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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 July 2016
The second World War was to find Germany and Italy as allies in a conflict in which their initial opponents were Britain, France and Poland. Italy did not immediately enter the war, but by the terms of the ‘pact of steel’ of 22 May 1939 she was to become a belligerent. The war broke out over the invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939. The circumstances under which it arose were peculiar in one particular point, namely in that Great Britain entered the conflict directly and immediately as an ally of a power in eastern Europe. She had entered the wars of 1914 and of 1793 in a secondary manner—as an ally of powers already at war and over commitments which related primarily to western and central Europe. It was novel therefore that she should have become involved directly in a conflict relating to eastern Europe.
If one had tried to predict, in 1919, the circumstances under which Britain would fight another war with Germany, few would have hazarded the opinion that she would choose the crossing of the Polish frontier as a casus belli. In addition, if one had, in 1938, tried also to predict Britain’s ally in an eventual conflict, Poland would have come towards the end of the list. Since 1934, Poland had generally been regarded as a power which was endeavouring to keep out of conflicts between Germany and the western powers—at least in the early stages of such a war. The relations between Berlin and Warsaw were, as from their agreement of 26 January 1934, surprisingly cautious; and the personal relations between leading Germans and Poles reflected—or so it appeared—the existence of such friendly relations. However, within a very short period after the Munich agreement of 30 September 1938, Britain was to become deeply involved in the defence of a frontier which British public opinion had previously regarded as the most open to criticism and revision of all the arrangements concluded at Versailles.
page no 62 note 1 This journal does not normally include matter not having a direct bearing on Irish history. An exception has been made of the present article, by the professor of modern history at University College, Dublin, owing to the intrinsic interest of the treatment and the significance of the subject.
page no 63 note 1 Documents on German foreign policy 1918-1943; from the archives of the German foreign ministry (hereinafter cited as D.G.F.P.) (London, H.M.S.O. 1951), series D, vol. iv, doc. 476, pp. 602-4Google Scholar. Tippelskirch to Schliep, Moscow, 3 Oct. 1938. M. Litvinov, the people’s commissar for foreign affairs, had already on 23 June 1938 warned the western powers: ‘This issue, the defence of Czechoslovakia, is the real test for Soviet Russia’s belief in the possibility of cooperation with the western powers against Hitlerite aggression’. Ibid., vol. i, doc. 627, pp. 921-24; cf. despatch of the German ambassador in Moscow, Count von der Schulenburg to the foreign ministry, 4 July 1938. Schulenburg commented on Litvinov’s strikingly objective attitude towards the Third Reich.
2 Ibid, vol. v, doc. 64, pp. 85-8. Von Moltke, German ambassador in Warsaw to the foreign ministry, 6 Oct. 193 8. At an earlier stage, however, Hitler was reported on Oct. 5 as ‘preferring to be generous rather than haggle with the Poles’ over the disposition of a particular Czech town, Odersberg. Ibid., doc. 62, p. 84. Memo by Herr Hewel.
3 Documents on British foreign policy, 1919-39, ed. Woodward, E.L. and Butler, Rohan (hereinafter cited as D.B.F.P.) (London, H.M.S.O. 1952) third series, vol. iv, doc. 262, pp. 231-33Google Scholar. Lord Halifax to Sir Maurice Palairet, British minister at Bucharest, 17 Nov. 1938, reporting on a discussion between the prime minister, Lord Halifax and King Carol of Rumania. See also Halifax to Sir Eric Phipps, British ambassador in Paris, 1 Nov. 1938. Ibid., doc. 285, pp. 251-3.
4 Szembek, Comte Jean (Polish vice-minister for foreign affairs), Journal: 1933-9 (Paris: Plon, 1952)Google Scholar; .entries for 10, 11 and 18 Oct. 1938, pp. 349, 350-1, 356-8.
5 Hassell, Ulrich von, Das andere Deutschland (Stuttgart: Drueffel Verlag, 1948), p. 18 Google Scholar. Evidence of Hitler’s general temper is also provided by a speech he delivered at Saarbrucken on 9 Oct. 1938, Voelkischer Beobachter, 10 Oct. 1938. Mr William Strang wrote to Sir Howard Kennard, British ambassador in Warsaw, on November 10, and informed him thatthe foreign office had, from secret sources, acquired the information that Hitler no longer regarded Poland ‘as a consolidated, independent state’. D.B.F.P., third series, vol. iv, doc. 201, pp. 276-8. Cf. ibid., doc. 403, pp. 386-9. Sir G. Ogilvie Forbes to Halifax, reporting current gossip in Berlin on Dec. 6, stated that Hitler had decided to embark on a policy of expansion beyond the borders inhabited exclusively by Germans.
6 Trial of the major war criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg 1945-6: proceedings and documents in evidence (Nuremberg International Military Tribunal 1947-9) (hereinafter cited as I.M.T.), xvi. 338-44. Cf. The trial of major war criminals (H.M.S.O., London, 1947), pt, xiii, p. 4 Google Scholar.
7 Beck, Colonel Josef, Dernier rapport (Neuchatel, 1952), pp. 73-4Google Scholar. Cf. also an extract from Mr C. Norton, British chargé d’affaires at Warsaw, to Sir Orme Sargent, permanent under-secretary of state at the foreign office. D.B.F.P., third series, vol. vi, doc. 224, pp. 248-9.
8 Polish white book: official documents concerning Polish-German and Polish-Soviet relations (London: Hutchinson, 1940), doc. 51, p. 55 Google Scholar. Extract from minute of von Ribbentrop’s interviews with the president of the republic and Marshall Smigly-Rydz, Warsaw, 26 Jan. 1939. Ibid., doc. 53, pp. 56-7. Count Szembek’s minutes of his conversation with Beck, Warsaw, 1 Feb. 1939.
9 Beck, op. cit., pp. 182-3. D.B.F.P., third series, vol. vi, doc. 223, pp. 246-8. Norton to F.O., 3 July 1939. D.G.F.P., series D, vol. v, doc. 119, pp. 152-8.
10 Szembek, op. cit., entries 3 Jan, 1939, 1 Feb. 1939. Polish white book, doc. 53, p. 56.
11 Ibid., doc. 44, pp. 47-8. Lipski to Beck, Berlin, 28 Oct. 1938. Ibid., doc. 45, p. 48. Beck’s instructions to Lipski, Warsaw, 31 Oct. 1938. D.G.F.P., series D, vol. v, doc. 81, pp. 104-7. Ribbentrop’s memo on conversation with Lipski, 24 Oct. 1938.
12 Documents and material relating to the eve of the second world war, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1948), i. 176-83Google Scholar.
13 The Fuehrer had tentatively brought up the possibilityof ‘a corridor across the Corridor’ as early as 1935, and hadcoupled this with a suggestion for revision of the Danzig statute. D.G.F.P., series D, vol. v, doc. 86, pp. 113-14.
14 I.M.T., vol. xxxiv, pp. 477-81, 481-3. Cf. also ibid., pp. 416-22.
15 I.M.T., vol. xxxiv, doc. 120C, p. 388. Cf. also ibid., doc. 120C, p. 420. Ibid., doc. 138C, p. 484.
16 Szembek, op. cit., entries for Dec. 7, 10, 12, 14, pp. 383-9.
17 D.G.F.P., series D, vol. iv, doc. 49, 51, 53, pp. 57, 58, 61. The German police rounded up over 20,000 Jews and kept them in the open on the frontier when the Poles refused to allow them to enter Poland. A large number of these Jews remained without any shelter for over a week. The behaviour of neither of the two states in this matter was edifying. Polish treatment of minorities was, if harsh, not barbaric. The German treatment of the Jews anticipated on a small scale the later horrors of the war.
18 D.B.F.P., series D, vol. iv, doc. 175, p. 181. Kennard to Halifax, 4 Mar. 1939. Beck was reported as saying that ‘as regards subjects for discussion, beyond a general tour d’horizon and question of colonies, Jews and Danzig, he had nothing to suggest’. With regard to Danzig he felt that the Reich were taking a reasonable attitude, even despite recent events there, and while he did not think there would be any developments before his visit there, he would inform Kennard ifthere were. The date of arrival was fixed for April 3; Beck was therefore mistaken as to the likelihood of further development. While Beck wished to discuss the possibility of introducing a new statute for the Free City, his real purpose was to tighten a loose connection with London, without severing relations with Berlin.
19 Szembek, op. cit., entry 15 Oct. 1938, pp. 355-6.
20 Bonnet, Georges, Fin d’une Europe, de Munich à la guerre (Paris, 1948), pp. 117-20Google Scholar. Ribbentrop, op. cit., p. 147. French yellow book, doc. 28, text of Franco-German agreement, 6 Dec. 1938, p. 141. D.G.F.P., series D, vol. iv, docs 369, 370, pp. 470-77. This issue was not clarified, perhaps because neither party wished to force decisions at that moment. The German minister was guilty of wishful thinking, and Bonnet of clever evasion that bordered on moral cowardice. Ribbentrop’s own account of his conversation with Bonnet did not explicitly justify Ribbentrop’s wishful interpretation.
21 D.B.F.P., series D, vol. iv, doc. 285, pp. 251-3. Halifax to Phipps, 11 Nov. 1938.
22 No documents are available which would establish conclusively the truth of this suggestion. Current contemporary gossip, however, reported by German sources, and the general attitude of Sir Robert Vansittart, tend to substantiate these reports. On 26 Sept. 1938, the foreign office issued a statement on the consequences of a German invasion of Czechoslovakia, which seriously embarrassed the prime minister.
23 D.G.F.P., series D, vol. iv, doc. 290, pp. 377-9. Dirksen to German foreign ministry 9 Jan. 1939.
24 D.B.F.P., series D, vol. iii, doc. 41, p. 40. Mallet to F.O., Washington, 28 Jan, 1939. Ibid., doc. 40, pp. 37-40, Halifaxto Brussels and The Hague, 28 Jan. 1939. Ibid., doc. 18, pp. 16-17, Sir Alexander Cadogan to Sir Neville Bland (Hague), 26 Jan. 1939.
25 Viscount Templewood in Nine troubled years (Collins, 1954) mentions rumours of this kind which were reported on several occasions in the spring of 1939; see p. 354.
26 D.B.F.P., series D, vol. iii, doc. 57, pp. 52-3. Bland to Halifax, 31 Jan. 1939.
27 The Times, 16 March 1939.
28 Ibid., 18 March 1939.
29 D.B.F.P., series D, vol. iv, doc. 208, p. 291, note. Henderson left Berlin on March 18, having received his papers of recall at 1.45 p.m. on the 17th. But the British on this occasion, as well as on all others in the next fortnight, took their decisions first, and afterwards informed the French government. The payment of loans to Czechoslovakia was suspended, and a visit which the president of the board of trade was making to Berlin was cancelled. The Rumanian ambassador, M. Tilea, had strongly advised the latter step. Ibid., doc. 297, p. 283. Halifax to Bucharest, 18 March 1939.
30 Observer, 19 March 1939.
31 D.B.F.P., series D, vol. iv, doc. 298, pp. 284-5. Minutes of Sargent, 16 March 1939.
32 Ibid., doc. 390, pp. 361, etc. Halifax to Warsaw, Angora, etc., 17 March 1939. Ibid., doc. 395, pp. 366-7. Halifax to Bucharest, 17 March 1939 (for greater detail).
33 Ibid., doc. 388, to Sir Eric Phipps in Paris; doc. 389, to Sir William Seeds in Moscow; doc. 390 to Warsaw, Angora, Athens and Belgrade, 17 March 1939, pp. 360-1.
34 Ibid., doc. 400, pp. 370-1. Sir H. Kennard to F.O., 18 March 1939; doc. 420, pp. 384-5, Sir R. Campbell (Belgrade) to F.O., 19 March 1939.
35 Ibid., doc. 399, pp. 369-70. Sir R. Hoare (Bucharest) to F.O., 18 March 1939.
36 Ibid., doc. 422, p. 386. Halifax to Moscow, Bucharest, Athens, etc., 19 March 1939.
37 Ibid., doc. 428, pp. 389-90. Halifax to Hoare.
38 Daily Telegraph (diplomatic correspondent), 17 March 1939. Observer, 20 March 1939. D.B.F.P., series D, vol. iv, doc. 275, p. 265. Shepherd (Danzig) to F.O., 15 March 1939. The high commissioner of Danzig, Dr C. J. Bruckhardt, however, the next day, discounted all rumours of imminent German aggression against Danzig.
39 Observer (Warsaw correspondent), 19 March 1939.
40 Ibid.
41 D.B.F.P., series D, vol. iv, doc. 391, p. 362. Kennard to Halifax, 17 March 1939.
42 Ibid., doc. 497, pp. 475-6, enclosing an aide-mémoire from the Lithuanian minister in London, 22 March 1939.
43 The Times, 20 March 1939. A Fuehrer directive dated 8 December 1938 had mentioned the possibility of coupling the occupation of Danzig with Memel. I.M.T., vol. xxxiv, doc. 120C, p. 420. Had news of this directive reached Warsaw or London?
44 Ibid.
45 D.B.F.P., series D, vol. iv, doc. 378, pp. 351-2. Halifax to Campbell, 22 March 1939. See also ibid., doc. 285, pp. 357-8, Sir A. Ryan (Durazzo), to F.O., 31 March 1939, in which he reports rumoursof Italian pressure on Albania. Cf.Ciano, Galeazzo, Diario (Rizzoli Editare, 1939-40), voi. i, p. 55 Google Scholar; entry for March 15. As early as February 6, Ciano had arranged with the Duce that the Albanian occupation should take place in Holy Week. Ibid., p. 35.
46 The Times, 18 March 1939. Feiling, Keith, The life of Neville Chamberlain (London, 1946), pp. 240-57Google Scholar.
47 The Times, 16 March 1939.
48 Daily Telegraph, 17 March 1939.
49 D.B.F.P., series D, vol. iv, doc. 446, pp. 400-401. Halifax to Paris, Moscow and Warsaw, 20 March 1939. The French ambassador in London, M. Corbin, seems to have been sceptical of the efficacy of this move. He was reported as saying ‘ that he felt convinced himself, though he could not answer for his government, that the publication of the bare declaration would have a much worse effect than publishing nothing at all ‘. Cf. doc. 405, p. 487. Halifax to Campbell (Paris), 23 March 1939.
50 Feiling, op. cit., p. 276.
