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A new problem of evil: authority and the duty of interference

  • LUKE MARING (a1)
Abstract
Abstract

The traditional problem of evil sets theists the task of reconciling two things: God and evil. I argue that theists face the more difficult task of reconciling God and evils that God is specially obligated to prevent. Because of His authority, God's obligation to curtail evil goes far beyond our Samaritan duty to prevent evil when doing so isn't overly hard. Authorities owe their subjects a positive obligation to prevent certain evils; we have a right against our authorities that they protect us. God's apparent mistake is not merely the impersonal wrong of failing to do enough good – though it is that too. It is the highly personal wrong of failing to live up to a moral requirement that comes bundled with authority over persons. To make my argument, I use the resources of political philosophy and defend a novel change to the orthodox account of authority.

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This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

John Austin (1995) The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, Wilfred E. Rumble (ed.) (New York: Cambridge University Press).

Bruce Reichenbach (1976) ‘Natural evils and natural law: a theodicy for natural evils’, International Philosophical Quarterly, 16, 179196.

Peter van Inwagen (2006) The Problem of Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Stephen Wykstra (1984) ‘The Humean obstacle to evidential arguments from suffering: on avoiding the evils of “appearance”’, International Journal of Philosophy of Religion, 16, 7393.

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Religious Studies
  • ISSN: 0034-4125
  • EISSN: 1469-901X
  • URL: /core/journals/religious-studies
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