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Vote Au Pluriel: How People Vote When Offered to Vote Under Different Rules

  • Karine Van der Straeten (a1), Jean-François Laslier (a2) and André Blais (a3)
Abstract
Abstract

This article reports on an Internet-based quasi-experiment that took place during the French 2012 presidential election. We designed a website where French voters could vote under different voting rules. Based on the observation of more than 8,000 participants, we find that a substantial minority (10% to 15%) vote differently under the different systems, with 17% of the voters not voting for their preferred candidate in the one-round election, this percentage dropped to 12% in the alternative vote (first choice). Compared to the two-rounds election, at the aggregate level, the top two candidates get slightly more votes under one round, while the minor candidates obtain more first choices under the alternative vote. These findings are consistent with what the literature suggests about the impact of these voting systems on voters' choice.

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This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

P. R. Abramson , J. H. Aldrich , A. Blais , M. Diamond , A. Diskin , I. H. Indridason , D. Lee , and R. Levine . 2010. “Comparing Strategic Voting under FPTP and PR Systems.” Comparative Political Studies 43: 6190.

W. Clark , and M. Golder . 2006. “Rehabilitating Duverger's Law: Testing the Mechanical and Strategic Modifying Effects of Electoral Laws.” Comparative Political Studies 39: 679708.

Gary Cox . 1997. Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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PS: Political Science & Politics
  • ISSN: 1049-0965
  • EISSN: 1537-5935
  • URL: /core/journals/ps-political-science-and-politics
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