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  • Cited by 4
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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Baril, Anne 2013. The Role of Welfare in Eudaimonism. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 51, Issue. 4, p. 511.

    Duncan, Craig 2013. Religion and Secular Utility: Happiness, Truth, and Pragmatic Arguments for Theistic Belief. Philosophy Compass, Vol. 8, Issue. 4, p. 381.

    Toner, Christopher 2013. The Dependence of Welfare Upon Virtue. Topoi, Vol. 32, Issue. 2, p. 161.

    Pihlström, Sami and DePaul, Michael 2010. Toward a Pragmatically Naturalist Metaphysics of the Fact-Value Entanglement. Journal of Philosophical Research, Vol. 35, p. 323.


Aristotelian Well-Being: A Response to L. W. Sumner's Critique

  • DOI:
  • Published online: 21 August 2006

Aristotle's ethical theory is often seen as instructing agents in the prudent pursuit of their own well-being, and therefore labeled egoistic. Yet it is also subject to the opposing charge of failing to direct agents to their well-being, directing them instead to perfection. I am here concerned chiefly with the second criticism, and proceed as follows: I first articulate Sumner's version of the criticism, and second assess his argument for his own (subjective) account of well-being. Third, I present reasons motivating a more objective account of well-being, reasons for taking another look at Aristotle. Finally, granting that Aristotle does indeed direct agents to pursue their perfection, I argue that perfection includes well-being within it. This shows how Aristotle escapes the second criticism, while at the same time pointing the way toward a defense against the first.

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  • ISSN: 0953-8208
  • EISSN: 1741-6183
  • URL: /core/journals/utilitas
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