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  • Cited by 6
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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Smith, Lindsay Veneziano, Vito and Wernick, Paul 2015. Machine Code and Metaphysics: A Perspective on Software Engineering. Philosophies, Vol. 1, Issue. 1, p. 28.

    Verhaegh, Sander 2014. Quine's Argument from Despair. British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Vol. 22, Issue. 1, p. 150.

    Sinclair, Nathan 2012. A Dogma of Naturalism. Metaphilosophy, Vol. 43, Issue. 5, p. 551.

    Trigg, Jonathan and Kalish, Michael 2011. Explaining How the Mind Works: On the Relation Between Cognitive Science and Philosophy. Topics in Cognitive Science, Vol. 3, Issue. 2, p. 399.

    Kemp, Gary 2010. Quine: The Challenge of Naturalism. European Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 18, Issue. 2, p. 283.

    LAVERS, GREGORY 2009. BENACERRAF’S DILEMMA AND INFORMAL MATHEMATICS. The Review of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 2, Issue. 04, p. 769.


Passing by the Naturalistic Turn: On Quine's Cul-de-Sac

  • P.M.S. Hacker (a1)
  • DOI:
  • Published online: 18 September 2006

Naturalism, it has been said, is the distinctive development in philosophy over the last thirty years. There has been a naturalistic turn away from the a priori methods of traditional philosophy to a conception of philosophy as continuous with natural science. The doctrine has been extensively discussed and has won considerable following in the USA. This is, on the whole, not true of Britain and continental Europe, where the pragmatist tradition never took root, and the temptations of scientism in philosophy were less alluring.

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  • ISSN: 0031-8191
  • EISSN: 1469-817X
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