Technology is a complex adaptive system that is both shaped by, and shapes, institutional arrangements. This critical insight, developed in depth by W. Brian Arthur – the father of complexity economics – is relevant to researchers interested in institutions. Arthur provides a method for capturing the underlying dynamics. He offers conceptual tools centred on the concept of increasing returns to make sense of some crucial challenges. He also suggests technical tools, including agent-based modelling, to tackle ill-defined economic, legal, and institutional problems. This article explores his body of work and derives some institutional insights from it.

The economic crisis experienced by many developed countries over the past decade saw the emergence of the phenomenon of so-called recovered firms (RFs), or employee buyouts of failed capitalist firms (CFs). While it is obvious that one of the objectives sought by these workers is to keep their jobs, the subsequent performance of these firms is unclear. Are RFs more likely to fail than other worker managed firms (WMFs) or than CFs? Do RF workers get higher incomes than their peers in other WMFs or in CFs? This analysis is based on a linked employer–employee panel data set from Uruguayan social security administrative records. The main findings are that RFs survive longer than other WMFs or than CFs. However, RF workers receive incomes lower than those of their peers at other WMFs or at CFs. This income differential is explained partly by a brain drain process and specific human capital losses.

This paper reveals a novel and perhaps surprising ingredient in the mix of influences that inspired and informed the work of Elinor and Vincent Ostrom on self-governance: cybernetics, understood as a theory of control via feedback mechanisms. Based on this crucial insight, the paper portrays self-governance as involving an architecture of multiple levels of so-called ‘second order’ feedback mechanisms. Such compounded systems of organization are the key to understanding any self-governance process and the paper argues that their intrinsic logic provides a critical link between the work of the Ostroms and the public choice and constitutional political economy perspectives on institutional order. The paper thereby offers both a fresh perspective on the Ostromian view of self-governance and also of also of governance theory in general.

This empirical study extends the public choice literature on the allocation of death during war by examining the political economy of foreign fighter deaths in the Russo-Ukrainian War since the 24 February 2022 invasion. The study explores the roles played by various demographic factors, military institutions, and international trade relations in determining the number of foreign fighters from a variety of countries who have died in support of either Ukraine or Russia during the Russo-Ukrainian War. Unlike other related studies, this study also investigates the importance of, and finds evidence in support of, both economic freedom and a robust democracy in shaping the choices made by individuals around the globe to venture to, and die fighting on, the battlefields of Ukraine.