When imported slaves were first sold in New Orleans, buyers were unaware of the slaves’ unobservable characteristics. In time, the new owners learned more about their slaves and may have resold the “lemons.” Previous research suggests that buyers anticipated such adverse selection and reduced their bids for these slaves. Consequently, we should observe lower prices for resold slaves. We test this proposition by linking the sequential sales records of 568 slaves. Through a comparison of initial and resale prices, we find little evidence to support the hypothesis that adverse selection lowered the price of resold slaves.

We report estimates of the fiscal multiplier for interwar Britain based on quarterly data, time-series econometrics, and “defense news.” We find that the government expenditure multiplier was in the range 0.3 to 0.8, much lower than previous estimates. The scope for a Keynesian solution to recession was less than is generally supposed. We find that rearmament gave a smaller boost to real GDP than previously claimed. Rearmament may, however, have had a larger impact than a temporary public works program of similar magnitude if private investment anticipated the need to add capacity to cope with future defense spending.

Construction of the first transcontinental railroad, financed with large federal subsidies, is an important event in American history. Were the subsidies necessary to induce private investment in the railroad? The ex-ante investment decision examined uses contemporary reports and a simulation model to show that investors expected the railroad to be profitable. Evidence also shows that the railroad created political conflicts in Congress between the North and South. The secession removed the South as a disputant in Congress, reducing short-term political conflict but not long-term conflict. Subsidies reduced political risk, rather than transport market failure, and encouraged private investment.

We analyze all slave manifests housed at the National Archives—some 24,400 documents involving approximately 135,000 slaves who were transported in the coastwise trade from 1810 to 1861. The manifests list the name of the owner or shipper, which allows us to match names with traders found in other sources. We also utilize demographic characteristics of the manifests to estimate the probability that a trader organized the shipment. Commercial transactions increased over the antebellum period, and on average were responsible for approximately 55 percent of slaves who migrated from Atlantic to Gulf coast ports.

This article examines the role of creditor protection in the development of the U.K. corporate bond market. This market grew rapidly in the late nineteenth century, but in the twentieth century it experienced a reversal, albeit with a short-lived post-1945 renaissance. Such was the extent of the reversal that the market from the 1970s onwards was smaller than it had been in 1870. We find that law does not explain the variation in the size of this market over time. Alternatively, our evidence suggests that inflation and taxation policies were major drivers of this market in the post-1945 era.

The geographical distributions of French and British foreign investment portfolios differ markedly before World War I. Did French portfolios favor European investments just as British portfolios favored “New World” assets? Should economic rationality have encouraged investors to invest widely in the “New World” rather than in Europe? Combining Modern Portfolio Theory and a new data set comprising assets listed on the Paris and London Stock Exchanges, we show that investing in the “New World” did not yield higher returns than investing in Europe. The “European preference” of the Paris Bourse and, by extension, of French investors was not inefficient.

The dictatorial Dominion of New England (1686–1689) saw the rise and fall of the first operational bank scheme in America. Both events resulted from the appointed rulers' attempts to personally profit from real estate, subject to an absolutist constitution imposed by England. The first, local ruler led a nominally private land bank. The subsequent, foreign ruler invalidated all land titles and thus killed the bank. This unusual case study exemplifies an extension of Mancur Olson's model of stationary and roving bandits, and demonstrates how economic development can be affected in different ways by different types of dictators.

Most American financial crises of the postbellum gold standard era were caused by fluctuations in the cotton harvest due to exogenous factors such as weather. The transmission channel ran through export revenues and financial markets under the pre-1914 monetary regime. A poor cotton harvest depressed export revenues and reduced international demand for American assets, which depressed American stock prices, drained deposits from money center banks and precipitated a business cycle downturn—conditions that bred financial crises. The crises caused by cotton harvests could have been prevented by an American central bank, even under gold standard constraints.

Secondary markets for public debt in Europe's most advanced preindustrial markets, Britain and the Dutch Republic, differed markedly. They were liquid in Britain, but not in the Republic. This article demonstrates that economic geography determined the shape of primary markets and the secondary markets that were based on them. Configuring financial markets in preindustrial Europe was thus not a uniform process leading to one ideal-type market structure. The development of markets with advanced financial institutions did not naturally produce liquid markets. While financial markets in preindustrial Europe were rooted in local circumstances, they functioned well while adapting to them.

The Near East underwent a process of integration with the global economy during the second half of the nineteenth century. This article explores one aspect of this process, examining the linkages established between the cotton industries in Egypt and Western Anatolia, and the international cotton market during the first wave of globalization. We undertake a quantitative exploration of the pattern of price transmission between the Near East and the international cotton markets over this period, connecting changes in the nature of spatial market integration to major economic and political developments.

Carefully constructed but fallible historical estimates of GDP and agricultural output inform our understanding of the preindustrial origins of economic growth. Here we review four recent attempts at estimating agricultural output and food availability in England and Wales at different points between the Middle Ages and the Industrial Revolution. We highlight their contrasting implications for trends in well-being and nutritional status over time. Building on these estimates, we propose our own tentative, compromise estimate of food availability. The compromise estimates are more coherent with our understanding of conditions before and during the Industrial Revolution.

Robert W. Fogel was a visionary economic historian, generous mentor, and eternal optimist whose works and lectures have informed and incited for more than half a century and whose writings will continue to do so for decades to come. He died on June 11, 2013 in his eighty-sixth year. He had co-taught a graduate course at the University of Chicago that quarter and in the weeks before he died he was planning his fall 2013 teaching. “I've often told my students I'm not retiring. You're going to have to carry me out in a wooden box. I'm having too much fun,” he remarked to a recent class.