This paper investigates the organization of southern agricultural enterprise in 1910, with special regard for the interrelations of race, land tenure conditions, and the allocation of resources. After surveying the distribution of farmers and land among the major racial and tenure classes, I seek to answer two main questions. First, what determined the distribution of farm rental contracts between share-rent and fixed-rent forms, and did the tenant's race influence the form of rental contract he obtained? Second, what effect did the race of the farmers and the form of their land tenure have on the determination of farm size? A concluding section raises some further questions and briefly explores the difficult problem of discovering the effects of racism on the southern economy.

From the Middle Ages through the sixteenth century, the major countries of Western Europe—England, Holland, France, and Spain—can be viewed as a single entity in terms of overall economic growth. Population and output rose in all until the early fourteenth century when famine and then plague caused population and production to decline for over a century. Again in the sixteenth century there exist clear indications of a general expansion of population and output levels. In the seventeenth century, however, this uniform pattern is broken. Holland and England continue to expand; France falls relatively behind; and Spain absolutely declines. A simple Malthusian model appears to go far in explaining the general contours of the pre-seventeenth-century growth pattern. The differential pattern of the seventeenth century, however, has proven less amenable to unique explanation. This paper will not provide a unique explanation of the seventeenth-century growth pattern. It will, however, attempt to focus the search for such an explanation by arguing that the source of the differential growth lay in a single sector of the economies under discussion. Specifically, it will be argued that given the relatively constant technology of the period, growth, both extensive and intensive, can be explained by population increase in conjunction with economies of scale; that the source of the economies of scale lay in the transactions sectors of the economies under study; that only England and Holland had institutional structures that allowed the population growth beginning in the sixteenth century to give rise to large market areas and thereby allow realization of the economies of scale inherent in the transactions sector; and that the productivity increases brought about through realization of these economies of scale made it possible for Holland and England in the seventeenth century to support continued population increase and to evidence an increasing standard of living. This explanation of growth will necessarily remain incomplete because no attempt will be made to explain why Crown policies, and therefore institutional structures, differed between the countries.

The political and economic institutions of the Dutch Republic puzzle the historian. Closely juxtaposed are elements suggesting a tantalizing precociousness and elements which hearken to the medieval past. The Republic was the creation of a revolution; it can be identified as the first European state to throw off a monarchical regime and bring a bourgeois social class to full political power. On the other hand, the foremost motive behind this rebellion was the resistance of medieval, municipal particularism to governmental centralization—to modernization, if you will.

The rise of the nation-state is assigned by most historians a central role in the economic growth of Europe. Most recently Douglass North and Robert Thomas have argued that sustained economic growth was made possible only by institutional changes which, themselves, were a consequence of the rise of the nationstate. Thus it is clear that a complete model of the economic growth of Europe will have to account for the rise of the nation-state. That is.the humble task of this paper.