the canonical case of domestic influence over international
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