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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Alzola, Miguel 2015. Virtuous Persons and Virtuous Actions in Business Ethics and Organizational Research. Business Ethics Quarterly, Vol. 25, Issue. 03, p. 287.


    Borden, Sandra L. 2015. A Virtue Ethics Critique of Silverstone's Media Hospitality. Journal of Media Ethics, Vol. 30, Issue. 3, p. 168.


    Brickhouse, Thomas C. and Smith, Nicholas D. 2014. Ancient Ethics.


    Hardy, Jörg 2014. Ancient Ethics.


    2014. Ancient Ethics.


    Bett, Richard 2012. A Companion to Ancient Philosophy.


    Hardy, Jörg 2011. How Should One Live?.


    Hardy, Jörg 2010. Seeking the Truth and Taking Care for Common Goods–Plato on Expertise and Recognizing Experts. Episteme, Vol. 7, Issue. 01, p. 7.


    Alzola, Miguel 2008. Character and Environment: The Status of Virtues in Organizations. Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 78, Issue. 3, p. 343.


    Risse, Mathias 2000. The Morally Decent Person. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 38, Issue. 2, p. 263.


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The Unity of Virtue*

  • John M. Cooper (a1)
  • DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500003149
  • Published online: 01 January 2009
Abstract

Philosophers have recently revived the study of the ancient Greek topics of virtue and the virtues—justice, honesty, temperance, friendship, courage, and so on as qualities of mind and character belonging to individual people. But one issue at the center of Greek moral theory seems to have dropped out of consideration. This is the question of the unity of virtue, the unity of the virtues. Must anyone who has one of these qualities have others of them as well, indeed all of them—all the ones that really do deserve to be counted as virtues? Even further, is there really no set of distinct and separate virtuous qualities at all, but at bottom only a single one—so that the person who has this single condition of “virtue” (and only he) is entitled also to the further descriptions “honest” and “well-controlled” and “just” and “friendly” and “courageous” and “fostering” and “supportive,” and so on, as distinguishable aspects or immediate effects of his unitary “virtue”?

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Social Philosophy and Policy
  • ISSN: 0265-0525
  • EISSN: 1471-6437
  • URL: /core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy
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