Two Sources of Morality*

¹ For a recent influential discussion of the concept-centered problem, see Korsgaard, Christine M., The Sources of Normativity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Korsgaard, Christine M., “Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant,” Journal of Ethics 3, no. 1 (1999): 1–29. My approach is rather different from hers, as I trace ethical conceptualization to a more social, and less reflective, origin; in this respect it is closer to the approach found in Postema, Gerald J., “Morality in the First Person Plural,” Law and Philosophy 14, no. 1 (1995): 35–64. For another different approach, one that involves many congenial themes despite supporting noncognitivism, see Gibbard, Allan, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).

² For a sketch of the cognitivist position I defend, see Jackson, Frank and Pettit, Philip, “Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation,” Philosophical Quarterly 45, no. 178 (1995): 20–40; and Pettit, Philip, “Embracing Objectivity in Ethics,” in Leiter, Brian, ed., Objectivity in Law and Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). For a critique of expressivism and an indirect argument for cognitivism, see Jackson, Frank and Pettit, Philip, “A Question for Expressivism,” Analysis 58, no. 4 (1998): 239–51.

³ For examples of this sort of approach, see Hurley, S. L., Natural Reasons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Jackson, and Pettit, , “Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation”; and Wedgwood, Ralph, “Conceptual Role Semantics for Moral Terms,” Philosophical Review, forthcoming.

⁴ On design specifications, see Dennett, Daniel C., The Intentional Stance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987); Pettit, Philip, The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society, and Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), chap. 1; and Railton, Peter, “On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and Action,” in Cullity, Garrett and Gaut, Berys, eds., Ethics and Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

⁵ On this point, see Deacon, Terrence W., The Symbolic Species: The Co-Evolution of Language and the Human Brain (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997).

⁶ Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Nidditch, P. H. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), bk. III, chap. 2.

⁷ For a qualified defense of this sort of view, see Pettit, , The Common Mind. For further elaboration of its implications, see Pettit, Philip and Smith, Michael, “Freedom in Belief and Desire,” Journal of Philosophy 93, no. 6 (1996): 429–49; and Pettit, Philip, A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001).

⁸ For an attempt to deal with some of the issues involved in this problem, see Pettit, , The Common Mind.

⁹ On this claim, however, see ibid., chap. 2.

¹⁰ For more on this approach, see Pettit, Philip, “A Theory of Normal and Ideal Conditions,” Philosophical Studies 96, no. 1 (1999): 21–44.

¹¹ On this point, see McGeer, Victoria and Pettit, Philip, “The Self-Regulating Mind,” forthcoming in Language and Communication.

¹² For discussion of this notion of virtual control, see Pettit, Philip, “The Virtual Reality of Homo Economicus,” The Monist 78, no. 3 (1995): 308–29.

¹³ I borrow this notion of fault-freedom from Price, Huw, Facts and the Function of Truth (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988).

¹⁴ Anscombe, G. E. M., Intention (Oxford: Blackwell, 1957).

¹⁵ An agent-neutral consideration is expressed in general terms, and can be fully understood independently of who the agent is for whom it is a consideration. An agent-relative consideration is expressed in indexical terms—terms like “me” or “my” or “mine”—and cannot be fully understood independently of who the agent in question is. If you overhear me say that I am moved by a concern for the general happiness, you can know all there is to know about which consideration is in question without knowing who is speaking. If you overhear me say that I am moved by a concern for the welfare of my children, you do not know all there is to know about which consideration is in question without knowing who is speaking, and in particular without knowing which children are to be favored.

¹⁶ On this point, see Pettit, and Smith, , “Freedom in Belief and Desire.”

¹⁷ Darwall, Stephen, “Reciprocal Recognition: The Second-Person Standpoint in Moral Thought and Theory” (manuscript).

¹⁸ It would be entirely hypothetical under the story told in Brandom, Robert B., Making It Explicit (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).

¹⁹ Davidson, Donald, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).

²⁰ On this point, see Pettit, , A Theory of Freedom.

²¹ See Pettit, Philip, “Realism and Response-Dependence,” Mind 100, no. 4 (1991): 587–626; and Pettit, Philip, “Terms, Things, and Response-Dependence,” European Review of Philosophy 3 (1998): 61–72.

²² Strawson, Peter, “Freedom and Resentment,” in Watson, Gary, ed., Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).

²³ Hume, David, “Of the Standard of Taste” and Other Essays, ed. Lenz, John W. (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965); Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. Selby-Bigge, L. A., 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978); and Hume, David, An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. Schneewind, J. B. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1983). See also Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey, “On Why Hume's ‘General Point of View’ Isn't Ideal — and Shouldn't Be,” Social Philosophy and Policy 11, no. 1 (1994): 202–28; Darwall, Stephen, The British Moralists and the Internal “Ought” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and Schneewind, J. B., The Invention of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Writers who emphasize the possibility of reading Hume on cognitivist lines, so that his approach would mirror that taken in this essay, include Mackie, J. L., Hume's Moral Theory (London: Routledge, 1980); Sainsbury, R. M., “Projections and Relations,” The Monist 81, no. 1 (1998): 133–60; and Railton, Peter, “Taste and Value,” in Crisp, Roger and Hooker, Brad, eds., Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

²⁴ For a modern development of the Humean approach, see, for example, Smith, Michael, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). Whereas Smith's approach gives prominence to the notion of an ideal point of view, however, it is arguable that Hume relied instead on the notion of a general point of view. For a fine case in support of this interpretation, see Sayre-McCord, , “On Why Hume's ‘General Point of View’ Isn't Ideal.”

²⁵ On obligations and rights, see Dworkin, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1978). On contractualism, see Scanlon, T. M., What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).

²⁶ See Pettit, Philip, “The Consequentialist Perspective,” in Baron, Marcia, Pettit, Philip, and Slote, Michael, Three Methods of Ethics: A Debate (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997). See also Pettit, Philip and Scanlon, T. M., “Contractualism and Consequentialism,” Theoria (2000): 228–45.

* In writing this essay, I benefited from exchanges with Allan Gibbard, Oswald Hanfling, Brad Hooker, Victoria McGeer, Susan Mendus, Michael Ridge, Michael Smith, and R. Jay Wallace, and from comments from this volume's contributors and editors. I was particularly influenced by conversations with Stephen Darwall and Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, and I owe a very considerable debt to each. The essay was also improved by helpful discussions when it was presented at the annual meeting of the British Society for Ethical Theory in July 2000, and at a university seminar at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln, in September 2000.