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Institutions, rules and equilibria: a commentary

  • KEN BINMORE (a1)
Abstract
Abstract:

This brief note is a commentary on Hendriks and Guala's (2014) unification of the institutional theories of Lewis, North, and Searle. It argues that the equilibrium theory of Lewis is fundamental and that the kind of equilibrium best suited in this role remains the orthodox notion of Nash.

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*Email: k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk
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This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

R. Aumann (1976), ‘Agreeing to Disagree’, Annals of Statistics, 4: 12361239.

K. Binmore (2005), Natural Justice, New York: Oxford University Press.

K. Binmore (2008), ‘Do Conventions Need to be Common Knowledge?’, Topoi, 27: 1727.

K. Binmore (2010), ‘Game Theory and Institutions’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 38: 245252.

M. Friedell (1969), ‘On the structure of shared awareness’, Behavioral Science, 14: 2839.

A. Greif and C. Kingston (2011), ‘Institutions: Rules or Equilibria?’, in N. Schofield and G. Caballero (eds.), Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy and Voting, Berlin: Springer.

J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund (1998), Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

J. Maynard Smith (1982), Evolution and the Theory of Games, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

D. North (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Journal of Institutional Economics
  • ISSN: 1744-1374
  • EISSN: 1744-1382
  • URL: /core/journals/journal-of-institutional-economics
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