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A Conflict in Common-Sense Moral Psychology

  • AARON Z. ZIMMERMAN (a1)
Abstract

Ordinary thinking about morality and rationality is inconsistent. To arrive at a view of morality that is as faithful to common thought as consistency will allow we must admit that it is not always irrational to knowingly act against the weight of reasons.

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Linked references
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This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

Jonathan Bennett , A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals (Oxford, 2003)

Michael Zimmerman , The Concept of Moral Obligation (Cambridge, 1996)

Peter Unger , Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence (Oxford, 1996)

Richard Joyce , The Myth of Morality (Cambridge, 2001)

Bernard Williams , Moral Luck (Cambridge, 1981)

Shaun Nichols , Sentimental Rules (Oxford, 2004)

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Utilitas
  • ISSN: 0953-8208
  • EISSN: 1741-6183
  • URL: /core/journals/utilitas
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