We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 January 2017
On August 6, 1919, a bloodless coup d'état occurred in Budapest, forcing the Socialist “trade union” government to resign, and bringing Hungary’s radical phase to an abrupt end. Hungary’s revolutionary experiments had been resounding failures, and the majority of the population was relieved. The first revolution of October 31, 1918 had promised democracy, independence, and unimpaired territorial integrity but had brought instead only disappointments— political instability and foreign occupation. The second revolution, which declared Hungary a Soviet republic on March 21, 1919, was no more successful than the first. The proletarian dictatorship, originally welcomed as a remedy for the discredited democratic institutions, rapidly lost its appeal, and the world revolution, initially held out as an answer to Hungary’s territorial mutilation, failed to become a reality. By the end of July, the Rumanian army was at the gates of Budapest and internal dissatisfaction had assumed threatening proportions.
1. Varjassy, Louis, Révolution, bolchevisme, réaction: Histoire de I'occupation francaise en Hongrie (1918-1919) (Paris: Jouve et Cie, 1934, pp. 99–100 Google Scholar; Jászi, Oszkár, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary (London: P. S. King and Son, 1924), p. 156 Google Scholar; Károlyi, Mihály, Egy egész világ ellen (Budapest: Gondolat, 1965, pp. 240–41.Google Scholar
2. Schmidt-Pauli, Edgar von, Graf Stefan Bethlen: Ein Abschnitt ungarischer Geschichte (Berlin: Verlag von Reimar Hobbing, 1931), p. 129 Google Scholar. See also Surányi, Miklós, Bethlen: Törtinétpolitikai tanulmányok (Budapest: Singer és Wolfner, 1927), p. 13.Google Scholar
3. Borsányi, Gyö;rgy, ed., Páter Zadravecz titkos naplója (Budapest: Kossuth, 1967, pp. 242–43.Google Scholar
4. Szabó, Ágnes and Pamlényi, Ervin, eds., A határban a Halál kassál …: Fejcsctek Prónay Pál feljegyzéseiből (Budapest: Kossuth, 1963, p. 214 Google Scholar. For a report on an actual attempt on his life by members of Horthy's National Army, see Új Nemsedék, March 3, 1920. When this did not succeed, the rightist opponents of Friedrich managed to implicate him in the murder of István Tisza. A number of witnesses were frightened into giving false testimony against Friedrich and two liberal politicians. Friedrich was eventually acquitted, but only after two grueling trials lasting over a year.
5. Országos Levéltar, Budapest (henceforth cited as O.L.), Minisztertanácsi jegyzŕkönyv (henceforth cited as M.j.), February 13, 1920.
6. Garami, Ernŕ, Forrongó Magyarorsság: Emlékezések és tanulságok, 2nd ed. (Vienna: Pegazus, 1922), p. 156 ff.Google Scholar; Böhm, Vilmos, Két forradalom tiizében (Budapest: Népszava, 1946), pp. 69–71, 91-93, 364Google Scholar; Buchinger, Manó, Kűzdelem a szocialismusért: Emlékek és élmények, 2 vols. (Budapest: Népszava, 1946), 2: 94–95Google Scholar.
7. Clark, Charles Upson, Greater Roumania (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1922), p. 312.Google Scholar
8. Berend, Iván T. and Ránki, György, “Az ellenforradalom kora,” in Molnár, Erik and Pamlényi, Ervin, eds., Magyarország törtenete, 2 vols. (Budapest: Gondolat, 1964), 2: 364.Google Scholar
9. Macartney, C. A., October Fifteenth: A History of Modern Hungary 1929-1945, 2 vols. (Edinburgh: The University Press, 1957), 1: 23.Google Scholar
10. The dearth of serious historical investigations of Friedrich's premiership and his political ideas is appalling. In the Magyar elctrajzi lexikon, 2 vols. (Budapest: Akademia, 1967-69), the most authoritative recent Hungarian biographical encyclopedia, the bibliography under Friedrich's name consists of one second-rate novel dealing with the Peidl government's six days in power: Sándor, Kálman, Szégyenfa (Feliér augusztus) (Budapest: Szépirodalmi, 1951)Google Scholar. With the exception of the brief paragraphs which the general histories devote to these few months, the only article on the subject, unfortunately a weak one, is Károly Mészáros's “Adatok a reakciós politikai irányzatok arculatához és tevékenységéhez (1919 augusztus), ” Toörténelmi Szemle, 13 (1970): 65-105.
11. Böhm, Két forradalom, p. 92.
12. Magyar életrajzi lexikon, 1: 543; László T. Boros, ed., Magyar politikai lexicon: Magyar politikusok, 1914-1929 (Budapest: Európa irodalmi es nyomdai, rt., 1929), p. 126.
13. Dezső Nemes, , Ac ellenjorradalom története Magyarorszagon, 1919-1921 (Budapest: Akadémia, 1962), p. 129.Google Scholar
14. By 1921 Friedrich estimated his estate as being worth five or six million crowns. See Új Nemsedék, April 13, 1921.
15. Palatinus, József, Szabadköművesek Magyarországon (Pécs, 1944), p. 52 Google Scholar. For Friedrich's career in the Freemason organization, see Wilczek, Gusztáv and Singer, Arthur, eds., Szabadköműves Almanack as 1919-ik esztendű;re, 2nd series (Budapest, 1918), p. 100 Google Scholar. The above references were kindly supplied to me by Zsuzsa L. Nagy of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
16. Batthyányi, Tivadar, Beszámolóm, 2 vols. (Budapest: Athenaeum, 1936), 2: 59 Google Scholar; Garami, Forrongó Magyarország, pp. 22-23.
17. Károlyi, Egy egész világ ellen, p. 240.
18. Hajdu, Tibor, Az 1918-as magyarországi polgári demokratiktts forradalom (Budapest: Kossuth, 1968, p. 46.Google Scholar
19. Garami, Forrongó Magyarország, p. 22.
20. The account of Friedrich's career handed down in diaries and memoirs by members of the Károlyi government is greatly distorted. They claim that, obscure in the days of October 1918, with no political influence, Friedrich took over the post of undersecretary by simply arriving at the ministry and sitting down in the office of one of the undersecretaries. When the Ministerial Council discovered that he had no official assignment, they took steps to remove the usurper, but Friedrich refused to relinquish his selfappointed post. Bohm, Ket jorradalom, pp. 69-71, and Garami, Forrongó Magyarország, p. 55. Elek Karsai repeats the same erroneous story in Számjeltávirat valamennyi magyar királyi követségnek (Budapest: Táncsics, 1969), pp. 119-20, as does Gábor Vermes in “The October Revolution in Hungary: From Károlyi to Kun, ” in Hungary in Revolution 1918-19, ed. Iván Völgyes (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1971), p. 40. However, Friedrich testified at a preliminary investigation into Tisza's murder that Károlyi had promised this post to him and that he had received a telephone call from the National Council on October 31 asking him “to take over the administration of the Ministry of Defense.” Új Nemzedék, December 3, 1919. Later, at the trial, Friedrich repeated his story. Nemzeti Újsdág. Melléklet. A targyalds tizedik napja, August 12, 1920. Károlyi himself acknowledged at the meeting of the Ministerial Council that Friedrich occupied this position with his approval. O.L., M.j., November 8, 1918.
21. Kozma, Miklós, As összeomlás, 1918-1919 (Budapest: Athenaeum, 1933, p. 28 Google Scholar. Friedrich dated his disillusionment with Károlyi's political stance from as early as November 3, 1918, when József Pogány, a Social Democrat, was named to head the Soldiers' Council. See Friedrich's testimony at the Tisza trial, Új Nemzedék, April 14, 1921.
22. Hajdu, Polgári demokratikus jorradalom, pp. 234 and 244.
23. Batthyányi, Beszámolóm, 2: 234-35.
24. Böhm accused Friedrich of double-dealing in the course of this incident. He claimed that Friedrich wrote a servile letter from jail to the editor of Vörös Újság, the official paper of the Communist Party of Hungary, in which he called attention to his democratic and revolutionary past and begged for his release. As a result, Böhm claimed, he was freed after a few weeks of imprisonment. Két forradalom, p. 301. Boros, in his Magyar politikai lexicon (p. 126), gives the accurate account, which is also confirmed by other sources—for example, by the testimony of Baron Sándor Szurmay, a fellow prisoner, at the Tisza trial. See Új Nemsedék, June 12, 1921.
25. This account is based on Csilléry's own recollection. Lábay, Gyula, Ac cllenjorradalom törtcnete as októberi forradalomtól a kommün bukásáig (Budapest: Élet irodalmi és nyomda rt., 1922), p. 169 Google Scholar. Lábay's book, which is actually a compilation of eyewitness accounts told in the first person, is of crucial importance to a proper assessment of Friedrich's role in the coup.
26. Ibid., pp. 170-73.
27. On Pekár, see Magyar politikai lexicon, pp. 325-27, and, more recently, Magyar irodalmi lexikon, 3 vols. (Budapest: Akádemia, 1963-67), 2: 461-62.
28. Lábay is quite explicit on this point. As cllenforradalom, p. 170. Yet all Marxist secondary sources make Friedrich the head of the White House or at least one of its long-standing members. See especially Nemes, As ellenforradalom, p. 53; Kirschner, Béla, A ‘szaksserveseti kormány’ hat napja, 1919 (Budapest: Kossuth, 1968, p. 223 Google Scholar; Hajdu, Tibor, A Magyarországi Tanácsköstársaság (Budapest: Kossuth, 1969, p. 354 Google Scholar. On Friedrich's close connection with Lovászy and Bartha during the Soviet period, see László Fenyes, , Védőbcsséde a Tissa-pcrben. A forradalom okai cs a Tissa-bűnper vádja (Budapest: Loblovvitz, 1922, p. 90.Google Scholar
29. Tormay, Cecile, An Outlaw's Diary, 2 vols. (London: P. Allen, 1923), 2: 201.Google Scholar
30. Interview with Lajos Beck, Neue Freie Presse, August 9, 1919.
31. Beck's negotiations were widely reported. See Albert Halstead, American commissioner in Vienna, to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, August 9, 1919, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Record Group 59, M820/215/309. Gyula Peidl gave details of his negotiations with Beck in a parliamentary debate on the coup on August 2, 1922. Jenő Kalmár, Kik hozták be a románokat Budapestre, vagy hogyan ütöttek agyon Friedrich, Csilléry, Pckár úrék a magyarországi szociáldemokrata pártot? (Budapest: Népszava, 1922), p. 122. Kalmár's book is a reprint of the parliamentary debate.
32. Interview with Lajos Beck, Neue Freie Presse, August 9, 1919.
33. On Peidl's negotiations with István Nagyatádi Szabó, the leader of the Smallholders, and Sándor Giesswein, head of the left wing of the Christian Socialist Party, see Gyula Peidl's speech in Parliament, August 2, 1922, in Kalmár, Kik hozták be a románokat, p. 121.
34. In spite of Peidl's later protestations to the contrary, the Social Democratic attitude on this question was inflexible. Vilmos Böhm, Peidl's diplomatic representative in Vienna, rejected an arrangement, suggested by István Bethlen, by which the Social Democrats would receive only one-third of the portfolios while the bourgeois and peasant parties would share the remaining cabinet posts. Böhm made it clear to Bethlen and to the Allied representatives that his party would not accept “the principle of majority before the elections.” See Mrs. Sándor Gábor, “Böhm Vilmos, bécsi magyar követ jelentesei a Peidl-kormányhoz és Ágoston Péter külügyminiszterhez, ” Párttörténeti Közlemények, 6 (November 1960): 202.
35. Csillery's speech in Parliament, August 2, 1922, in Kalmár, Kik hozták be a románokat, p. 63.
36. Romanelli, Guido, Nell'Ungheria di Béla Kun c durante Voccupasione vrilitare romena: La mia missione, maggio-novembre 1919 (Udine: Doretti, 1964, p. 337.Google Scholar
37. On the agreement with Lovaszy, see Nemzeti újsdg, October 9, 1919. For Friedrich's insistence on a coalition government which would include the Social Democrats, see Lábay, As ellenforradalom, pp. 174 and 177.
38. Gratz, Gusztáv, A forradalmak kora: Magyarország története, 1918-1920 (Budapest: Magyar Szemle Társaság, 1935), p. 229.Google Scholar
39. In contrast to most aristocrats, not only did Joseph not call for the removal of the Károlyi government; he even sent the outline of Oszkár Jászi's nationality law to “his dear cousin” in Buckingham Palace as an indication of Hungary's democratic intentions towards the nationalities. Tibor Hajdu, “Adatok a Tanácsköztársaság kikiáltásának történetéhez, ” Párttörténeti Köslemények, 18 (September 1972): 135.
40. Lábay, As ellenjorradalom, p. 193.
41. Ibid., p. 177.
42. Peidl eventually denied that such a telephone conversation had ever taken place. See his speech in Parliament, August 2, 1922, in Kalmar, Kik hostak be a romanokat, p. 121. However, Böhm's well-documented discussions with István Bethlen and the Entente representatives only a day before the alleged telephone conversation indirectly support the claim of the insurgents. For details, see Gábor, “Böhm Vilmos jelentései, ” pp. 200-203.
43. The police officer instrumental in providing police protection for the insurgents was none other than Károly Kormos, the same man who had been the spokesman for the revolutionary faction of the Budapest police force in October 1918. As early as October 29, 1918, Kormos announced the allegiance of the police to the National Council. See László Bús Fekete (pseud.), Katona-forradalmárok (Budapest: Újságüzem, 1918), p. 39. On Kormos's role in the coup, see his testimony at the Tisza trial, Nemseti Ojsag. Melléklet. A tárgyalás tisenötödik napja, August 17, 1920, and Dietz, Károly, Oktãbertől augiisctusig (Budapest: Rácz Vilmos, 1920), p. 160.Google Scholar
44. Lábay, As ellenforradalom, pp. 190-91.
45. Ibid., p. 193.
46. Deák, Francis, Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference: The Diplomatic History of the Treaty of Trianon (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942, p. 116.Google Scholar
47. Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt. Központi Bizottság. Intézet, Párttörténeti, A magyar forradalmi munkásmosgalom története, 3 vols. (Budapest: Kossuth, 1966-70), 2: 7.Google Scholar
48. Friedrich established a newspaper, A Nép, in cooperation with the Socialist poet Sándor Csizmadia. See Friedrich's testimony at the Tisza trial, Új Nemzedék, April 14, 1921. Nándor Korcsmáros, a vehement opponent of Friedrich, quoted at length from A Nép to show his brutal attacks on the Tisza regime and to discredit Friedrich as a turncoat. Forradalom és emigráció (Vienna, 1923), pp. 78-79.
49. O.L., M.j., August 7, 1919.
50. Reported in the New York Times, August 9, 1919.
51. Seton-Watson, R. W., “The Fall of Béla Kun,” The New Europe, 12 (July-October 1919): 99.Google Scholar
52. O.L., M.j., August 7, 1919.
53. The text of the memorandum handed to Gyula Peidl by an interministerial delegation demanding a reorganization of the government was read by Csilléry in Parliament, August 2, 1922; in Kalmér, Kik hostak be a románokat, pp. 75-76. Peidl refused their demands.
54. In fact, Péter Ágoston, Peidl's foreign minister, stated in his diary that “the new government reestablished the status of March 21, 1919, ” that is, the status quo prior to the Communist takeover. Ágnes Szabó, comp., “Részletek Ágoston Péter naplójából,” Párttörténeti Közlemények, 9 (May 1963): 162. (Henceforth cited as Ágoston, “Napló. “) Some Marxist historians, on the other hand, in their effort to prove the “counterrevolutionary” nature of the Friedrich government, resort to outright historical falsification. Dezső Nemes finds it necessary to make and even emphasize the untrue claim that the undersecretaries chosen for the provisional cabinet posts “were undersecretaries of the pre-1918 regime.” Az ellenjorradalom, p. 35. He thereby implies that Friedrich's ministers were officials who had been removed after the victory of the 1918 revolution. Although some of the undersecretaries had been employed in lesser posts in the ministries prior to October 31, 1918, all without exception served as undersecretaries in the Károlyi government. Some also came to the Károlyi regime as new political appointees. See Magyar áletrajzi lexikon, passim.
55. Budapesti Köslöny, August 9, 1919.
56. Budapesti Köslöny, August 10, 1919 (morning).
57. Anti-Semitic outbursts, especially at the universities, were the greatest domestic problems facing the new government. On August 6 fights broke out between Jewish and non-Jewish students in the cafeterias. Gaál, Jenő, Elmények és tanulságok (Budapest: Magyar Történelmi Társulat, 1940), p. 554 Google Scholar. The next day Jewish officials were beaten by students. Ágoston, “Napló, ” p. 160; Ferenc Harrer, Egy magyar polgár életc (Budapest: Gondolat, 1964), p. 430. Eventually, the universities had to be closed for an indefinite period of time. See the rector's announcement in Budapesti Köslöny, September 28, 1919. As for the widespread denunciations, Gyula Hevesi, a high Communist official in hiding, remembered that “the anti-Communist denunciations to the district police stations were so numerous that the police were unable to register them all.” Hevesi, Gyula, Egy mériök a forradalomban (Budapest: Kossuth, 1965, p. 294.Google Scholar
58. Budapesti Köslöny, August 8, 1919. Friedrich was himself accused of being anti-Semitic. See, for example, Graham, Malbone Watson, The New Governments of Central Europe (London: Pitman and Sons, 1924, p. 250 Google Scholar. Contradicting these charges, Gusztáv Gratz reports that Friedrich appointed Jenő Polnay, director of the Atlantica Shipping Company, as his first minister of food. “Polnay was a close friend of Friedrich, and he was a Jew. The original idea was that Jakab Bleyer would also take part ‘ i the first ministry, and accordingly he showed up at the first Ministerial Council meeting. But when he found the Jewish Polnay there, he would not take the portfolio. Csillery also shared Bleyer's view. The latter gave up his appointment when Friedrich announced that the Entente demanded the presence of a Jew in the cabinet, which, by the way, was untrue. Bleyer, on the other hand, could not be persuaded… . When the officials of the Ministry of Food heard that in the person of Polnay they were getting a Jewish minister, they almost revolted. Archduke Joseph and Friedrich themselves went to the ministry and tried to calm the officials and to warn them against religious intolerance.” Gratz, A forradalmak kora, pp. 233 and 235. See also Friedrich's warning words concerning the incident in Budapesti Közlöny, August 8, 1919. Vilmos Vazsonyi, the liberal Jewish leader of the National Democratic Party, testified in Parliament thatj' .ailed Friedrich, before and during the Károlyi revolution, “a pro-Semite flirting with Zionism.” Revolution and Counter-Revolution, p. 156. It is true, however, that in the early 1920s Friedrich moved in the direction of anti-Semitism.
59. Harrer, Egy magyar polgár élete, p. 446.
60. Korcsmáros, Forradalom és emigráció, p. 71.
61. The Social Democrats, claiming persecution and terror, refused to participate in the first postwar elections on January 25, 1920. The party, however, did instruct its followers to cast blank ballots signifying their political stance. In Budapest, the most industrial city, 19.3 percent of the ballots cast were blank. However, this figure also includes genuinely void ballots. See Ságvári, Ágnes, ed., Források Budapest múltjából, 4 vols. (Budapest: Budapest Főváros Levéltára, 1972), 3: 24 Google Scholar. The elections proved to be a resounding defeat for the Liberals and Social Democrats. For example, out of the 37, 266 votes cast in Kispest, a suburb of the capital which had been called Red Kispest even before the war, only 10, 203 were blank. The Christian Social candidate won the election with an absolute majority of 19, 921 votes. Nemseti Újság, January 30, 1920. Trade union membership also declined drastically. While in 1917 there were 215, 222 members and in 1918 membership almost tripled, in 1920 Social Democratic trade unions could boast only 152, 441 members. See Jászai, Samu, A magyar ssakszervezctck története (Budapest: Magyarországi Szakszervezeti Tanács, 192S), pp. 272–73Google Scholar. Vilmos Vázsonyi, a Liberal politician and an ally of the Social Democratic Party in 1919, estimated that at the forthcoming elections “there would be no ten socialists elected out of about 200 deputies.” J. Schiopul to George D. Herron, September 11, 1919, George D. Herron Papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
62. Ságvári, ed., Források Budapest múltjából, 3: 21. Horthy's address to the inhabitants of Budapest on November 16, 1919, included references to the denial of Budapest's thousand-year-old past, red rags, and alienation from the national ideal. Altogether it was written in the spirit of revenge. It can be profitably compared to Archduke Joseph's address to the municipal delegation which visited him a day after he was named governor. In it Joseph repeatedly talked about his “beloved Budapest” and asked “God's blessing on this city.” See Budapesti Köslöny, August 10, 1919 (morning).
You have
Access
