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  • Cited by 8
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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Toh, Kevin 2015. Erratum to: Four Neglected Prescriptions of Hartian Legal Philosophy. Law and Philosophy, Vol. 34, Issue. 3, p. 333.


    Tuzet, Giovanni 2015. Due domande siamesi: natura e funzioni del diritto. SOCIOLOGIA DEL DIRITTO, Issue. 2, p. 63.


    Greenberg, Mark 2012. Erratum to: Implications of Indeterminacy: Naturalism in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Law II. Law and Philosophy, Vol. 31, Issue. 6, p. 619.


    Greenberg, Mark 2011. Implications of Indeterminacy: Naturalism in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Law II. Law and Philosophy, Vol. 30, Issue. 4, p. 453.


    RIJPKEMA, PETER 2011. The Inevitability of Moral Evaluation*. Ratio Juris, Vol. 24, Issue. 4, p. 413.


    COLEMAN, JULES L. 2009. Beyond Inclusive Legal Positivism*. Ratio Juris, Vol. 22, Issue. 3, p. 359.


    PAVLAKOS, GEORGE 2009. Practice, Reasons, and the Agent's Point of View*. Ratio Juris, Vol. 22, Issue. 1, p. 74.


    Greenberg, Mark 2005. A New Map of Theories of Mental Content: Constitutive Accounts and Normative Theories1. Philosophical Issues, Vol. 15, Issue. 1, p. 299.


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HOW FACTS MAKE LAW

  • Mark Greenberg (a1)
  • DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1352325204040212
  • Published online: 01 September 2004
Abstract

Nearly all philosophers of law agree that nonnormative, nonevaluative, contingent facts—descriptive facts, for short—are among the determinants of the content of the law. In particular, ordinary empirical facts about the behavior and mental states of people such as legislators, judges, other government officials, and voters play a part in determining that content. It is highly controversial, however, whether the relevant descriptive facts, which we can call law-determining practices, or law practices (or simply practices) for short, are the only determinants of legal content, or whether legal content also depends on normative or evaluative facts—value facts, for short. In fact, a central—perhaps the central—debate in the philosophy of law is a debate over whether value facts are among the determinants of the content of the law (though the debate is not usually characterized in this way).

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Legal Theory
  • ISSN: 1352-3252
  • EISSN: 1469-8048
  • URL: /core/journals/legal-theory
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