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Richard Swinburne's argument to the simplicity of God via the infinite

  • JEREMY GWIAZDA (a1)
Abstract
Abstract

In The Coherence of Theism Richard Swinburne writes that a person cannot be omniscient and perfectly free. In The Existence of God Swinburne writes that God is a person who is omniscient and perfectly free. There is a straightforward reason why the two passages are not in tension, but recognition of this reason raises a problem for Swinburne's argument in The Existence of God (the conclusion of which is that God likely exists). In this paper I present the problem for Swinburne's argument. I then consider two potential responses and suggest that neither succeeds.

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e-mail: jgwiazda@gc.cuny.edu
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This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

Richard Swinburne Prior probabilities in the argument from fine-tuning’, Faith and Philosophy, 22 (2005), 644645.

Quentin Smith Review article: Swinburne's explanation of the universe’, Religious Studies, 34 (1998), 93.

Richard Swinburne Could there be more than one God?’, Faith and Philosophy, 5 (1988), 225.

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Religious Studies
  • ISSN: 0034-4125
  • EISSN: 1469-901X
  • URL: /core/journals/religious-studies
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