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Public Finance, Special Interests, and Direct Wine Shipping Laws in the United States*

  • Omer Gokcekus (a1) and Dennis Nottebaum (a2)
Abstract

This study develops thirteen criteria to detail diverging direct shipping laws of the U.S. states. It also investigates why some states have prohibitive laws by utilizing a logit regression model. Regression results provide strong support for public finance and special interest arguments: It appears that states concerned about incurring losses in tax revenues, that is, that are heavily dependent on federal aid and have low state revenues, and protecting the wholesalers and retailers that benefit from the three-tier system (at the expense of wineries and wine drinkers) are most likely to have a prohibitive law. (JEL Classification: D72, H71, Q18)

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Corresponding author
For all correspondence: Omer Gokcekus, John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University, South Orange, NJ 07079, USA; tel.: 973-313-6272, fax: 973-275-2519, e-mail: omer.gokcekus@shu.edu
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*

The authors thank Andrew Fargnoli, Adam Godet, Justin Myzie, Ryan Kane, Nicolas Reinhart, Edward Tower, and Daniel Verderosa, participants in the 2008 American Association of Wine Economists Meeting in Portland, two anonymous referees, and Karl Storchmann for their comments and suggestions.

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References
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Journal of Wine Economics
  • ISSN: 1931-4361
  • EISSN: 1931-437X
  • URL: /core/journals/journal-of-wine-economics
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