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Disembodied Persons

  • G. R. Gillett (a1)

In discussing Disembodied Persons we need to confront two problems:

A. Under what conditions would we consider that a person was present in the absence of the normal bodily cues?

B. Could such circumstances arise?

The first question may be regarded as epistemic and the second as metaphysical.

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1 Geach P. T., Mental Acts (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957).

2 Penelhum T., Survival and Disembodied Existence (London: Routledge & KeganPaul, 1970).

3 Dennett D., ‘Conditions of Personhood’, in Brainstorms (Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1978).

4 Op. cit.

5 Quinton A. P., ‘The Soul’, Journal of Philosophy 1 (1962).

6 Seddon G., ‘Logical Possibility’, Mind V, No. LXXXI (1972).

7 Wiggins D., Sameness and Subsfance (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980).

8 Op. cit. note 6, p. 481.

9 Op. cit. note 7, pp. 174ff.

10 Putnam H., Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge University Press, 1981).

11 Op. cit. note 7, p. 172.

12 Op. cit. note 7, p. 188.

13 Op. cit. note 10, p. 79.

14 Op. cit. note 6.

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  • ISSN: 0031-8191
  • EISSN: 1469-817X
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