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Sceptical theism and divine truths

  • AARON SEGAL (a1)
Abstract
Abstract

Sceptical theism has been employed by its adherents in an argument aimed at undermining the so called ‘noseeum inference’. Erik Wielenberg (2010) has recently argued that there is an equally plausible argument for the conclusion that sceptical theism implies that we do not know any proposition that has word-of-God justification only. Thus, sceptical theists need to give up their argument against the noseeum inference or accept the conclusion that we do not know any proposition that has word-of-God justification only. I claim that sceptical theists need not face such a difficult choice because the argument that Wielenberg offers is not as plausible as their argument against the noseeum inference.

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e-mail: asegal@nd.edu
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This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

M. Bergmann (2001) ‘Sceptical theism and Rowe's new evidential argument from evil’, Nous, 35, 278296.

M. Bergmann & M. Rea (2005) ‘In defense of sceptical theism: a reply to Almeida and Oppy’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 83, 241251.

J. Lackey & E. Sosa (2008) Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

(1988) ‘Evil and theodicy’, Philosophical Topics, 16, 119132.

(1991) ‘Ruminations about evil’, Philosophical Perspectives, 5, 6988.

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Religious Studies
  • ISSN: 0034-4125
  • EISSN: 1469-901X
  • URL: /core/journals/religious-studies
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