This article examines the complex risks, costs and rewards of large-scale private law climate litigation – the climate litigation ‘holy grail’. It argues that while these cases undoubtedly have heroic aspects, their impacts can be complex or difficult to understand. It uses overlapping theories of metaphor and narrative in law, and theories of private law, to make some critical observations about these cases. Distilling some core reflections from the grail legends, the article argues that success in these cases requires a nuanced understanding of victory and defeat, and more careful thinking about the character, aims, and effect of these pieces of litigation. These stories inspire constant reflection as to what the metaphor of the ‘holy grail’ might mean in this context, and the role that these cases play in the development of a narrative about climate litigation.

This contribution takes the form of an uncommon case report. It discusses an action brought to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) before the final decision has been rendered. The author believes this is justified because the innovative character of the procedural and substantive reasoning of the application could be of interest to a wider public. This may be the case even if the CJEU eventually dismisses the action as being inadmissible, leaving the substantive questions undecided. The applicants in Carvalho and Others v. European Union claim that European Union (EU) law does not limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions as strictly as is required by EU human rights and international law. The case note explains the parties in the case, the acts being challenged, the relief being sought, and the content and application of the relevant procedural and substantive law. The case is illustrative of the high barriers for direct access to the CJEU, and suggests how they might be overcome. It is also a laboratory for examining the interface of climate science, economics, and law. At this interface, available emissions budgets and the technical and economic feasibility of emissions reductions are calculated and made legally relevant. Carvalho is based on the applicants’ conviction that, where the EU assumes a regulatory competence such as that of GHG emissions reduction, it must exercise it in accordance with its human rights and international obligations.

Traditional custodians of the Martuwarra (Fitzroy River) derive their identity and existence from this globally significant river. The First Laws of the Martuwarra are shared by Martuwarra Nations through a common songline, which sets out community and individual rights and duties. First Law recognizes the River as the Rainbow Serpent: a living ancestral being from source to sea. On 3 November 2016, the Fitzroy River Declaration was concluded between Martuwarra Nations. This marked the first time in Australia when both First Law and the rights of nature were recognized explicitly in a negotiated instrument. This article argues for legal recognition within colonial state laws of the Martuwarra as a living ancestral being by close analogy with the case concerning the Whanganui River. We seek to advance the scope of native title water rights in Australia and contend that implementation of First Law is fundamental for the protection of the right to life of the Martuwarra.

Several scholars have claimed or implied that the Paris Agreement imposes a collective obligation on states to keep global warming below 2°C, but what is a collective obligation from a legal point of view? The literature that asserts the existence of a collective obligation fails to address this question. In this article I argue two points. Firstly, while a legally binding collective obligation for states is not a theoretical impossibility, the Paris Agreement has not demonstrably created such an obligation; therefore, the collective obligation that appears in the treaty constitutes at most an objective of the Agreement, albeit a crucial one. Secondly, while state observance of the Agreement's apparent collective obligation (but, in fact, paramount objective) is necessary for the success of the treaty, the Agreement does not provide for a process to resolve the global mitigation burden into state-level ambition commitments to ensure that the paramount objective is met. While this is a significant failing of the Agreement, the provisions in the 2018 Paris Rulebook on the global stocktake are sufficiently loose to allow for this mechanism to play a role in the ‘individuation’ of the mitigation burden.

This article examines the concept of granting legal rights to nature as a strategy for more effective environmental protection in the era of the Anthropocene. Following decades of debate over the possibility and consequences of natural objects becoming legal rights holders, a number of countries have recently implemented rights of nature laws in their national legal systems. Comparing two of these examples – a constitutional amendment in Ecuador and recently transposed legislation in New Zealand – will help in understanding the potential for and challenges in the implementation of this concept. On the basis of the findings of this comparison the article further analyzes the possibility of legal reform in a European country, using Germany by way of example. This analysis demonstrates that the realization of rights of nature in Europe is faced with many obstacles as it contests institutional and legal frameworks that are deeply rooted in Western individual rights doctrines and neoliberal economic models. Nevertheless, the holistic approach of expanding the number of rights-bearing subjects beyond an anthropocentric framework can allow for more serious consideration of environmental interests, something that aligns with the German narrative of recognizing nature's intrinsic value in law and the need for effective environmental protection measures.

Whether companies and shareholders should be held liable for land contamination that occurred prior to the passage of the law imposing liability for such contamination is a complex issue. After a theoretical analysis of the legitimacy of retroactivity in land contamination law, our comparative study shows that most countries have adopted, or tacitly approve of, retroactive liability for land contamination. However, the liability schemes implemented in the countries investigated vary as to the types of obligation, the timing of conduct for which liability is imposed, and the standard of liability, among other factors. The retroactive imposition of liability in China's recently enacted Law on the Prevention and Control of Soil Pollution is examined, as well as the roadblocks that still remain, and further improvement based on the theoretical and comparative analysis are considered.