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  • Cited by 5
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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Johnson, David Kyle 2014. The Failure of the Multiverse Hypothesis as a Solution to the Problem of No Best World. Sophia, Vol. 53, Issue. 4, p. 447.


    Leftow, Brian 2013. God's Deontic Perfection. Res Philosophica, Vol. 90, Issue. 1, p. 69.


    Kraay, Klaas J. 2008. Creation, Actualization and God's Choice among Possible Worlds. Philosophy Compass, Vol. 3, Issue. 4, p. 854.


    Mawson, T. J. 2008. Divine eternity. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 64, Issue. 1, p. 35.


    Kraay, Klaas 2007. Divine Unsurpassability. Philosophia, Vol. 35, Issue. 3-4, p. 293.


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No best world: moral luck

  • BRIAN LEFTOW (a1)
  • DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0034412505007584
  • Published online: 01 June 2005
Abstract

William Rowe and others argue that if ours is a possible world than which there is a better, it follows that God does not exist. If this is correct, then if there is no best possible world, it is not so much as possible that God exist. I reject the key premise of Rowe's argument. The key to seeing that it is false, I suggest, is seeing that God is subject to something fairly called moral luck. In this first part of the article, I set up Rowe's argument, indicate my strategy, introduce the notion of moral luck and show how it bears on Rowe's claims.

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Religious Studies
  • ISSN: 0034-4125
  • EISSN: 1469-901X
  • URL: /core/journals/religious-studies
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