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Modeling the evolution of preferences: an answer to Schubert and Cordes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 November 2013

JAKOB KAPELLER*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy and Theory of Science, University of Linz, Altenbergerstraße 69, Linz, Austria
STEFAN STEINERBERGER*
Affiliation:
Mathematical Institute, University of Bonn, Endenicher Allee 60, 53115 Bonn, Germany

Abstract:

We applaud the effort of Schubert and Cordes (2013, this journal) to contribute a model describing the social mediation of preferences and to apply their results to the more general context of economic welfare. Although we consider this topic to be of utmost importance and interest, we have found a problem in Schubert and Cordes’ argument that renders their statements in Section 3 invalid. After providing some basic intuition on the problem at hand, we present a short proof showing that the assumptions of the model always lead to a stable society. We also report on an interesting non-linear segregation effect that can occur within the Schubert-Cordes model.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Millennium Economics Ltd 2013 

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