Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 January 2011
This article explains how foreign assistance to one or both sides in a civil war influences the dynamics of the conflict. It submits that external assistance has the potential of affecting the military capabilities available to the belligerents. It then argues that the balance of those capabilities impacts significantly on whether the warfare in a civil war assumes a conventional, guerrilla or irregular form. These theoretical assertions are tested against the case of the Angolan Civil War. It is shown that during that war, variations in the form of warfare correlated closely to the type, degree, and direction of foreign intervention given to each of the belligerents.
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5 Although the causes of third-party intervention – on either side – is outside the scope of this article, there exists a vast and growing literature on the motivations behind foreign intervention. See, for example, Svensson, Isak, ‘Bargaining, Bias and Peace Brokers: How Rebels Commit to Peace’, Journal of Peace Research, 44:2 (2007), pp. 177–194CrossRefGoogle Scholar .
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11 Terrorism is not included in this typology because rarely has a terrorist strategy reached the threshold of most definitions of ‘civil war’. For example, the campaigns of the Red Army Faction, Red Brigades or November 17 would not be considered ‘civil wars’ by most definitions. While bearing this in mind, however, terrorism does frequently play a prominent role in how civil wars are fought, although does so as a tactic in parallel with a conventional, guerrilla or irregular strategy. When separated from these more intense forms of violence, terrorism hardly ever reaches the intensity required for it to be described as a war.
12 Indeed, the only major difference between my typology and Kalyvas' is in terminology. Where Kalyvas has employed the term ‘systematical non-conventional warfare’, I have used ‘irregular warfare’. See Kalyvas, , The Logic of Violence in Civil WarsGoogle Scholar ; Kalyvas, ‘Warfare in Civil Wars’.
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57 The four camps were located in Cabinda, Salazar (N'Dalatando), Benguela and Henrique de Carvalho (Saurimo). See Mallin, Jay, Cuba in Angola (Miami: University of Miami Press, 1987), p. 4Google Scholar ; George, , The Cuban Intervention in Angola, p. 64Google Scholar . When the existing 50 Cuban instructors redeployed from Brazzaville to Luanda, their Soviet colleagues remained behind. It was intended that the Cuban instructors would take 4,800 MPLA recruits, combine the recruits with Soviet supplied weapons, and convert them into 16 infantry battalions, 25 mortar batteries and anti-aircraft units. Also see, Gunn, ‘Cuba and Angola’, pp. 72–3.
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