The success of World Bank policy has recently been proclaimed in Adjustment in Africa: reforms, results, and the road ahead (New York, published for the World Bank by Oxford University Press, 1994), which maintains that the Bank's macro-economic policies have improved economic performance, and that, in general, the greater the degree of implementation, the better the results. My review of this policy research report is intended to show that the presented data fail to support this claim and even bolster the contrary thesis.

In May 1994 the Life President of Malawi, Dr H. Kamuzu Banda, the world's oldest Head of State, was peacefully defeated in the country's first multi-party elections after having been in power since February 1963. During that 31 year era his Malawi Congress Party (MCP) régime had been characterised by a remarkably high degree of legitimacy. It can of course be argued that this was simply based on political repression, which certainly existed, notably during periods of excessive sensitivity to various criticisms and actions that were interpreted as threats to the prevailing stability. This could be seen in the activities of Banda's strong-arm organisations (such as the Young Pioneers and the Youth League), and in the omnipresent secret police, who did their best to identify dissidents and rebels. Punishments included detention without trial, or much worse, and disloyalty was often vaguely and broadly defined.

The reunification of Germany on 3 October 1990 marked the end not only of a socialist experiment but also of an alternative source of aid to developing countries as far apart as Vietnam, Cuba, and Mozambique. Whilst the Soviet Union was the major socialist provider of assistance, the former German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.) played a not insignificant rôle. Yet how great was the loss to the developing world when the G.D.R. rapidly disintegrated? What was distinctive about its aid compared with that of capitalist donors? What happened to the projects, experts, overseas students, and foreign workers once Germany reunified?

During the era of the All People's Congress (A.P.C.), 1968–92, the state machinery and resources of Sierra Leone were used to promote the interests of a relatively small number of persons rather than those of the general public. A system of patronage thrived under this ruling party primarily because membership of particular groupings was a more acceptable qualification for position than an individual's actual capabilities. The ensuing intrigues deterred development in the country because members of cliques were only accountable to their leader and his top officials.

Independent Botswana has developed on three main pillars: rapid and sustained economic growth (over the decade to 1992, for example, at 8.4 per cent a year, third-highest among all developing countries, and far in excess of any other in Africa); multi-party or liberal democracy; and an efficient central state, the main features of which have been identified and praised by observers. With growth, an accompanying build-up of a relatively strong governmental system took place, with activities especially focused on finance and planning. The civil service was maintained at a high level, according to Ravi Gulhati, by avoiding rapid localisation, by providing high compensation for officials, and by keeping well-defined lines of authority and accountability. Able people were placed in key positions and kept there for extended periods. The political elite fairly consistently sought expert advice from leading bureaucrats, and the two groups have displayed a closeness and mutuality of interest built upon their common involvement in cattle and commerce, and the not uncommon tendency for cabinet ministers to arise from the ranks of the senior bureaucracy.

As members of the Debt Crisis Network of Charities and Non-Governmental Organisations, my colleague, Bill Peters, and I, Co-Chairmen of the Campaign for Jubilee 2000, were invited to the annual presentation in London of the World Bank's very detailed Debt Tables that are prepared with great care each year by Malvina Pollock and her team in Washington. They draw on statistics from 129 (116 in 1992–3) third-world governments, which are dealt with country by country in four pages of analysis in Volume 2, having been aggregated in Volume 1 to give totals for each major area, and for different income groups. Both sets of figures include lengthy and informative introductions analysing the changes and structures in debt and finance for developing countries during the last year.

Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o has established himself as one of the leading second-generation African writers. His first two novels, Weep Not, Child (London, Heinemann, 1964) and The River Between (London, Heinemann, 1965), written while an undergraduate at Makerere University College, Kampala, brought him recognition as the foremost East African writer. His third novel, A Grain of Wheat (London, Heinemann, 1967), established James Ngugi, as he then called himself, as one of the most distinguished literary voices from Africa. There was a long pause before Ngũgĩ published his next novel, Petals of Blood (London, Heinemann, 1977). The change in name signalled that during the intervening years he had developed a radical new perspective on Kenya, the explicit locale of all his writing.

With five years to go until 2000 is upon us the debt campaign is at present concentrating on two elements important for success. The first is capturing and extending what might be described as grass-roots interest: signs already have appeared of some sympathy with, and even support for, the campaign among economists, bankers, civil servants, diplomats, and politicians; discreet encouragement from the inner courts of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank has been recorded. The second is a change in the international, political, and intellectual climate to favour remission.

International concern over the pathology of political corruption increases apace. The last five years have witnessed a proliferation of organisations, conferences, and meetings dedicated to analysing the phenomenon as well as proposing workable policies of containment and control.This rising concern is a consequence partly of accelerating globalisation which not only increases awareness of the incidence and appalling scale of corruption but, more seriously, allows the contagion to infect the international system of trade and finance as a result of the activities of organised crime syndicates, money launderers, arms dealers, and the like. Furthermore, the ending of the cold war has meant that the ‘great’ powers are now having to confront the consequences of their longstanding indulgence, in the interests of political expediency, of sundry seedy dictators and their cronies; kleptocrats who seemed to devote much of their incumbency to transferring millions of dollars, sometimes billions, from the public treasury into Swiss bank accounts.

The Government of Uganda headed by President Yoweri Museveni, which came to power in January 1986, has made impressive progress since then in bringing about peace and national reconcilication, and in restoring the rule of law. It has turned the economy round from what might be described as ‘free fall’ to steady growth, albeit still heavily dependent on foreign aid. It has returned expropriated properties to their Asian owners, and has begun to attract foreign investment. Above all it has restored hope and given Ugandans back their pride. These are no means achievements, and place the country firmly among the few in Africa in recent years which have managed to bring about a real improvement in the overall quality of life for their citizens, albeit from a very low base. This would in itself be sufficient reason for looking more closely at what has been happening there. But, after all the disappointments of the past, it is also legitimate to ask whether these dramatic improvements are likely to be sustainable.