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A Conflict in Common-Sense Moral Psychology


Ordinary thinking about morality and rationality is inconsistent. To arrive at a view of morality that is as faithful to common thought as consistency will allow we must admit that it is not always irrational to knowingly act against the weight of reasons.

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Jonathan Bennett , A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals (Oxford, 2003)

Michael Zimmerman , The Concept of Moral Obligation (Cambridge, 1996)

Peter Unger , Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence (Oxford, 1996)

Richard Joyce , The Myth of Morality (Cambridge, 2001)

Bernard Williams , Moral Luck (Cambridge, 1981)

Shaun Nichols , Sentimental Rules (Oxford, 2004)

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  • ISSN: 0953-8208
  • EISSN: 1741-6183
  • URL: /core/journals/utilitas
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