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  • Cited by 3
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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Black, Sam and Tiffany, Evan 2013. International Encyclopedia of Ethics.


    Shaver, Robert 2013. International Encyclopedia of Ethics.


    Berkovski, Sandy 2011. Prichard's Heresy. Philosophy, Vol. 86, Issue. 04, p. 503.


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UNDERIVATIVE DUTY: PRICHARD ON MORAL OBLIGATION

  • Thomas Hurka (a1)
  • DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0265052509990173
  • Published online: 01 June 2010
Abstract
Abstract

This paper examines H.A. Prichard's defense of the view that moral duty is underivative, as reflected in his argument that it is a mistake to ask “Why ought I to do what I morally ought?”, because the only possible answer is “Because you morally ought to.” This view was shared by other philosophers of Prichard's period, from Henry Sidgwick through A.C. Ewing, but Prichard stated it most forcefully and defended it best. The paper distinguishes three stages in Prichard's argument: one appealing to his conceptual minimalism, one an epistemological argument that parallels Moore's response to skepticism about the external world, and one arguing that attempts to justify moral duties on non-moral grounds distort the phenomena by giving those duties the wrong explanation or ground. The paper concludes by considering Prichard's critique of ancient ethics and in particular the ethics of Aristotle. The paper is broadly sympathetic to Prichard's position and arguments; its aim is partly to make a case for him as a central figure in the history of ethics.

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This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

H. A. Prichard , Moral Writings, ed. Jim MacAdam (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 720

Patricia S. Greenspan , “Conditional Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives,” Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975): 259–76

Michael Stocker , “Agent and Other: Against Ethical Universalism,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 54 (1976): 208

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Social Philosophy and Policy
  • ISSN: 0265-0525
  • EISSN: 1471-6437
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